The Calculus of Coercion: Analyzing the Legal and Geopolitical Implications of the US Follow-Up Strike on a Venezuelan-Flagged Vessel (December 2025)
Abstract
The December 2025 incident, wherein a US admiral ordered a follow-up strike on an alleged drug-trafficking vessel originating from Venezuela, as confirmed by the White House, presents a critical case study in the intersection of international maritime law, delegated military authority (Rules of Engagement, ROE), and the volatile geopolitics of the US-Venezuela relationship. This paper analyzes the legal scope under which such an operation is justified, particularly focusing on the application of lethal force in counter-narcotics (CN) operations against non-state actors operating near sovereign interests. While the White House asserted the admiral “worked well within his authority,” this claim necessitates examination against established frameworks, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of necessity and proportionality. The paper argues that this specific use of force, characterized as a “follow-up strike,” risks normalizing an expansive interpretation of CN operational authority, potentially escalating maritime tensions in a contested theater.
- Introduction and Context
The militarization of US counter-narcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere has intensified over the past decade, transforming traditional policing functions into matters of high naval strategy. The waters surrounding the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific are critical transit points for illegal narcotics, and US operational forces—primarily Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)—maintain an aggressive interdiction posture.
On December 2, 2025, the global security environment was focused on an operation confirmed by White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, involving a US admiral who authorized a subsequent, likely lethal, strike against an alleged drug vessel linked to Venezuela. Leavitt’s swift justification—that the admiral acted “well within his authority”—highlights the DoD’s internal confidence in the legality of the action, but simultaneously raises profound questions regarding the limits of delegated authority in non-declared hostilities.
This paper seeks to address four primary areas of inquiry prompted by this event:
The interpretation of international maritime law (specifically UNCLOS) concerning the interdiction of suspected drug vessels.
The operational significance of a “follow-up strike” in the context of Rules of Engagement (ROE) and proportionality.
The specific geopolitical risks inherent in using force against a vessel associated with a state (Venezuela) that the US does not recognize diplomatically and views as a major security threat.
The precedent set by the Executive Branch’s robust defense of unilateral military action in contested maritime domains.
- Legal and Operational Frameworks for Maritime Interdiction
The legality of forceful interdiction hinges heavily on the status and location of the vessel, as defined primarily by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though the US is not a signatory, it adheres to its customary international law principles.
2.1 The Principle of Jurisdiction and Statelessness
Under international law, coastal states possess exclusive jurisdiction over vessels in their territorial seas (up to 12 nautical miles). In the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the High Seas, the principle of Flag State exclusive jurisdiction generally applies. Exceptions allowing non-Flag States to intervene include:
Stateless Vessels: If the vessel fails to assert or prove its nationality, it is considered stateless, stripping it of international protection and rendering it susceptible to interdiction by any state.
Universal Jurisdiction Crimes: Certain crimes, notably piracy, allow for universal jurisdiction. While drug trafficking is not traditionally classified as piracy, the US often applies expansive interpretations, particularly under domestic laws like the Maritime Drug Trafficking Act (MDTA), when vessels are intercepted in areas covered by specific bilateral agreements or in the absence of Flag State objections.
Crucially, the White House referred to an “alleged drug boat from Venezuela.” This phrasing is ambiguous. If the vessel was indeed Venezuelan-flagged and operating outside Venezuelan territorial waters, the US required either consent from the Venezuelan government (highly unlikely given bilateral relations) or clear evidence of statelessness or an equivalent threat that justifies universally recognized self-defense.
2.2 Analysis of the “Follow-Up Strike” and Proportionality
The concept of a “follow-up strike” implies that an initial engagement—likely a warning shot, disabling fire, or an aborted boarding attempt—had occurred. Within the military’s Rules of Engagement, force must adhere to the principle of proportionality, meaning the force used must be commensurate with the threat faced and necessary to achieve the military objective (i.e., stopping the illegal activity).
A follow-up strike, especially if it resulted in the sinking of the vessel or loss of life, requires high justification:
Imminent Threat: Did the vessel continue to pose an immediate threat (e.g., attempting to ram the intercepting warship, using weapons, or actively destroying evidence in a manner that resisted lawful capture)?
Failure of Less-Lethal Options: Standard ROE demands that force should escalate only when non-lethal and less-lethal options (e.g., water cannons, warning fire) have been exhausted or proven ineffective.
Objective: The objective in CN operations is seizure and arrest, not destruction. Authorization for the deliberate destruction of a suspected vessel is an extreme measure, typically reserved for scenarios where the vessel is a clear hostile combatant or presents an overwhelming risk to US personnel.
The White House’s assertion that the admiral “worked well within his authority” strongly suggests that the ROE authorized commanders to use lethal force in response to specific, pre-defined non-compliance protocols, treating the vessel not merely as a civilian trafficker but as a non-compliant threat in a high-risk operational environment.
- Geopolitical Tensions: The US-Venezuela Dynamic
The operational context of the strike is inextricably linked to the hostile geopolitical relationship between the US and the Maduro regime in Venezuela. The US views the Venezuelan government as a state sponsor of terrorism and a major hub for transnational organized crime.
3.1 Elevating Counter-Narcotics to National Security
In the context of the Caribbean, CN operations are not merely law enforcement endeavors; they are core components of US national security strategy aimed at disrupting malignant state actors and their proxies. By linking the vessel to Venezuela, the military action, though allegedly against criminal elements, carries significant sovereign implications.
This specific incident risks being interpreted by Caracas as an act of calculated aggression—a tacit confirmation of US willingness to apply militarized pressure directly against entities associated with the Venezuelan state, regardless of whether the force was applied within Venezuelan territorial waters. Such actions provide the Maduro regime with diplomatic leverage to denounce US imperialism and maritime aggression globally, potentially destabilizing regional security cooperation.
3.2 Implied Delegation of Authority
For an admiral to order a “follow-up strike,” the delegated authority must have been robust. This suggests that the administration has provided theater commanders with broad latitude to engage non-compliant, alleged narco-vessels based on the premise that these vessels are functionally extensions of hostile state or quasi-state elements (narco-terrorist networks), thereby warranting a military rather than purely law enforcement response. This expansive delegation reflects the administration’s maximal pressure campaign against Caracas.
- Conclusion and Future Implications
The December 2025 incident involving the US strike on an alleged Venezuelan drug boat serves as a critical inflection point in the maritime dimension of the War on Drugs. While the White House’s confirmation that the admiral “worked well within his authority” addresses the domestic chain of command, it provides insufficient transparency regarding the proportionality assessment and the adherence to international legal norms.
The core tension lies between the US military’s imperative to disrupt transnational crime vigorously and the fundamental international law commitment to freedom of navigation and respect for jurisdictional sovereignty. By authorizing and defending a “follow-up strike,” the US administration implicitly validated an ROE that permits an escalated use of force against maritime targets based primarily on suspicion of criminal activity and non-compliance, rather than solely verified hostile intent (like self-defense).
Should this precedent be consistently applied, it risks:
Erosion of UNCLOS Norms: Challenging the delicate balance between high seas freedom and the right of interdiction, particularly if the vessel’s statelessness or explicit consent for interdiction cannot be proven easily.
Regional Instability: Providing Caracas with a clear casus belli for political and military resistance, potentially leading to counter-escalation in contested maritime zones.
Broadening of ROE: Further entrenching the policy of delegating inherently kinetic decision-making power to theater commanders in complex, non-wartime scenarios, thereby raising the operational temperature in sensitive areas.
Future research must focus on the specific Rules of Engagement utilized in the Western Hemisphere drug interdiction theater and the diplomatic fallout that stemmed from this high-profile act of force against a vessel associated with a hostile state actor.
References
Note: As this paper analyzes a hypothetical future event based on a news snippet, references are illustrative of key legal documents and strategic doctrines.
Chayes, A. H., & Handler Chayes, A. (2000). The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Harvard University Press.
DoD (U.S. Department of Defense). (2024). Manual for Commanders: Rules of Engagement. (Hypothetical strategic directive).
MDTA (Maritime Drug Trafficking Act), 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq.
UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). (1982). Montego Bay, Jamaica.
US SOUTHCOM (United States Southern Command). (2025). Counter-Threat Strategy in the Western Hemisphere. (Hypothetical operational report).