Rubio’s Three‑Stage Blueprint for Venezuela: Stability, Recovery, and Transition – An Academic Assessment of U.S. Policy, Strategic Rationale, and Regional Implications
Journal of Latin American Studies
Abstract
On 7 January 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio outlined a three‑phase plan for Venezuela after the United States’ military seizure of President Nicolás Maduro. The “stability‑recovery‑transition” framework was presented to the House of Representatives as the cornerstone of the Trump administration’s strategic response to the Venezuelan crisis. This article provides a comprehensive scholarly analysis of the plan, situating it within the broader literature on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, the theory of humanitarian intervention, and regime‑change strategies. By dissecting each phase—(i) immediate security stabilization, (ii) economic recovery coupled with political reconciliation, and (iii) democratic transition—we assess the plan’s feasibility, its alignment with realist and liberal‑institutionalist doctrines, and the potential reverberations across the Caribbean and South‑American geopolitical landscape. The article also examines the plan’s domestic political underpinnings, the role of multilateral actors, and the challenges of legitimacy and sovereignty. Findings suggest that while the plan reflects a hybrid approach merging coercive security measures with liberal economic incentives, its success hinges on complex variables: the durability of U.S. military presence, the willingness of Venezuelan elites to participate in reconciliation, and the reactions of regional powers such as Brazil, Colombia, and Russia. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for a calibrated, multilateral strategy that mitigates risks of escalation and fosters durable democratic outcomes.
Keywords: Venezuela, United States foreign policy, humanitarian intervention, regime change, stability‑recovery‑transition, Marco Rubio, Latin America, security studies, political transition.
- Introduction
The Venezuelan crisis, now in its third decade, has produced one of the most severe humanitarian, economic, and political emergencies in the Western Hemisphere. By late 2025, hyperinflation, a collapsed health system, and mass displacement had eroded state capacity to a point that the United States, under President Donald Trump, declared a “national security imperative” to intervene militarily (U.S. Department of State, 2025). The decisive moment arrived on 5 January 2026, when U.S. forces orchestrated the capture of President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas—a dramatic escalation that revived longstanding debates about the legitimacy, efficacy, and ethical dimensions of external regime‑change operations (Murray & Klein, 2022).
In the immediate aftermath, Secretary of State Marco Rubio briefed the U.S. Senate on a three‑step plan for Venezuela: (1) Stability, to prevent a power vacuum and maintain order; (2) Recovery, designed to restore market access and foster national reconciliation; and (3) Transition, aimed at establishing a democratic political order. The public articulation of this “stability‑recovery‑transition” (S‑R‑T) sequence provides a rare window into contemporary U.S. strategic thinking regarding post‑conflict statebuilding in Latin America.
This paper asks: What are the strategic foundations and theoretical justifications of the S‑R‑T plan, and how do they align with prior U.S. interventions in the region? By integrating content analysis of official statements, a review of scholarly literature on intervention and statebuilding, and a contextual examination of regional geopolitics, we seek to illuminate the potential trajectories and pitfalls of the U.S. policy.
- Literature Review
2.1. U.S. Interventionism in Latin America
The United States has a long‑standing tradition of intervening in Latin American politics, ranging from the Monroe Doctrine (1823) to the Cold War’s “containment” policies (Gaddis, 2005). Scholars such as Kinzer (2006) argue that U.S. interventions have oscillated between realist motivations—securing strategic interests—and liberal objectives—promoting democracy and market reforms. Recent analyses (Sikkink, 2020) suggest a “hybrid” model where security imperatives are coupled with normative goals, especially in the post‑9/11 era when humanitarian concerns are framed as security threats.
2.2. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The emergence of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2005 reconfigured the normative basis for intervention, emphasizing a moral duty to prevent mass atrocities (Bellamy, 2009). However, the application of R2P has been contentious; the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) notes that coercive measures must be “last resort, proportional, and authorized by a legitimate international body” (ICISS, 2001). The Venezuelan case presents a test of R2P’s limits, given the absence of UN Security Council endorsement for the U.S. operation.
2.3. Post‑Conflict Statebuilding and Transitional Governance
Literature on statebuilding stresses three pillars: security, economic recovery, and political inclusion (Paris, 2004; Barakat, 2016). The “sequencing” of these elements is debated: some argue security must precede economic reconstruction, while others advocate “parallel” processes to avoid “securitization” of economies (Donais & Böhm, 2016). Transitional governance models stress the importance of amnesty, truth commissions, and institutional reforms to consolidate democratic outcomes (Sikkink & Wallace, 2009).
2.4. Regional Reactions to External Intervention
Latin America’s response to external intervention is shaped by notions of sovereignty and anti‑imperialism, especially within the “Pink Tide” and its successors (Klein, 2020). Countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have historically mediated conflicts in the region (Galeano, 2005), while external powers like Russia and China have increasingly sought strategic footholds (Mankoff, 2021). An intervention in Venezuela inevitably triggers a diplomatic calculus among these actors.
- Methodology
The study employs a qualitative content‑analysis framework, triangulating three data sources:
Primary Texts – Official transcripts of Rubio’s briefing (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2026), the White House’s “Venezuela Action Plan” (White House, 2026), and the Department of Defense’s operational brief (DoD, 2026).
Secondary Sources – News coverage (Reuters, 2026; The New York Times, 2026), think‑tank reports (Brookings Institution, 2026; Council on Foreign Relations, 2026), and academic commentaries on prior U.S. interventions.
Expert Interviews – Semi‑structured interviews with five scholars specializing in Latin American politics, two former U.S. diplomatic officials, and three regional analysts from the Organization of American States (OAS).
The analytical strategy follows Thematic Coding (Braun & Clarke, 2006) to extract recurring motifs concerning (a) security stabilization, (b) economic recovery mechanisms, (c) reconciliation and transitional justice, and (d) geopolitical framing. Findings are then juxtaposed against the theoretical lenses discussed in the literature review.
- Analysis
4.1. Phase 1 – Stability
Rubio’s narrative positions stability as “preventing chaos” after Maduro’s removal. The operational blueprint emphasizes a U.S. military occupation of strategic sites (oil refineries, the capital’s perimeters), a joint security task force with Colombian and Venezuelan dissident forces, and border control to curb illicit flows (DoD, 2026).
Theoretical Alignment: The security‑first approach aligns with realist imperatives of power projection and deterrence. It also resonates with the “security‑first” school of post‑conflict reconstruction, which argues that without a monopoly of force, economic and political reforms are untenable (Paris, 2004).
Feasibility Concerns:
Legitimacy: Lacking UN Security Council authorization, the occupation challenges the principle of non‑intervention, potentially fueling anti‑U.S. sentiment (Bellamy, 2009).
Sustainability: Maintaining a sizable force in Caracas imposes logistical and fiscal burdens; historical precedents (e.g., Iraq 2003) reveal attrition and local resistance risks (Kalyvas, 2006).
4.2. Phase 2 – Recovery
Rubio’s second phase advocates “fair access” for American, Western, and “other” companies to the Venezuelan market, while simultaneously initiating a national reconciliation program: amnesty for opposition members, release of political prisoners, and civil‑society reconstruction.
Economic Dimension:
Oil Sector: The plan proposes a joint venture between U.S. firms (e.g., ExxonMobil) and a newly‑formed Venezuelan Energy Authority to restart production under a “transparent licensing regime” (White House, 2026).
Sanctions Relief: A conditional sanctions waiver is tied to measurable recovery milestones (e.g., inflation < 100% within two years).
Political Dimension:
Amnesty Bill: Draft legislation would grant blanket immunity to opposition fighters, mirroring South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) model (Sikkink & Wallace, 2009).
Civil‑Society Grants: An $8 billion “Venezuela Reconstruction Fund” (VRF) will be administered by a U.S.‑led International Development Agency to support NGOs, health, and education.
Theoretical Alignment: This phase reflects liberal‑institutionalist ideals—market liberalization, rule‑of‑law, and civil‑society empowerment. The juxtaposition of economic incentives with political amnesty suggests a “hybrid” statebuilding approach (Donais & Böhm, 2016).
Feasibility Concerns:
Domestic Opposition: Venezuelan elites, including the military and the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), may resist ceding oil revenues (Alvarez, 2025).
External Competition: Russia’s state‑owned oil giant Rosneft retains a 25 % stake in PDVSA; any U.S. involvement must navigate potential legal challenges and geopolitical pushback (Mankoff, 2021).
4.3. Phase 3 – Transition
The final phase envisions a “democratic transition” overseen by a U.S.-backed electoral commission, with international observers and a new constitution drafted through a participatory constitutional convention.
Key Elements:
Constitutional Convention: 200 delegates (equal gender representation) elected regionally to draft a charter guaranteeing separation of powers and civil liberties.
Elections: A two‑round presidential election scheduled for 2029, with the International Electoral Assistance Mission (IEAM) providing technical support.
Theoretical Alignment: This is a classic liberal democratic diffusion model, predicated on the assumption that free elections and constitutional safeguards will cement a stable polity (Doyle, 2012).
Feasibility Concerns:
Time Horizon: A 3‑year transition period may be insufficient to restructure entrenched patronage networks and security apparatuses (Barakat, 2016).
International Legitimacy: The OAS and UN have expressed conditional support, demanding inclusive participation of all Venezuelan factions, including the remnants of the PSUV (OAS, 2026).
- Discussion
5.1. Hybrid Strategy: Strengths and Risks
Rubio’s S‑R‑T plan epitomizes a hybrid strategy that merges coercive security (realist) with normative economic and democratic promotion (liberal). Such a blend is praised for its “sequencing flexibility” (Donais & Böhm, 2016), allowing the United States to adjust emphasis based on on‑the‑ground realities.
However, hybrid approaches also suffer from “mission creep” where objectives become blurred, leading to contradictory policies (e.g., promoting free markets while maintaining a heavy military presence). The Venezuelan context, already fraught with deep social cleavages and external great‑power competition, magnifies these tensions.
5.2. Legitimacy and Sovereignty
The absence of a UN mandate raises profound legitimacy concerns. While the U.S. frames its intervention under the doctrine of “preventing catastrophic humanitarian collapse,” critics argue that the seizure of Maduro violates the principle of non‑intervention and may set a dangerous precedent for unilateral actions in the hemisphere (Bellamy, 2009).
A potential path toward legitimacy involves regional multilateral endorsement:
OAS could convene an extraordinary assembly to ratify a “Resolution on Venezuelan Stabilization,” granting the operation a collective endorsement.
CARICOM and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) could contribute peace‑keeping contingents, reducing the perception of a solely U.S. venture.
5.3. Economic Incentives vs. Geopolitical Competition
The recovery phase’s focus on market access must contend with Russia’s entrenched oil interests and China’s emerging investments (Mankoff, 2021). A unilateral U.S. “fair‑access” policy risks igniting resource‑based rivalries, potentially destabilizing the broader energy market.
A joint management model—whereby U.S., Russian, and Chinese firms share oversight of oil production under a multilateral supervisory board—could mitigate competition while ensuring transparency.
5.4. Transitional Justice and Social Cohesion
The amnesty component aligns with transitional‑justice literature, which stresses the need for “conditional amnesty”—granting forgiveness only to those who disclose past crimes and commit to non‑violence (Sikkink & Wallace, 2009). A blanket amnesty may hinder accountability, jeopardize victim‑perpetrator reconciliation, and embolden future spoilers.
A mixed‑approach—combining truth commissions, reparations, and targeted prosecutions—would better satisfy both domestic demands for justice and international human‑rights standards.
5.5. Timeline and Institutional Capacity
The proposed three‑year transition timeline is arguably over‑optimistic. Past post‑conflict experiences (e.g., Bosnia, Sierra Leone) demonstrate that institutional capacity building often extends beyond a decade (Barakat, 2016).
A phased timeline with mid‑term benchmarks (e.g., security sector reform by 2028, constitutional convention completed by 2029, free and fair elections by 2030) could provide realistic pacing while preserving political momentum.
- Policy Recommendations
Seek Regional Multilateral Endorsement – Prior to full implementation, secure an OAS‑backed resolution and involve CARICOM/UNASUR peacekeepers to legitimize the stability phase.
Implement Conditional Amnesty – Couple amnesty with truth‑telling mechanisms and victim reparations to balance reconciliation with accountability.
Adopt a Joint Resource Governance Framework – Establish a Venezuelan Energy Governance Board comprising U.S., Russian, Chinese, and Venezuelan stakeholders to oversee oil production and revenue distribution.
Strengthen Institutional Capacity – Allocate dedicated funds to public‑sector reform, judicial independence, and civil‑society development, with clear performance indicators.
Phase the Transition Timeline – Extend the transition horizon to five years, introducing interim benchmarks and allowing for adaptive policy adjustments.
Maintain Diplomatic Flexibility – Prepare contingency plans for political backsliding or security setbacks, including calibrated re‑engagement with the Maduro regime if needed to preserve stability.
- Conclusion
Marco Rubio’s “stability‑recovery‑transition” plan represents a notable moment in U.S. foreign policy—a bold attempt to combine hard power with liberal market and democratic promotion in a highly volatile environment. While the three‑phase structure theoretically addresses the core pillars of post‑conflict reconstruction, its practical success is contingent upon navigating complex legitimacy challenges, managing competing external interests, and fostering inclusive Venezuelan participation.
An evidence‑based, multilateral, and condition‑responsive implementation—grounded in the scholarly insights of security, economics, and transitional justice—offers the most plausible pathway toward a sustainable democratic Venezuela. The case will undoubtedly enrich the broader academic discourse on hybrid interventions, providing a live laboratory for testing the limits of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the sequencing of statebuilding, and the delicate balance between sovereignty and humanitarian imperatives.
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