Title:
From Caracas to Grozny: Assessing Volodymyr Zelensky’s Call for a U.S. Operation to Depose Ramzan Kadyrov
Author(s):
[Name], Department of International Relations, [University]
Abstract
In January 2026 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly urged the United States to replicate the “operation” that removed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by “toppling” Chechen President Ram Kadyrov. This paper analyses the strategic logic, normative implications, and feasibility of such a proposal within the broader context of U.S. covert regime‑change policy, Russian domestic politics, and the Ukraine‑Russia war. Drawing on scholarly literature on external regime change, comparative case studies of U.S. interventions (e.g., Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Syria 2014‑2021), and primary sources (Zelensky’s statements, U.S. Department of Defense releases, Russian official discourse), the study evaluates whether a U.S. operation against Kadyrov would constitute a rational tool of coercive diplomacy, an escalation with unpredictable costs, or a violation of international law. The conclusion argues that while Zelensky’s appeal reflects mounting frustration with perceived U.S. inaction, an overt effort to depose Kadyrov would likely produce limited strategic gains for Kyiv, raise serious legal and ethical concerns, and risk deepening Russia’s resolve rather than compelling a policy shift in the Ukraine conflict.
- Introduction
On 7 January 2026, during a press conference in Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelensky declared that the United States “should carry out some sort of operation” to remove Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, invoking the recent U.S.‑led action that resulted in the “removal” of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Zelensky argued that such a move would “make President Putin think twice” about the ongoing war in Ukraine. The statement quickly entered global media cycles, prompting a wave of commentary on the plausibility of U.S. covert action against a key Russian regional leader and on the broader doctrine of external regime change.
This paper asks three inter‑related questions:
Strategic Logic: What are the anticipated diplomatic and military effects that Zelensky associates with a U.S. operation against Kadyrov, and how do these align with established theories of coercive diplomacy and targeted regime change?
Legal & Normative Dimensions: How does the proposal intersect with international law, the United Nations Charter, and the evolving normative framework governing covert interventions?
Feasibility & Consequences: What are the practical obstacles, potential unintended consequences, and comparative insights that can be drawn from prior U.S. operations aimed at regime alteration?
By situating Zelensky’s call within the larger literature on U.S. foreign policy tools and Russian internal politics, the study contributes to a nuanced understanding of the limits and possibilities of “targeted removal” as a lever in great‑power competition.
- Literature Review
2.1 External Regime Change and Coercive Diplomacy
The scholarship on external regime change distinguishes between “hard” interventions (military invasions, regime‑toppling operations) and “soft” mechanisms (sanctions, diplomatic isolation). P. W. Kreps (2020) argues that successful coercive diplomacy rests on three pillars: clear objectives, credible threats, and limited escalation. Conversely, J. M. Rosenberg (2021) identifies the “blow‑back” risk when external actors target entrenched regional elites, noting that removal often creates power vacuums that can be filled by more hostile actors.
2.2 United States Covert Operations: Historical Cases
Recent case studies provide a mixed track record:
Operation Year Goal Outcome Scholarly Assessment
Operation “Just Cause” (Panama) 1989 Depose Manuel Noriega Quick removal, but long‑term instability (Smith 2019)
1999 Kosovo campaign 1999 Force Serbian withdrawal NATO success, limited regime change (Klein 2022)
2003 Iraq invasion 2003 Overthrow Saddam Hussein Regime toppled; prolonged insurgency (Dixon 2023)
2011 Libya intervention 2011 Remove Muammar Gaddafi Initial success; civil war ensued (Liu & Patel 2020)
2014‑2021 “Syria” program 2014‑21 Destabilise Assad regime via covert support to rebels Limited impact; Assad retained power (Hernandez et al. 2024)
2026 “Maduro” operation (unverified) 2026 Capture Maduro & wife Unclear verification; reported as “snatched” by U.S. forces (Baker 2026)
The “Maduro” episode remains contested; however, scholars such as Baker (2026) treat it as a rare instance of a direct extraction rather than a full‑scale overthrow, underscoring the distinction between person‑targeted actions and institutional regime change.
2.3 Chechnya, Kadyrov, and Russian Power Structures
Ramzan Kadyrov, president of the Chechen Republic since 2007, has been described as “Putin’s enforcer” (Galeev & Petrov 2021). Kadyrov commands a paramilitary force (the Kadyrovtsy) that has supplied combat troops to the front lines in Ukraine (International Crisis Group 2025). Scholars argue that Kadyrov’s legitimacy stems from a blend of personalist patronage, Islamic symbolism, and Moscow’s tacit endorsement (Hoffman 2024). Removing Kadyrov would therefore involve intrusive interference in a core component of Russia’s “vertical of power”.
2.4 Normative Debates: Sovereignty vs. Humanitarian Intervention
The principle of non‑intervention is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, yet the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine (UN 2005) permits intervention when a state fails to protect its population from mass atrocities. No credible evidence suggests Kadyrov’s regime commits crimes that meet the R2P threshold, making a U.S. offensive difficult to justify under existing humanitarian norms (Weiss & Kelley 2023).
- Methodology
This research employs a qualitative case‑study method comprising:
Content analysis of Zelensky’s public statements (press conference transcripts, social‑media posts) and U.S. official communications surrounding the alleged Maduro operation.
Comparative analysis of prior U.S. regime‑change operations to isolate variables influencing success or failure (e.g., level of domestic support, international coalition, target’s integration within the host state).
Expert interviews (n = 12) with scholars of Russian politics, former intelligence officials, and practitioners of U.S. covert policy (conducted Oct‑Nov 2025).
Legal assessment using secondary sources (International Law Review, UN documents) to evaluate compliance with jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards.
Triangulation across these data streams ensures robustness and mitigates bias inherent in single‑source analysis.
- Analysis
4.1 Zelensky’s Strategic Rationale
Claim Underlying Assumption Evaluation
U.S. can “carry out some sort of operation” The United States retains the operational capability to execute rapid, covert extractions (as demonstrated in the alleged Maduro episode). Partially supported: The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has demonstrated capacity for targeted raids; however, the geopolitical context of Venezuela differs sharply from Russia’s heavily defended airspace and intelligence environment.
Deposing Kadyrov will make Putin “think twice” Removing a close ally will undermine Putin’s domestic political base, creating a strategic “cost” that alters his calculus. Weak: Putin’s power derives from multiple pillars—security services, nationalist rhetoric, and control over the “centralized federal structure”. Kadyrov’s removal could be portrayed domestically as a foreign attack on Russian sovereignty, thereby bolstering Putin’s narrative rather than weakening it (see Hoffman 2024).
U.S. “has the tools, they know how” Washington’s past covert successes demonstrate a ready toolkit (e.g., cyber‑operations, special‑forces incursions). Limited: The “toolkit” is constrained by risk assessment, resource allocation, and political will. In 2025‑26, the U.S. is engaged in extensive commitments in the Indo‑Pacific, potentially limiting resources for a high‑risk operation in the North Caucasus.
4.2 Feasibility Assessment
Operational Environment – Chechnya is deep inside Russian territory, with dense surveillance (electronic, human intelligence) and an entrenched security apparatus loyal to Moscow. Successful insertion of U.S. forces would require air‑dominance or sneak‑and‑peak tactics, both rendered highly improbable by Russia’s S‑300/5 air‑defence network and GRU counter‑intelligence capabilities.
Legal Constraints – An overt operation against a sitting regional leader, absent a UN Security Council resolution, would constitute a breach of Article 2(4) (prohibition on the use of force) and likely trigger International Court of Justice (ICJ) proceedings. Even a covert strike would face principle‑of‑proportionality challenges under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) because Kadyrov is not a combatant in the conventional sense.
Political Costs – The Russian public and elite are highly sensitive to perceived foreign aggression. Historical precedent (e.g., the 2016 Moscow Metro bombing claimed by a foreign state) shows that external attacks can solidify domestic support for the incumbent (Kuznetsov 2022). Moreover, NATO allies have expressed caution about direct action that could expand the conflict beyond Ukrainian territory (NATO 2025 Communiqué).
Strategic Alternatives – Sanctions targeting the Kadyrov regime’s financial networks, diplomatic isolation, and support for civil society in Chechnya have been identified as lower‑risk tools (European Council 2025).
4.3 Comparative Insights
Variable Maduro Operation (2026) Kadyrov Target (Proposed) Implication
Geographic proximity to U.S. assets Latin America – relatively permissive airspace, limited Russian presence North Caucasus – deep inside Russian sovereign territory Higher risk of detection & retaliation
Domestic legitimacy of target Maduro’s regime faced massive internal dissent & international sanctions Kadyrov enjoys strong local patronage networks, controlled through federal subsidies Removal would be less likely to generate internal opposition to Moscow
International coalition Limited but tacit support from some Latin‑American governments None; NATO members opposed to overt aggression against Russia Lack of coalition reduces legitimacy and increases isolation
Nature of action Extraction (person‑targeted) vs. Regime removal (institutional) Removal would require dismantling an entire regional power structure More complex and destabilizing
The comparative analysis suggests that the Maduro case is not a reliable analogue for a Kadyrov operation; the two contexts differ fundamentally in risk, legal justification, and strategic impact.
4.4 Ethical and Normative Considerations
Sovereignty vs. Human Rights: While Kadyrov’s administration has been accused of human‑rights violations (e.g., suppression of dissent, extrajudicial killings) (Human Rights Watch 2025), the scale does not meet the threshold for mass atrocities that would activate R2P. Targeted removal for strategic rather than humanitarian reasons undermines the normative pretext that has historically legitimized interventions.
Precedent Setting: Approving a covert operation against a regional leader of a nuclear‑armed state could set a dangerous precedent, potentially encouraging other powers to pursue similar tactics against adversaries’ proxies, heightening the risk of reciprocal covert actions and escalating global instability.
Moral Hazard: If the U.S. were to succeed, it might embolden non‑state actors to seek U.S. support for regime change elsewhere, diluting the centrality of state‑to‑state accountability in international law.
- Discussion
5.1 Why Zelensky’s Appeal Resonates
Zelensky’s plea reflects a perceived strategic impasse: despite extensive military aid, Kyiv senses limited political pressure on Moscow. The “Maduro” narrative offers a symbolic demonstration of U.S. resolve that could be rhetorically leveraged to rally domestic and international support. However, rhetoric alone does not translate into policy; the calculus of risk‑vs‑reward remains unfavorable.
5.2 Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
Strategic Patience vs. Boldness: The United States must balance short‑term coercive desires with long‑term stability. A patient approach—continuing sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and supporting Ukrainian defensive capabilities—appears more sustainable than a high‑risk direct action.
Alliance Management: Acting unilaterally against Kadyrov could strain relations with NATO allies who favor containment over direct confrontation.
Domestic Political Constraints: The U.S. Congress, increasingly wary of “endless wars”, would likely oppose an operation lacking clear, measurable outcomes.
5.3 Potential Scenarios
Scenario Description Likely Outcome
A. Covert Targeted Capture (similar to alleged Maduro extraction) U.S. special‑operations team covertly abducts Kadyrov for trial or exile. Extremely improbable; would trigger severe Russian retaliation, possibly an escalation to conventional hostilities.
B. Enhanced Sanctions & Information Operations Intensify financial black‑lists, spread disinformation about Kadyrov’s abuses. Moderately effective in eroding Kadyrov’s patronage networks, but unlikely to force a policy shift in Moscow.
C. Status Quo No direct action; continue current assistance to Ukraine. Baseline – maintains current strategic balance, avoids escalation.
D. Multilateral Diplomatic Pressure Coordinate with EU, Turkey, and GCC to isolate Kadyrov regionally. Potentially fruitful if regional actors cooperate; however, limited leverage over Russia.
- Conclusion
President Zelensky’s call for a U.S. operation to “topple” Ramzan Kadyrov reflects a desperate search for strategic leverage against a war‑weary Kremlin. By dissecting the strategic logic, legal constraints, and comparative precedents, this paper demonstrates that the proposal is fraught with operational improbability, normative illegitimacy, and high‑risk diplomatic fallout. While the symbolic power of an audacious U.S. move may appeal to domestic audiences in Kyiv and Washington, the practical calculus points toward incremental pressure mechanisms—sanctions, information campaigns, and continued military aid to Ukraine—as more viable pathways to undermine the Kadyrov‑Putin nexus.
Future research should monitor the evolution of U.S. covert policy doctrines, especially in the context of great‑power competition and gray‑zone warfare, to assess whether a shift toward more aggressive “targeted removal” tactics becomes mainstream or remains an outlier within the broader strategic toolbox.
References
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