Peru’s request for emergency legislative powers represents a critical juncture in the nation’s ongoing struggle with political instability and organized crime. Prime Minister Ernesto Alvarez’s appeal to Congress for 90 days of legislative authority signals both the severity of Peru’s security situation and the government’s determination to restore order. This analysis examines the underlying causes, potential implications, and relevance to Singapore’s interests in the region.
The Security Crisis: Root Causes and Manifestations
Political Instability as a Catalyst
Peru’s security deterioration cannot be separated from its unprecedented political turbulence. With seven presidents since 2018, the country has experienced a revolving door of leadership that has fundamentally undermined institutional stability. This chronic instability has created several critical vulnerabilities:
Weakened Institutional Authority: Frequent changes in leadership have prevented the development of coherent, long-term security strategies. Each new administration inherits incomplete initiatives, leading to policy fragmentation and enforcement gaps that criminal organizations have exploited.
Erosion of Public Trust: The rapid succession of governments has damaged citizen confidence in state institutions. When people lose faith in legitimate authority, they may turn to alternative power structures, including criminal networks that offer protection and economic opportunities in areas where the state has retreated.
Corruption and Governance Deficits: Political instability often correlates with weakened oversight mechanisms. The ousting of former President Dina Boluarte and the subsequent emergency inauguration of President Jose Jeri earlier this month suggests ongoing governance challenges that extend beyond individual leadership failures.
The Prison-Crime Nexus
Prime Minister Alvarez’s specific mention of extortion calls originating from inside prisons reveals a sophisticated criminal infrastructure that has penetrated state institutions. This phenomenon indicates:
Criminal Governance from Behind Bars: Gang leaders operating from within prisons demonstrates that incarceration has failed as a deterrent or containment strategy. Instead, prisons have become command centers where criminal enterprises coordinate with external operatives, suggesting that Peru’s correctional system has been comprehensively compromised.
Systematic Corruption: For prisoners to maintain communication networks capable of coordinating extortion operations, there must be widespread corruption among prison staff and security personnel. This points to deep-rooted institutional rot that cannot be addressed through superficial reforms.
Territorial Control: The ability of criminal organizations to operate with such impunity suggests they have established territorial control in certain areas, creating parallel power structures that challenge state authority.
The Legislative Power Request: Constitutional Implications
Understanding Emergency Powers
The request for 90 days of legislative authority represents a significant concentration of executive power. In democratic systems, such measures typically allow governments to bypass normal legislative processes to respond rapidly to crises. However, this approach carries inherent risks:
Efficiency vs. Oversight: While emergency powers enable swift action, they also reduce checks and balances. The abbreviated parliamentary debate and scrutiny that accompanies normal legislation is curtailed, potentially leading to poorly drafted laws or measures that exceed necessary bounds.
Precedent Setting: In countries with histories of political instability, emergency powers can establish dangerous precedents. Future governments may invoke similar measures for less legitimate purposes, gradually normalizing authoritarian governance.
Implementation Challenges: Even with legislative powers, the Jeri government faces the practical challenge of implementation. Laws are only effective if institutions can enforce them, and Peru’s compromised security apparatus may struggle to operationalize new regulations effectively.
The Vote of Confidence
The government’s decisive vote of confidence (79 in favor, 5 against) suggests broad parliamentary support, yet this overwhelming margin warrants scrutiny. It may indicate:
- Genuine consensus about the severity of the security crisis
- Political calculation by opposition parties unwilling to be seen as obstructing anti-crime measures
- Exhaustion with political instability, leading to acceptance of strong-handed approaches
- Limited public awareness of potential risks associated with concentrated executive power
Economic Dimensions and Development Implications
The Mining Sector Connection
Prime Minister Alvarez’s projection of 3.2% economic growth by 2026, predicated on increased mining sector investment, reveals the interconnection between security and economic development. Peru is one of the world’s leading producers of copper, silver, and gold, but the mining sector faces multiple security-related challenges:
Community Conflicts: Mining operations frequently encounter resistance from indigenous and rural communities concerned about environmental impacts and equitable benefit-sharing. Insecurity can inflame these tensions, leading to blockades, protests, and violence that disrupts production.
Criminal Extortion: Mining companies and their workers are lucrative targets for criminal organizations. Extortion, theft of equipment and materials, and illegal mining operations undermine legitimate industry activity.
Infrastructure Vulnerability: Mining depends on transportation infrastructure to move products to ports for export. Criminal control of certain territories threatens these supply chains, potentially disrupting the export projections of $83 billion for 2025.
Foreign Investment Considerations
International investors, including Singaporean entities with interests in Peru’s natural resources and infrastructure, carefully monitor political and security conditions. The current crisis presents several investment risks:
Operational Disruption: Security incidents can halt operations, delaying projects and reducing returns on investment.
Insurance and Risk Premiums: Deteriorating security conditions typically lead to higher insurance costs and risk premiums, reducing project profitability.
Reputational Concerns: Companies operating in high-risk environments face scrutiny regarding their security arrangements, community relations, and potential complicity in human rights issues.
Singapore’s Interests and Potential Impacts
Trade and Investment Linkages
Singapore maintains significant economic relationships with Peru through multiple channels that could be affected by the security crisis:
Bilateral Trade: Peru is Singapore’s largest trading partner in South America, with substantial trade in minerals, agricultural products, and manufactured goods. Security disruptions could affect supply chain reliability, particularly for minerals used in Singapore’s electronics and advanced manufacturing sectors.
Singaporean Investments: Several Singapore-based companies and sovereign wealth fund entities have investments in Peru’s mining, infrastructure, and financial services sectors. Temasek Holdings and GIC have historically shown interest in Latin American assets, and deteriorating security conditions could impact existing investments or future opportunities.
Port and Logistics: Singapore’s position as a global logistics hub means that disruptions to Peruvian exports could affect shipping schedules, container availability, and freight rates on trans-Pacific routes.
The Peru-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
The Peru-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA), in effect since 2009, has facilitated increased bilateral commerce. However, security instability threatens the agreement’s full potential:
Implementation Challenges: Even with favorable tariff arrangements, businesses may hesitate to deepen commercial relationships if security conditions make operations unpredictable or hazardous.
Services Sector: The FTA includes provisions for services trade, including financial services, telecommunications, and professional services. Singaporean companies operating in these sectors in Peru could face operational challenges if security deteriorates further.
Regional Stability Considerations
Singapore’s foreign policy emphasizes regional stability and respect for international law. Peru’s crisis has broader implications for South American stability:
Migration Pressures: Severe instability in Peru could contribute to regional migration flows, affecting neighboring countries and potentially reaching countries with significant Peruvian diaspora populations, including those in Asia-Pacific.
Democratic Governance: As a strong advocate for rule of law and good governance, Singapore monitors democratic backsliding in partner countries. The concentration of executive power, even if intended to address legitimate security concerns, could set troubling precedents.
Multilateral Cooperation: Peru is a member of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), along with Singapore. Instability in Peru could affect APEC initiatives and reduce the forum’s effectiveness in promoting regional economic integration.
Comparative Analysis: Lessons from Other Contexts
El Salvador’s Security Approach
Peru’s situation invites comparison with El Salvador’s recent experience with gang violence. President Nayib Bukele implemented a controversial “state of exception” beginning in 2022, involving mass arrests and significant curtailment of civil liberties. The results have been mixed:
Crime Reduction: El Salvador has seen dramatic reductions in homicide rates and visible gang activity.
Human Rights Concerns: International organizations have documented arbitrary detentions, due process violations, and prison conditions that may constitute cruel treatment.
Sustainability Questions: While crime statistics have improved, questions remain about whether security gains are sustainable or have merely displaced criminal activity.
Singapore’s Security Model
Singapore offers a contrasting model of security maintenance through different mechanisms:
Institutional Strength: Singapore’s security is predicated on strong, trusted institutions with minimal corruption. This contrasts sharply with Peru’s compromised state apparatus.
Economic Inclusion: By providing economic opportunities and social mobility, Singapore reduces incentives for criminal activity. Peru’s high inequality and limited opportunity structure creates fertile ground for criminal recruitment.
Preventive Approach: Singapore emphasizes prevention through community policing, social programs, and early intervention, rather than relying primarily on punitive measures after crimes occur.
Rule of Law: Singapore maintains security within a robust legal framework that, while strict, operates predictably and transparently. Peru’s challenge is to restore rule of law after its erosion through political instability.
Future Scenarios and Risks
Optimistic Scenario
If the Jeri government successfully utilizes emergency powers to implement effective reforms, Peru could enter a period of stabilization:
- Enhanced prison security prevents criminal coordination
- Asset freezes disrupt criminal financing
- Restored state authority encourages economic investment
- Political stability returns, allowing for sustained policy implementation
- Economic growth targets are met, providing resources for further security improvements
Pessimistic Scenario
Alternatively, the emergency powers could prove insufficient or counterproductive:
- Heavy-handed enforcement alienates communities, driving support toward criminal organizations
- Corruption undermines new security measures
- Political instability continues, with the government falling before reforms take effect
- Economic targets are missed due to investor concerns and operational disruptions
- Criminal organizations adapt to new enforcement measures, maintaining their operations through different methods
Most Likely Scenario
A mixed outcome seems most probable, with partial successes and continuing challenges:
- Some security improvements in Lima and major urban areas
- Persistent problems in rural regions and border areas where state presence remains weak
- Gradual economic recovery, but below target levels
- Continued political uncertainty as elections approach in April 2026
- Incremental institutional strengthening, but insufficient to fully address systemic corruption
Recommendations for Singaporean Stakeholders
For Government and Policymakers
Monitor Closely: Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and trade agencies should maintain close monitoring of Peru’s security situation through diplomatic channels and economic intelligence gathering.
Diplomatic Engagement: Singapore could offer technical assistance in areas of comparative advantage, such as port security, anti-corruption measures, and institutional capacity building, framing such offers as supporting a fellow APEC member.
Contingency Planning: Relevant ministries should develop contingency plans for protecting Singaporean nationals and economic interests should conditions deteriorate significantly.
For Businesses and Investors
Risk Assessment: Companies with existing or planned operations in Peru should conduct thorough security risk assessments and implement appropriate mitigation measures.
Diversification: Investors should consider geographic and sectoral diversification to reduce exposure to Peru-specific risks.
Local Partnerships: Strong relationships with reputable local partners can provide better ground-level intelligence and risk management capabilities.
Insurance Review: Ensure political risk insurance and kidnap-and-ransom coverage are adequate for current conditions.
For Singaporean Citizens
Travel Advisories: Singaporeans planning travel to Peru should consult Ministry of Foreign Affairs travel advisories and exercise heightened caution, particularly regarding the state of emergency in Lima and Callao.
Emergency Preparedness: Those residing in or visiting Peru should register with the Singapore Embassy and maintain emergency communication plans.
Conclusion
Peru’s request for emergency legislative powers reflects a government confronting a multifaceted crisis of security, governance, and institutional legitimacy. The 90-day legislative authority represents both an opportunity for decisive action and a risk of concentrated power being used ineffectively or inappropriately.
For Singapore, Peru’s challenges carry direct implications through trade relationships, investment exposure, and broader concerns about regional stability and democratic governance. While geographically distant, the two countries are economically interconnected through bilateral trade agreements, investment flows, and shared participation in multilateral forums.
The coming months will reveal whether Peru can break its cycle of political instability and restore effective governance. The government’s emphasis on security as “a matter of state” recognizes the existential nature of the challenge, but implementation will determine whether emergency powers lead to genuine reform or merely represent another chapter in Peru’s ongoing political turbulence.
For Singaporean stakeholders, the situation demands vigilance, prudent risk management, and recognition that Peru’s stability—or instability—has tangible implications for Singapore’s economic interests and strategic relationships in the Americas. The outcome of this crisis will serve as a test case for whether democratic institutions can effectively respond to organized crime without sacrificing the rule of law principles that ultimately underpin both security and prosperity.
The Perpetual State of Exception: Analyzing the Recurrent Militarization of Public Security and the Effectiveness of Emergency Declarations in Metropolitan Lima, Peru (2025)
Abstract
This paper analyzes the recurring invocation of the State of Emergency (SoE) in Peru, specifically focusing on the declaration made by President Jose Jeri in October 2025 for Lima and Callao provinces in response to rising crime. Drawing on critical security studies and Latin American political dynamics, the study investigates why successive Peruvian governments, despite evidence of failure and expert critique, persistently rely on militarized responses to address fundamentally socio-economic and institutional deficiencies in public security. The findings indicate that while these declarations serve a critical political function—legitimizing new administrations and temporarily placating public fear—they consistently fail to reduce long-term crime rates, instead contributing to the normalization of the ‘state of exception,’ the blurring of police and military roles, and the potential erosion of democratic oversight. The analysis underscores that the 2025 declaration perpetuates a cycle where security crises are met with performative, short-term military deployments rather than comprehensive policy reform.
- Introduction
The security landscape in many Latin American democracies is characterized by a fragile balance between maintaining public order and preserving constitutional rights. Peru, in particular, faces a twin crisis: chronic political instability marked by rapid presidential transitions, and a severe surge in urban crime, particularly within the capital, Lima, and its key port neighbor, Callao.
In October 2025, newly inaugurated President Jose Jeri, who ascended following the ousting of Dina Boluarte, declared a 30-day State of Emergency (SoE) across Lima and Callao. The stated objective was to transition “from defense to offense in the fight against crime,” authorizing the highly significant deployment of the Armed Forces (FF.AA.) to support the National Police in maintaining public order (Reuters, 2025). This declaration was made amidst significant public pressure, including violent protests demanding effective anti-crime measures.
This incident is not an isolated event; rather, it represents the continuation of a predictable pattern. Former President Boluarte implemented an identical 30-day measure in March of the same year. Security experts and analysts have consistently argued that these repeated security declarations have had negligible impact on long-term crime reduction (Reuters, 2025).
This paper addresses three central questions: What is the political functionality of the recurring SoE declarations in unstable regimes like Peru? How does the militarization of public security, particularly in the 2025 context, operate? And why do these measures repeatedly fail to produce sustainable security outcomes?
The central thesis of this work is that in politically vulnerable states, the State of Emergency functions primarily as a tool for political legitimation and crisis management, rather than effective crime reduction. This emphasis on immediate militarization avoids the difficult, long-term structural reforms necessary for judicial, penal, and police institutions, thereby ensuring the perpetual return to the ‘state of exception.’
- Theoretical Framework: The State of Exception and Securitization
2.1 The Concept of the State of Exception
The theoretical foundation of this analysis rests on the concept of the ‘state of exception’ (or state of emergency). Building on Schmitt (2005) and Agamben (2005), the state of exception describes a juridical-political space where normal constitutional rules are suspended, allowing the sovereign power (in this case, the executive) to dictate necessary measures outside the bounds of law, ostensibly to protect the order itself.
In modern democracies facing internal threats (like crime rather than war), the SoE has become a normalized governmental technique. In the Peruvian context, the emergency declaration—suspending rights such as freedom of assembly or inviolability of the home—is presented as a temporary, necessary evil. However, when these declarations become routine, the ‘exception’ risks becoming the ‘rule,’ fundamentally altering the relationship between the state and its citizens and normalizing the suspension of civil liberties.
2.2 Militarization of Public Security
The deployment of the armed forces (trained for external conflict) into internal policing roles is known as the militarization of public security. While proponents argue that the military provides superior manpower, resources, and discipline, critical literature highlights major drawbacks (Sabet, 2012):
Doctrine Mismatch: Military training emphasizes neutralizing threats, not upholding due process or community policing. This often leads to human rights abuses and excessive force.
Accountability Gap: Military operations often lack the robust civilian oversight required for police activities, undermining institutional integrity.
Institutional Erosion: Relying on the military impedes the necessary professionalization and institutional strengthening of the civilian police force (Pérez, 2018).
In Peru, the 2025 declaration explicitly authorizes the FF.AA. “alongside the police to maintain public order,” confirming this doctrinal blurring central to the militarization process.
- The Contextual Crisis: Political Volatility and Crime in Metropolitan Lima
3.1 Political Instability and the Legitimacy Deficit
Peru has experienced profound and persistent political instability, characterized by high turnover in the presidential and ministerial offices. President Jeri’s ascension in October 2025 followed the impeachment or resignation of his predecessor, Dina Boluarte, underscoring a deep crisis of institutional legitimacy. New administrations are often under immense pressure to immediately demonstrate decisive action to secure public backing.
The declaration of an SoE serves this political function. By taking a proactive, aggressive stance (“moving from defense to offense,” Jeri, 2025), the new administration signals strength and competence, particularly to civil society groups and young people (Generation Z) who were protesting the lack of measures against rising crime. The militarized response thus acts as a symbolic assertion of governmental control, crucial for a regime attempting to consolidate power.
3.2 The Crime Surge in Lima and Callao
Lima and its neighboring port, Callao, serve as Peru’s economic and political nerve centers, but they also function as key hubs for organized crime, drug trafficking, and transnational gangs. The rising incidence of violent crime, linked to extortion, illegal mining, and territorial disputes, generates deep public fear.
The failure of previous non-military police strategies, coupled with perceived corruption within the National Police, creates a demand for radical, immediate measures. This public dissatisfaction provides the political “cover” for the executive branch to bypass normal legislative processes and invoke the SoE, framing the crime epidemic as an existential threat requiring military intervention.
- Analysis of the 2025 Emergency Declaration
4.1 Rhetoric and Operationalization
President Jeri’s televised address framed the 30-day measure as a decisive shift in strategy, aiming to “regain peace, tranquility, and the trust of millions of Peruvians” (Reuters, 2025). This rhetoric seeks to mobilize nationalist sentiment and justify extraordinary measures by positioning the crime fight as a moral crusade.
Operationally, the deployment of the armed forces alongside the police introduces significant complexity. While the military provides logistics and manpower, their presence often heightens tension and increases the potential for confrontation.
Critical to the effectiveness of the SoE is the temporary suspension of constitutional rights. In previous Peruvian SoEs, these suspensions have included the right to assembly, which is particularly salient given the context of recent protests that left one person dead and over 100 injured (Reuters, 2025). Thus, the SoE achieves a dual purpose: combating crime and, crucially, managing political dissent under the guise of security maintenance.
4.2 The Precedent of Failure
The current declaration is heavily undermined by its immediate precedent. Former President Boluarte imposed an identical 30-day measure in March 2025 (Reuters, 2025). The fact that the Jeri administration was compelled to repeat the action just months later strongly suggests the failure of the previous attempt.
The core policy critique articulated by “analysts and security experts” (Reuters, 2025) is that these repeated emergency declarations do little to reduce crime. This critique confirms that the measure is politically appealing but practically deficient.
- The Policy Deficit: Why States of Emergency Do Not Deliver Sustainable Security
The consistent failure of successive SoE declarations in Peru can be traced to fundamental policy deficits rooted in the structural causes of crime.
5.1 Symptom Treatment vs. Structural Reform
SoEs are temporary measures designed to suppress visible symptoms of crime (e.g., street violence, high-profile arrests) through saturation patrols and checkpoints. They are inherently incapable of addressing the underlying drivers of organized crime, which include weak judicial institutions, high impunity rates, social inequality, and lack of opportunities for employment, particularly among the youth.
The 30-day limit imposes a temporal constraint that guarantees the measure is unsustainable. Once the military withdraws, the structural conditions that allowed crime to flourish—including corruption within the security apparatus itself—remain unchanged, leading to a quick rebound in criminal activity.
5.2 Institutional Deterioration of the Police
A reliance on military deployment functions as a political excuse for postponing essential police reform. Instead of investing in better police training, higher salaries, localized community intelligence, and technological upgrades for the National Police, the government outsources the core function of public safety to the military. This dynamic exacerbates the long-term weakness of the civilian police institution, trapping Peru in a perpetual cycle of needing emergency military assistance.
5.3 Normalization of Exception and Human Rights Risks
The repetition of the SoE (“perpetual exception”) normalizes the suspension of rights, making extraordinary governance ordinary. This desensitization lowers the public expectation of democratic accountability and increases the risk of human rights abuses inherent to military-led security operations. The focus shifts from guaranteeing citizen safety under the rule of law to simply asserting state dominance by force.
- Conclusion and Future Directions
President Jose Jeri’s October 2025 declaration of a State of Emergency in Lima and Callao exemplifies a deeply entrenched, yet demonstrably ineffective, policy response in Peruvian security politics. Driven by the dual pressures of political instability and rising crime rates, the executive branch utilizes the militarization of public security as a crisis management strategy to secure political legitimacy.
However, as security analysts have repeatedly warned, these repeated emergency declarations fail to provide anything more than a fleeting show of force. They neither dismantle the organizational structures of crime nor facilitate the long-term institutional strengthening required by the National Police and the judiciary.
Future research into Peruvian security policy must shift focus from analyzing the justification of the SoE to empirically measuring its specific effects on human rights, police budgets, and long-term impunity rates. Policy recommendations should strongly advocate for a pivot away from militarization toward sustainable models of community policing, judicial modernization, and targeted social investment aimed at addressing the socioeconomic roots of organized crime in Lima and Callao. Until such a structural pivot occurs, Peru is destined to remain in a perpetual state of exception, where the promise of peace is repeatedly deferred by the expedient deployment of state force.
References
Agamben, G. (2005). State of Exception. University of Chicago Press.
Pérez, O. (2018). The Militarization of Public Security in Latin America: Policy Implications and Democratic Risks. Journal of Latin American Studies, 50(1).
Reuters. (2025, October 22). Peru declares 30-day state of emergency in Lima to tackle rising crime. [Source Article Data used for analysis].
Sabet, D. M. (2012). The End of the War Metaphor: The Changing Role of the Military in Public Security. Security Studies, 21(4).
Schmitt, C. (2005). Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. University of Chicago Press.
The Vicious Cycle of Instability: Governance Crisis, Youth Mobilization, and State Violence in Post-Boluarte Peru
Abstract
This paper analyzes the immediate political turbulence following the installation of President Jose Jeri in Peru, precipitated by widespread protests in October 2025. Based on a critical case study of the documented clashes in Lima, which resulted in one civilian death and numerous injuries, the paper argues that this conflict is symptomatic of Peru’s endemic governance crisis, characterized by deep-seated corruption, rising crime, and a failure of political institutions to deliver basic security and stability. Specifically, we examine the drivers of mobilization (Gen Z, civil groups), the dynamics of the state response (police violence and tear gas), and the executive’s framing strategy—simultaneously promising investigation and seeking expanded securitization authority. The analysis concludes that Jeri’s early tenure reflects a dangerous continuity of democratic fragility where political turnover fails to resolve structural grievances, escalating the risk of violence and potentially leading to a securitization trap that undermines civil liberties.
- Introduction: Peru’s Perpetual Crisis of Legitimacy
Peru has experienced one of the most volatile periods of executive turnover in modern Latin American history. The rapid succession of presidents, often removed via congressional impeachment or mass social pressure, underscores a profound democratic deficit and a crisis of state legitimacy. The events of October 2025, culminating in the ouster of President Dina Boluarte and the swift ascension of Jose Jeri, set the stage for immediate and violent social confrontation.
Just days into his administration, President Jeri faced nationwide protests driven by a diverse coalition of actors, including young “Gen Z” protesters, transport workers, and civil groups. The core grievances driving this mobilization—rising crime, economic insecurity, and pervasive corruption—are structural failures that permeate the political system, regardless of who occupies the presidential palace.
This paper addresses the following research question: How does the initial confrontation between the new Peruvian government (President Jeri) and protesting civil society reflect the persistent structural weaknesses of Peruvian democracy, particularly regarding state authority and the management of dissent?
Our central thesis is that the deadly clashes in Lima on October 16, 2025, represent a critical juncture where long-term structural grievances converge with the immediate collapse of political trust. The new administration’s attempt to manage the crisis—by contrasting a promise of objective investigation with a simultaneous pursuit of expanded executive power for public safety—highlights a strategic pivot toward securitization rather than genuine political reform.
- Theoretical Framework: Democratic Fragility and the Securitization Trap
2.1 Hyper-Presidentialism and Political Instability
Peru’s political system is often described through the lens of hyper-presidentialism coupled with a historically weak party structure (Levitsky & Way, 2010). This structure facilitates the rapid removal of leaders, creating institutional incoherence. The frequent turnover (e.g., Boluarte’s ouster) satisfies immediate public anger but fails to dismantle the entrenched corruption networks that fuel instability. Consequently, each new administration inherits the same crisis of legitimacy, forcing leaders to govern under perennial threat of popular uprising. The chant, “Everyone must go!”, observed during the Lima protests, illustrates this deep distrust in the entire political class, not just the individual executive.
2.2 Grievance Mobilization and the Role of Youth
The protests are driven by both conventional and emerging actors. The involvement of transport workers signals traditional economic grievances related to cost of living and labor conditions. Crucially, the participation of Gen Z protesters highlights the role of youth mobilization responding to profound systemic frustration (Tarrow, 1998). For younger generations, corruption and economic precarity translate into a lack of socio-economic opportunity, fueling a rejection of established political norms and accelerating the use of direct action.
2.3 State Violence and the Securitization Trap
When regimes face pervasive challenges to their political legitimacy, they often resort to strategies of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998). Instead of addressing accountability and reform, the government frames dissent as a national security threat perpetrated by “delinquents who infiltrated a peaceful demonstration to sow chaos,” as President Jeri claimed. This framing justifies the expansion of policing powers and security measures. The ensuing state violence—typified by the use of tear gas, clashes, and the fatal shooting of Eduardo Mauricio Ruiz (32)—risks trapping the regime in a cycle where repression further delegitimizes the state, stimulating renewed radicalization and protest.
- Case Analysis: The October 16th Confrontation
3.1 Catalysts and Demands
The protests in Lima and across Peru were explicitly linked to the unresolved issues that led to Boluarte’s departure: corruption and public safety (rising crime). The demonstration outside Congress served as a symbolic attack on the heart of the deeply mistrusted political establishment. The use of traditional protest tactics (rocks, burning objects) met with institutional defense mechanisms (metal barriers, tear gas), indicating a breakdown in mediated dialogue.
3.2 The Deadly Outcome and Accountability Mechanisms
The death of Eduardo Mauricio Ruiz, shot during the clash, immediately shifted the political dynamic from one of social unrest to one of state accountability. The process that followed is critical:
Ombudsman/Prosecutor Intervention: The state ombudsman’s office and the prosecutor’s office swiftly confirmed the death and launched an investigation. This institutional response is a key measure used in fragile democracies to demonstrate adherence to rule of law after incidents of state violence.
PNP Identification and Mitigation: The head of the National Police, Oscar Arriola, publicly identified the alleged shooter, Luis Magallanes, removing him from duties and confirming he was hospitalized after being physically assaulted. This rapid identification aims to isolate the incident as the action of an individual officer rather than systemic state repression, thereby managing the narrative and potentially mitigating further immediate protest escalation.
3.3 The Executive’s Dual Strategy: Contrition and Command
President Jeri’s reaction demonstrated a strategic attempt to balance public outrage with the need to assert executive authority:
Contrition and Investigation: Jeri expressed regret and promised an “objective” investigation into Ruiz’s death, fulfilling the requirement for political decorum and immediate crisis management.
Securitization Push: Simultaneously, Jeri requested “authority to legislate on public safety issues” from Congress, specifically mentioning prison reform. This move strategically exploits the public focus on “rising crime” to expand executive power. By framing public disorder as a matter of criminal delinquency rather than political dissent, Jeri attempts to delegitimize the protest movement and acquire tools potentially usable for future repression.
- Discussion: The Implications for Peruvian Governance
The October 2025 crisis demonstrates the extreme difficulty faced by any new Peruvian administration in establishing political legitimacy. The new regime is immediately confronted not by political rivals, but by a highly mobilized and hostile civil society.
4.1 Delegitimization of the Security Apparatus
Despite the PNP’s rapid removal of the officer accused of the shooting, the fact that a fatal incident occurred during a protest against the new government severely damages the administration’s ability to use the police force as a neutral instrument of order. The perception of the police as an arm of a corrupt state, reinforced by the use of lethal force against demonstrators, ensures that future reliance on security forces will be met with increased resistance and public condemnation.
4.2 The Danger of the Securitization Agenda
Jeri’s pivot toward requesting special legislative powers on public safety is a high-risk strategy. While prison reform and crime reduction are legitimate concerns, seeking extraordinary powers in the immediate aftermath of political violence suggests an emphasis on coercive control over systemic political reform. If these powers are used broadly to suppress dissent or restrict civil liberties, Jeri risks deepening the very democratic deficit that brought down his predecessor. This approach prioritizes short-term stability through force over long-term stability through institutional trust.
4.3 Policy Fragmentation and Endemic Failure
The crisis confirms that the political instability in Peru does not stem from a lack of legal mechanisms for transition, but from the inability of successive governments to tackle the root issues of corruption and economic inequality. As long as these drivers remain unaddressed, governance will be fragmented, characterized by a perpetual cycle: political crisis $\rightarrow$ regime change $\rightarrow$ immediate mass protest $\rightarrow$ state violence.
- Conclusion
The violence unleashed during the protests against President Jose Jeri in October 2025 serves as a chilling illustration of Peru’s ongoing political crisis. The new administration commenced amid immediate and deadly conflict, highlighting that the removal of one president and the installation of another is insufficient to quell deeply rooted structural grievances.
The swift death of Eduardo Mauricio Ruiz underscores the extreme risks associated with social mobilization in a context of high state fragility. While Jeri’s administration utilized official channels (Ombudsman, police investigation) to manage the immediate fallout, his simultaneous pursuit of expanded security powers suggests a preference for a securitization strategy.
For Peruvian democracy to move beyond this vicious cycle of instability, future governance must shift focus from managerial crisis control to comprehensive institutional reform. Failure to address pervasive corruption and economic insecurity will ensure that every subsequent administration begins its term facing the same urgent and potentially fatal challenges to its legitimacy.
References (Hypothetical)
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. de. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge University Press.
The Straits Times. (2025, October 17). One dead, dozens injured as Peru’s new president faces widespread protests. [Source Article Text/Data]