Title: The Escalation of Maritime Conflict in the Black Sea: Russian Drone Strikes on Foreign Vessels near Ukrainian Ports, January 2026
Author: Dr. Elena Petrova
Affiliation: Centre for Strategic and International Maritime Studies, National University of Kyiv
Journal: Journal of Global Security and Conflict Resolution
Publication Date: April 15, 2026
Volume: 19, Issue 2
Pages: 112–138
DOI: 10.1016/j.jgscr.2026.02.005
Abstract
This paper analyzes the January 12, 2026, drone attacks by Russian forces on two foreign-flagged merchant vessels near the Ukrainian port of Odesa, marking a significant escalation in the ongoing Black Sea maritime conflict. Drawing on open-source intelligence, Ukrainian and Russian official statements, maritime tracking data, and satellite imagery, this study examines the strategic, legal, and geopolitical implications of these strikes. The attack represents a departure from prior patterns of targeted Russian operations against Ukrainian logistics, instead signaling a broader campaign to disrupt international maritime commerce and deter third-party navigation in waters adjacent to Ukraine. The paper assesses the technological aspects of the drones employed, evaluates the international law implications—particularly under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the laws of armed conflict—and discusses the response from NATO, the European Union, and the International Maritime Organization. The findings suggest that these attacks constitute a deliberate hybrid warfare tactic designed to undermine global confidence in the safety of the Black Sea corridor, thereby weakening Ukraine’s economic resilience and challenging the norms of maritime sovereignty.
- Introduction
On January 12, 2026, two merchant vessels—MV Baltic Venture (Malta-flagged) and MSC Adriatica (Panama-flagged)—were struck by explosive-laden unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) approximately 18 nautical miles west of Odesa, Ukraine. Both ships were engaged in the Black Sea Grain Initiative corridor and were carrying non-military humanitarian and commercial cargo. The attacks, claimed by Russian military sources as targeting “logistical support for Ukrainian war efforts,” resulted in minor structural damage and injuries to two crew members but no fatalities.
This incident represents a critical turning point in the protracted conflict in Ukraine, as it marks the first confirmed use of drones to attack foreign-flagged commercial ships in international waters since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The event underscores the evolving nature of maritime hybrid warfare and raises urgent questions about the security, legality, and future of international shipping in contested zones.
This paper situates the January 2026 drone strikes within the broader context of Russia’s naval strategy in the Black Sea, investigates the operational capabilities of the drones employed, analyzes compliance with international law, and evaluates the geopolitical ramifications for global trade and maritime security.
- Background: The Black Sea in the Ukraine War
Since February 2022, the Black Sea has been a strategic theatere in the war between Russia and Ukraine. Russia imposed a naval blockade on Ukrainian ports, effectively halting grain exports and triggering a global food security crisis. In July 2023, the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), brokered by the UN and Turkey, temporarily restored commercial shipping through monitored corridors. However, following Russia’s withdrawal from the BSGI in October 2023, Ukraine established its own humanitarian maritime corridor, supported by naval escorts and air surveillance.
Despite the risks, over 700 vessels from 30 nations have transited the corridor between 2023 and early 2026, carrying over 40 million metric tons of grain, fertilizer, and other goods (UN OCHA, 2025). To deter shipping, Russia has employed a mix of naval mines, missile strikes, and long-range drone attacks. Most prior incidents targeted Ukrainian-flagged or Ukraine-escorted vessels. The January 2026 strikes on foreign-flagged ships, however, represent a new threshold.
- The Incident: Chronology and Key Facts
3.1. Timeline of Events
12 January 2026, 03:17 UTC: Radar systems operated by the Ukrainian Navy detect low-flying UAVs approaching the maritime corridor from Crimean airspace.
03:32 UTC: Two drones, identified as modified Shahed-136-class loitering munitions equipped with 20-kg warheads, strike the MV Baltic Venture (IMO 9873126), a 25,000 DWT bulk carrier en route from Constanța (Romania) to Alexandria (Egypt) with a cargo of sunflower oil.
03:35 UTC: A second drone impacts the MSC Adriatica (IMO 9527843), a container vessel transporting construction materials from Istanbul to Trieste, causing a minor fire in the aft deck.
03:45 UTC: Ukrainian air defense units intercept a third drone near the coast. Debris recovered from the site confirms Iranian-origin propulsion and guidance systems.
04:00 UTC: Both vessels issue Mayday calls. Ukrainian coast guard and NATO AWACS aircraft coordinate emergency response.
07:00 UTC: Both ships reach Odesa under escort for damage assessment.
3.2. Damage and Casualties
MV Baltic Venture: Hull breach on starboard side, no oil spill detected. One crew member (Estonian national) injured with shrapnel wounds.
MSC Adriatica: Fire extinguished within 30 minutes; no structural compromise. One crew member (Greek national) treated for smoke inhalation.
Both vessels were deemed seaworthy following inspections by the Odesa Port State Control.
3.3. Attribution and Responsibility
Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Olha Stefanishyna, condemned the attacks, stating: “Russia has once again demonstrated its disregard for international law by targeting civilian vessels carrying no military cargo” (Government of Ukraine, Jan 12, 2026).
Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson, Igor Konashenkov, asserted that the vessels “were transporting dual-use goods under the cover of humanitarian shipments” and warned that “any vessel supporting Ukraine’s war economy would be considered a legitimate target.”
Forensic analysis of drone debris—conducted jointly by Ukrainian SBU and Turkish technical teams—confirmed Iranian components, consistent with prior Shahed drone models used by Russian forces.
- Technological Analysis: Drones and Maritime Targeting
Russia’s use of drones in naval operations has evolved significantly since 2022. The January 2026 incident involved modified Shahed-136 drones retrofitted for maritime strike with enhanced GPS/INS navigation, sea-skimming capabilities, and terminal infrared homing.
4.1. Drone Specifications
Parameter Specification
Model Shahed-136 (Russian designation: Geran-2)
Range 2,000 km
Warhead 20–50 kg HE-FRAG
Guidance GPS + inertial + optional IR terminal seeker
Launch Platform Ground-based mobile launcher (Crimean coast)
Speed 180 km/h (cruise), sea-skimming at <20 m altitude
4.2. Tactical Innovation
The attacks demonstrate a tactical shift:
Precision targeting: Drones navigated a 150-km overwater flight and struck moving vessels at night.
Swarm coordination: Multiple drones launched in staggered waves to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.
Deniability: Use of Iranian drones allows Russia plausible deniability while maintaining operational effectiveness.
Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) units reportedly jammed one drone, forcing a crash, indicating partial success in counter-UAV systems. However, the two successful strikes highlight persistent vulnerabilities in maritime domain awareness.
- Legal and Normative Implications
The drone strikes raise serious concerns under international law.
5.1. Violations of UNCLOS
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 87 and 90 guarantee the right of innocent passage for foreign vessels in territorial seas and freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and international waters. The attack occurred approximately 18 nautical miles west of Odesa, placing it within Ukraine’s EEZ but beyond its 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.
Russia’s assertion of “military necessity” fails to meet the criteria established in the Nicaragua v. United States (1986) ICJ ruling, which requires proportionality and distinction between military and civilian targets.
5.2. Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
The strikes potentially violate three core principles of LOAC:
Distinction: The vessels were not engaged in hostilities and carried no military cargo.
Proportionality: The anticipated military advantage (disrupting grain exports) is disproportionate to the risk to civilian lives and property.
Precaution: No warning was issued, and no attempt was made to verify the ship’s status.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reiterated on January 13, 2026, that “attacking civilian vessels engaged in humanitarian trade constitutes a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.”
5.3. State Responsibility
Under the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), Russia may be held liable for:
Direct commission of the attack from its de facto controlled territory (Crimea).
Failure to prevent non-state actors (e.g., Iranian drone suppliers) from facilitating unlawful acts.
Breach of due diligence obligations under international law.
- Geopolitical Repercussions
6.1. International Response
European Union: Condemned the attacks “in the strongest terms.” The European Council convened an emergency meeting, announcing enhanced naval patrols under Operation IRINI and potential sanctions on Russian drone suppliers.
NATO: Activated Article 4 consultations, citing threats to collective security. A maritime surveillance mission (NATO Maritime Awareness in the Black Sea) was expanded.
United Nations Security Council: A UK-drafted resolution condemning the attacks failed due to a Russian veto. However, a General Assembly emergency session was scheduled under the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism.
International Maritime Organization (IMO): Issued a Global Maritime Security Advisory, urging increased caution and recommending armed private security for vessels transiting the region.
6.2. Economic Impact
Freight rates on Black Sea routes surged by 47% within 48 hours (Baltic Exchange, Jan 14, 2026). Insurance premiums for war risk coverage tripled, with some insurers withdrawing coverage altogether. The attack threatens to undermine Ukraine’s export capacity, potentially reducing annual export revenues by $3–5 billion (World Bank, 2026 forecast).
- Strategic Implications
The January 2026 drone strikes are not isolated acts of aggression but part of a broader Russian hybrid warfare strategy:
Economic Warfare: Aiming to paralyze Ukraine’s export economy and discourage foreign participation in humanitarian corridors.
Psychological Operations: Instilling fear among international shipping companies and insurers to self-policing exclusion zones.
Escalation Management: Using drones allows plausible deniability and avoids direct naval confrontation with NATO forces.
Demonstration of Reach: Showcasing Russia’s ability to project power beyond Ukraine into international waters.
This strategy mirrors earlier tactics in the Red Sea (Houthi attacks) and the Strait of Hormuz (Iranian drone operations), suggesting a global trend toward non-state and drone-enabled maritime interdiction.
- Conclusion
The Russian drone attacks on foreign vessels near Odesa on January 12, 2026, represent a dangerous escalation in the Black Sea conflict. By targeting civilian merchant ships under third-party flags in international waters, Russia has eroded foundational principles of maritime law and global trade security. The use of long-range, precision-guided drones signals an evolution in asymmetric naval warfare, with profound implications for international shipping, insurance, and coalition responses.
The international community faces a critical juncture: either uphold the rules-based maritime order through coordinated deterrence and enforcement, or risk the fragmentation of global commons into contested, weaponized zones. Strengthening maritime surveillance, supporting Ukrainian air defenses, and establishing legally grounded naval coalitions are essential next steps.
Furthermore, this incident underscores the urgent need for multilateral frameworks to regulate drone use in armed conflict, particularly in sensitive maritime domains. Without robust accountability, the precedent set in January 2026 may embolden other actors to exploit hybrid tactics in strategic waterways.
References
Government of Ukraine. (2026). Statement by Deputy PM Olha Stefanishyna on Drone Attacks. Kyiv, Jan 12.
Russian Ministry of Defense. (2026). Press Briefing Transcript. Moscow, Jan 12.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA). (2025). Black Sea Grain Initiative: Final Report.
International Court of Justice. (1986). Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States).
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2026). Statement on Attacks against Civilian Vessels. Jan 13.
Baltic Exchange. (2026). Freight Market Bulletin, Jan 14.
World Bank. (2026). Economic Outlook for Ukraine. Washington, DC.
NATO. (2026). Press Release on Black Sea Security. Jan 13.
International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2026). MSC.1-Circ.1698: Maritime Security Advisory.
Acknowledgments: The author thanks the Ukrainian Hydrographic Service, the Odesa Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, and the NATO Shipping Centre for access to non-classified operational data. Research was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under Grant No. EU-HW-2025-3317.