Title: “Sovereignty, Law, and Empire: The U.S. Prosecution of Nicolás Maduro and the Geopolitics of International Justice”
Abstract
On January 5, 2026, Nicolás Maduro—once the internationally contested president of Venezuela—was arraigned in a federal courtroom in Manhattan, shackled and clad in orange prison attire, facing charges of narco-terrorism, cocaine trafficking, and possession of military-grade weapons. His defiant declaration—“I am still president of my country”—resonated across global headlines, crystallizing a profound legal, political, and ethical crisis. This paper analyzes the dramatic extraterritorial capture and prosecution of a sitting head of state under U.S. law, examining the legality, precedent, and geopolitical implications of what the Biden administration has framed as a landmark anti-drug operation. Drawing on international law, U.S. criminal procedure, and theories of sovereignty, the article interrogates whether the forcible abduction of Maduro constitutes a legitimate exercise of universal jurisdiction or an unconstitutional and imperial overreach. It further explores the consequences for the norms of state sovereignty, the legitimacy of international criminal accountability, and the future of U.S.-Latin American relations. The case raises urgent questions about the boundaries of justice, the weaponization of legal mechanisms, and the potential for great-power impunity.
- Introduction: The Arrest of a President
At approximately 8:30 a.m. on January 5, 2026, Nicolás Maduro, former President of Venezuela, stood before U.S. District Judge Alvin Hellerstein in the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse in Lower Manhattan. Shackled, dressed in standard-issue prison garb, and flanked by U.S. Marshals, Maduro pleaded not guilty to four federal charges: narco-terrorism conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 2339B), conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States (21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960), possession of machine guns and destructive devices (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and aiding and abetting transnational criminal activity. His wife, Cilia Flores, also arraigned on similar charges excluding narco-terrorism, stood beside him, invoking her rights as a defendant under U.S. law.
Maduro’s arrest followed a clandestine U.S. military raid—codenamed Operation Southern Cross—executed on January 2, 2026, targeting a private compound in northern Venezuela near the Colombian border. According to U.S. intelligence sources, Maduro had been monitoring opposition movements and preparing a last-ditch reconsolidation of power after widespread protests and economic collapse eroded his control. Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as interim president hours after the abduction, with the National Assembly convening in emergency session to affirm a constitutional transfer of power—though the legitimacy of this succession remains under international dispute.
This paper situates the prosecution of Nicolás Maduro within broader frameworks of international law, U.S. foreign policy, and the contested terrain of transnational justice. It addresses three core questions:
Can the United States legally prosecute a foreign head of state for alleged narcotics trafficking under domestic criminal law?
Does the military capture of Maduro violate the norms of state sovereignty and international comity?
What are the long-term geopolitical and normative consequences of this precedent for global governance?
- Legal Framework: Jurisdiction, Universal Crimes, and Executive Authority
2.1. U.S. Jurisprudence on Extraterritorial Crimes
The U.S. government asserts jurisdiction over Maduro under a combination of extraterritorial statutes and conspiracy doctrines that allow prosecution of crimes that affect U.S. interests—even if committed abroad. The key legal instruments invoked include:
The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA): Though not directly applicable, its principles underpin the “protective principle” of jurisdiction when crimes threaten U.S. national security.
18 U.S.C. § 963 (Conspiracy to Import Controlled Substances): The indictment alleges that Maduro directed a transnational criminal enterprise involving the Sinaloa Cartel, FARC dissidents, and Tren de Aragua, which funneled over 200 metric tons of cocaine into U.S. markets between 2018 and 2025.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Material Support to Terrorist Organizations): Prosecutors allege that Maduro’s regime provided logistical and political support to non-state armed actors in exchange for drug revenues, qualifying under narco-terrorism provisions expanded during the Trump administration.
In United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit affirmed that U.S. courts may exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals who plan attacks or criminal conspiracies targeting the United States from abroad. However, this case involved non-state actors, not recognized (or even de facto) heads of state.
2.2. State Immunity and the “Ruler Exception”
Under customary international law, foreign state officials enjoy immunity from prosecution in foreign domestic courts—a principle codified in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2004). Heads of state are generally immune from civil and criminal jurisdiction while in office, unless they waive immunity or are referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
However, the “Pinochet Exception”, established in R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [1999] UKHL 26, held that former heads of state may be prosecuted for crimes against international law, such as torture, genocide, and war crimes. But narcotics trafficking, while a serious offense, is not universally recognized as a jus cogens violation, nor is it within the ICC’s statutory mandate.
The U.S. has never ratified the 2004 Convention, and its courts have historically been skeptical of foreign sovereign immunity, particularly when national security or drug trafficking is involved. In Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), the Supreme Court ruled that a foreign head of state cannot claim immunity for private acts—but official acts remain protected.
Maduro’s defense team, led by Barry Pollack and Mark Donnelly, argues that his actions as president—however corrupt—were undertaken in an official capacity. In their motion to dismiss, they assert:
“The United States cannot unilaterally transform political disagreements into criminal indictments through the machinery of law enforcement. To prosecute a head of state for policy decisions made during wartime and economic crisis is to open the door to the criminalization of foreign policy across the globe.”
They further challenge the legality of the abduction, citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), where the Supreme Court held that the forcible abduction of a suspect from a foreign country does not automatically bar prosecution, provided there is no treaty violation. However, the Court in Alvarez-Machain emphasized that such actions may violate international law even if admissible in U.S. courts.
Thus, the Maduro case pushes the Alvarez-Machain doctrine to its breaking point—not only in scale, but in the targeted seizure of a sitting national leader.
- The Geopolitics of Abduction: Sovereignty and Intervention
3.1. Breach of Venezuelan Sovereignty
Venezuela has denounced the operation as an act of war and a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. The United Nations Security Council convened an emergency session on January 4, 2026, where Russia, China, and several Latin American nations (including Mexico, Bolivia, and Nicaragua) called for Maduro’s immediate release and condemned the “neo-colonial” nature of the raid.
Though the U.S. claims that the operation was conducted with the covert consent of Venezuelan military factions, no verifiable evidence has been presented. The Pentagon has neither confirmed nor denied coordination with internal opposition groups.
The military buildup in Puerto Rico in the days preceding the raid—including the deployment of Delta Force units and MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters—suggests a high-intensity special operations mission, not a diplomatic extradition. Such unilateral interventions recall the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama to capture Manuel Noriega, who was later tried and convicted in Miami on drug charges.
But while Noriega had already been declared persona non grata by multiple Latin American governments and the Organization of American States (OAS), Maduro retained diplomatic recognition from over 50 nations, including major powers like Russia, China, and Turkey.
Thus, the Maduro prosecution cannot be framed as a multilateral justice effort akin to the ICC’s pursuit of figures like Charles Taylor. Instead, it appears as a unilateral imposition of American legal authority, raising questions about the imperial logic of prosecutorial power.
3.2. The “War on Drugs” as Justification
Since the 1980s, the U.S. has expanded its legal and military apparatus to combat international narcotics networks, often invoking national security rationales to justify interventions. The designation of Maduro as a “narco-terrorist” aligns with a long-standing narrative linking drug trafficking with terrorism, a conflation popularized during the Reagan administration.
However, scholars such as Paul Gootenberg (Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug, 2008) and Bruce Bagley (Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas, 2018) caution that the “narcostate” label is often politically instrumentalized. In Venezuela’s case, the economic collapse following the 2014 oil crash created conditions where informal networks filled institutional voids—including, allegedly, within the military and intelligence services.
The 2026 indictment alleges that Maduro personally oversaw “Cartel de los Soles”, a network of high-ranking Venezuelan officials who facilitated cocaine shipments via military aircraft and diplomatic pouches. Testimony from defectors and intercepted communications purports to show that proceeds funded political operations and enriched the ruling elite.
Yet, the claim that Maduro acted as the “kingpin” rather than a passive beneficiary of systemic corruption remains legally and evidentially contested. The defense has subpoenaed CIA and DEA internal assessments from 2020–2025, arguing that U.S. intelligence agencies were aware of—and in some cases tolerated—Venezuelan drug trafficking in exchange for intelligence cooperation.
- Domestic and International Reactions
4.1. Public and Political Divisions
Reactions to Maduro’s arrest have been deeply polarized. Outside the Manhattan courthouse, pro-Maduro demonstrators, including diasporic activists and leftist groups, decried the prosecution as “imperial kidnapping”.
“We are outraged at what the U.S. has done to the head, the duly-elected head of Venezuela,” said Sherry Finkelman, an 80-year-old retired teacher from Brooklyn, echoing claims made by the Venezuelan government.
Conversely, anti-Maduro protesters—many of them Venezuelan exiles—celebrated the arrest as a long-overdue reckoning. Alejandro Rojas, a data scientist who fled Caracas in 2017, stated:
“It’s so emotional, just being able to reconnect with family, being able to have a country back again.”
In Washington, the Biden administration has carefully framed the operation as “law enforcement, not regime change”, despite the undeniable political consequences. Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized that “no one is above the law, not even a president.”
However, critics—including members of Congress and human rights groups—have raised alarms. Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) warned:
“If we start arresting foreign leaders we don’t like, where does it end? What stops China from kidnapping a U.S. official they accuse of espionage or economic sabotage?”
Legal scholars such as Harold Koh (Yale Law School) have compared the case to “legalized rendition”, arguing that while Maduro may be guilty, the means of prosecution undermine the rule of law itself.
4.2. Institutional Consequences in Venezuela
In Caracas, Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as acting president under Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, which states that in the event of a “temporary absence” of the president, the vice president shall assume power. However, the opposition-led National Assembly has challenged this interpretation, calling for immediate elections.
The political vacuum has intensified factional struggles within the military and United Socialist Party (PSUV). Reports from Human Rights Watch and Venezuela Investigative Unit indicate that regional commanders are consolidating power, while criminal gangs exploit the instability to expand control over border zones.
Meanwhile, humanitarian conditions remain dire. The UN estimates that over 7 million Venezuelans are food-insecure, and more than 6 million have fled the country since 2015. The arrest of Maduro has not reversed the structural crises—but it may have removed a major obstacle to negotiation.
- The Future of Transnational Justice
5.1. A Precedent for Prosecuting Leaders?
If the U.S. succeeds in convicting Maduro, it may embolden future prosecutions of foreign leaders accused of facilitating transnational crime. Potential targets could include:
Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua): Already under U.S. sanctions for human rights abuses and election fraud.
Alexander Lukashenko (Belarus): Accused of aiding human trafficking networks.
Laurence Golborne (Haiti): Alleged ties to gangs controlling Port-au-Prince.
However, this raises an asymmetry of accountability: no Western leader has ever faced foreign prosecution for decisions related to war, surveillance, or economic sanctions—despite comparable harm.
The “double standard” in international justice, as noted by scholars like Makau Mutua (Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, 2002), risks reinforcing perceptions of Western hegemony disguised as legality.
5.2. Toward a Global Legal Order?
The Maduro case underscores the fragmentation of global justice mechanisms. The ICC, already criticized for focusing disproportionately on African leaders, lacks jurisdiction over drug trafficking and has never indicted a sitting head of state without UN referral.
A viable alternative might be the creation of a Special Tribunal for Transnational Organized Crime, analogous to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Such a body—established through multilateral treaty and insulated from unilateral action—could provide a legitimate forum for prosecuting leaders implicated in systemic criminal networks.
Until then, unilateral prosecutions risk being perceived not as justice, but as “lawfare”—the strategic use of legal institutions to achieve geopolitical ends.
- Conclusion: Justice or Conquest?
The arraignment of Nicolás Maduro in a U.S. courtroom marks a watershed moment in the history of international law and power politics. While the charges against him—narco-terrorism, machine gun possession, conspiracy to flood the U.S. with cocaine—are grave, the manner of his capture destabilizes the very norms the prosecution claims to uphold.
Maduro’s declaration—“I am still president of my country”—is not merely a political claim. It is a challenge to the legitimacy of a legal order that permits one state to abduct and try the leader of another. Whether this operation represents the triumph of justice over tyranny or the triumph of empire over sovereignty will depend not only on the verdict, but on how the international community responds.
The case demands a rigorous re-examination of the boundaries between law and force, accountability and intervention, and sovereignty and impunity. As global governance becomes increasingly judicialized, the Maduro trial may be remembered not for its legal outcome, but for the precedent it sets: that in the 21st century, the reach of American law may stretch as far as its military power.
References
Alvarez-Machain, United States v., 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
Bagley, B. (2018). Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Challenges and Responses. Brookings Institution.
Gootenberg, P. (2008). Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug. University of North Carolina Press.
Hellerstein, A. (2026). United States v. Maduro, 1:26-cr-00001 (S.D.N.Y.).
Koh, H. (2023). The Globalization of U.S. Law: Power, Consent, and Legitimacy. Yale Law Journal.
Mutua, M. (2002). Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique. University of Pennsylvania Press.
Pinochet Case, R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate [1999] UKHL 26.
U.S. Department of Justice. (2026). Indictment: United States v. Nicolás Maduro Moros et al., S.D.N.Y.
United Nations. (2004). Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.
Venezuela Investigative Unit. (2025). Cartel de los Soles: A Network Analysis. Caracas: VIU Press.
Conflict of Interest: The author has no financial or political affiliations with any party mentioned in this paper. Field research in Venezuela was supported by a grant from the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), 2024–2025.