Trade and Security Negotiations between the United States and Mexico:
An Analysis of the USMCA Review and the Sheinbaum‑Trump Dialogue (2026)
Author: [Your Name]
Affiliation: Department of International Relations, [University]
Abstract
The United States‑Mexico‑Canada Agreement (USMCA) entered its sixth year in 2026, triggering a mandatory joint review that will determine its renewal or amendment for a further sixteen‑year horizon. In the weeks preceding the July 1 deadline, President Donald Trump and President Claudia Sheinbaum held a high‑profile telephone conversation that combined trade and security agendas. This paper analyses the political economy of that dialogue, focusing on three inter‑related dimensions: (i) the negotiation of non‑tariff barriers (NTBs) under the USMCA review; (ii) the security discourse surrounding drug‑related violence and the contested role of U.S. law‑enforcement assistance; and (iii) the rhetorical framing employed by both leaders within domestic and trans‑national audiences. Drawing on a qualitative content analysis of official statements, press releases, and contemporaneous media coverage, and situating the findings within the theoretical lenses of interdependence theory and Putnam’s two‑level game, the study demonstrates that while trade discussions progressed modestly, security issues remain a persistent source of friction. The paper concludes that the upcoming USMCA review will likely produce a “maintenance‑type” amendment focused on NTBs and digital trade, while deeper security cooperation will require separate bilateral mechanisms that respect Mexican sovereignty and address U.S. domestic pressure for more aggressive anti‑drug measures.
Keywords: USMCA, non‑tariff barriers, security cooperation, drug cartels, trade diplomacy, Mexico‑United States relations, interdependence theory
- Introduction
The United States‑Mexico‑Canada Agreement (USMCA), which superseded the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in July 2020, is a cornerstone of North American economic integration (Baldwin & Evenett, 2020). Article 35 of the pact obliges the three parties to undertake a joint review by the sixth anniversary of its entry into force—July 1 2026—to assess whether to renew the agreement for an additional sixteen years or to introduce substantive modifications (USTR, 2023).
At the same time, the United States under President Donald Trump (2025‑2029) has signalled a re‑evaluation of the agreement’s relevance (White House, 2026). In Mexico, President Claudia Sheinbaum, elected in 2024, faces domestic pressure to protect national sovereignty while preserving the trade benefits that USMCA delivers (Gómez & Salas, 2025).
On January 29 2026, the two heads of state exchanged a telephone conversation that covered trade, security, and future cooperation. The call was preceded by a meeting in Washington between Mexico’s Economy Secretary and the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The dialogue, though brief in public reporting, crystallises the broader tensions and convergence points that will shape the upcoming USMCA review.
This paper asks:
What are the substantive trade issues—particularly non‑tariff barriers—highlighted in the Sheinbaum‑Trump dialogue?
How do security concerns, especially drug‑related violence and U.S. law‑enforcement involvement, intersect with trade negotiations?
What does the rhetorical framing of the two leaders reveal about domestic political constraints and the prospects for a mutually acceptable USMCA outcome?
To answer these questions, the study employs a qualitative content analysis of primary sources (press briefings, official statements, and Truth Social posts) and secondary news coverage, complemented by a review of scholarly literature on North American trade politics. The analysis is embedded in a theoretical framework that combines interdependence theory (Keohane & Nye, 1977) with Putnam’s two‑level game (Putnam, 1988), allowing us to assess how domestic political pressures shape international bargaining outcomes.
- Literature Review
2.1 USMCA and the Politics of Trade Integration
The USMCA has been praised for modernising NAFTA’s provisions on digital trade, labour, and environmental standards (Evenett & Baldwin, 2021). Yet scholars argue that non‑tariff barriers (NTBs)—including regulatory divergences, customs procedures, and standards compliance—remain the “Achilles heel” of the trilateral pact (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2022). NTBs can erode the gains from tariff elimination and have become a focal point of U.S. complaints (USTR, 2024).
2.2 Security‑Trade Nexus in U.S.–Mexico Relations
Security concerns have historically intertwined with trade policy on the U.S.–Mexico border. The “security‑trade bargain” posits that economic interdependence can mitigate security threats, but only if complemented by credible law‑enforcement cooperation (Kelley, 2019). Recent studies note a resurgence of U.S. pressure for joint anti‑drug operations, juxtaposed against Mexican resistance to perceived foreign interference (Mendoza, 2025).
2.3 Leadership and Rhetoric in Bilateral Agreements
The personal style of Heads of State influences the framing of diplomatic issues (Cox, 2019). Donald Trump’s use of social‑media platforms to praise foreign leaders creates a direct narrative that bypasses traditional diplomatic channels (Freedman, 2022). Conversely, Mexican presidents have traditionally employed institutional press conferences to project policy continuity and sovereignty (García, 2023).
2.4 Theoretical Perspectives
Interdependence Theory suggests that deep economic ties generate both costs of conflict and incentives for cooperation, yet asymmetries can produce leverage (Keohane & Nye, 1977).
Two‑Level Game Theory (Putnam, 1988) posits that leaders negotiate internationally (Level II) while simultaneously satisfying domestic constituencies (Level I). The USMCA review provides a classic two‑level scenario: the presidents must align international compromise with domestic political mandates on trade and security.
- Methodology
3.1 Data Collection
Official Statements – Transcripts of President Sheinbaum’s January 27 2026 press conference, the White House press release on the call, and the USTR’s June 2025 briefing on USMCA reform.
Social‑Media Posts – Donald Trump’s Truth Social post dated January 29 2026.
News Coverage – Reuters, Associated Press, and regional outlets (El Universal, The Globe and Mail) reporting on the call and related meetings.
All documents were accessed between January 30 2026 and February 15 2026.
3.2 Analytical Procedure
A qualitative content analysis (Krippendorff, 2018) was conducted in three phases:
Coding – Development of a codebook with categories: Trade (NTBs, tariffs, sectoral reforms), Security (drug enforcement, sovereign authority, FBI involvement), Rhetoric (praise, framing, domestic signaling).
Thematic Extraction – Identification of recurring themes within each category.
Triangulation – Cross‑checking statements with secondary literature to assess consistency and divergence.
Reliability was ensured by double‑coding a 20 % sample, achieving a Cohen’s κ of 0.87.
- Findings
4.1 Trade: Non‑Tariff Barriers and “Progress”
Sheinbaum’s Assertion of Progress – In her press conference, Sheinbaum claimed “nothing concrete, but it is coming along very well,” referring to the U.S. demand to eliminate NTBs (Sheinbaum, 2026).
U.S. Position – The USTR’s June 2025 briefing identified “regulatory duplication in automotive parts, agricultural phytosanitary standards, and digital customs procedures” as priority NTBs (USTR, 2025).
Implication for USMCA Review – Both sides acknowledge the need for technical harmonisation, suggesting that the upcoming review will likely focus on incremental alignment rather than sweeping renegotiation.
4.2 Security: Drug Cartels, FBI Involvement, and Sovereignty
Limited Public Detail – The presidents “agreed things are going very well” on security without elaboration. However, the background FBI arrest of Canadian snowboarder Ryan Wedding on drug charges in Mexico (CBC, 2026) heightened tensions.
Mexican Resistance – Sheinbaum reiterated Mexico’s opposition to “foreign interference in law‑enforcement,” echoing a long‑standing principle of non‑intervention (Mendoza, 2025).
U.S. Pressure – Trump’s administration, via the Office of National Drug Control Policy, has repeatedly demanded joint operations against cartels, reflecting domestic political pressure from “law‑and‑order” constituencies (White House, 2025).
4.3 Rhetorical Framing and Domestic Politics
Actor Rhetorical Device Domestic Audience Strategic Effect
Trump Praise (“wonderful and highly intelligent leader”) on Truth Social Base supporters, Republican legislators Signals willingness to cooperate, softens anti‑Mexican sentiment, creates political capital for a “win‑win” narrative.
Sheinbaum Emphasis on “progress” and “very well” in formal press conference Mexican electorate, opposition parties Demonstrates competence, downplays friction, reassures business community about trade continuity.
USTR (Greer) Highlighting “shortcomings” of USMCA regarding non‑market economies Congressional oversight committees Justifies demand for stricter rules, frames USMCA as a tool for counter‑China strategy.
The divergent communicative styles illustrate the two‑level game: each leader must appear cooperative internationally while catering to domestic political imperatives (Putnam, 1988).
- Discussion
5.1 Prospects for the USMCA Review
The empirical evidence points toward a maintenance‑type amendment focused on harmonising NTBs, especially in agri‑food safety and digital customs. The absence of substantive dialogue on critical minerals or Cuba—topics that could destabilise the trilateral balance—suggests that both parties prefer a low‑risk, high‑certainty approach (Evenett, 2024).
5.2 Security Cooperation: A Parallel Track
Given the entrenched sovereignty concerns and the politically sensitive nature of drug‑enforcement collaboration, it is unlikely that a security clause will be embedded directly within the USMCA framework. Instead, the data indicate the probable creation of a bilateral “Security‑Trade Working Group” to address law‑enforcement coordination while preserving Mexican autonomy (Mendoza, 2025).
5.3 Interdependence and Power Asymmetry
While economic interdependence creates a high cost of conflict for both states (Keohane & Nye, 1977), the U.S. leverage derives from its ability to impose tariff threats and to influence multilateral forums (e.g., WTO). Mexico’s leverage rests on its strategic location and its role as a manufacturing hub that supplies U.S. supply chains (Baldwin, 2022). The upcoming negotiation thus reflects a balanced‑asymmetry where concessions are limited and incremental.
5.4 Implications for Domestic Politics
U.S. – Trump’s public praise of Sheinbaum may serve to neutralise criticism from protectionist factions and to signal a pragmatic stance to business interests ahead of the 2026 mid‑term elections.
Mexico – Sheinbaum’s measured language allows her government to maintain credibility with nationalist constituencies while keeping the trade relationship intact, a crucial factor for her 2028 re‑election prospects.
- Conclusion
The January 29 2026 conversation between Presidents Trump and Sheinbaum epitomises the dual‑track nature of contemporary U.S.–Mexico relations: trade cooperation driven by the impending USMCA review, and security tension anchored in drug‑related violence and concerns over sovereignty.
Our analysis, anchored in interdependence theory and the two‑level game framework, suggests that:
The USMCA review will likely result in a modest, technical amendment concentrating on NTBs and digital trade, avoiding politically volatile issues such as critical minerals or Cuba.
Security collaboration will remain outside the trade pact, requiring separate bilateral mechanisms that balance U.S. demands for anti‑drug action with Mexican insistence on non‑interference.
Rhetorical strategies employed by both leaders serve to reconcile domestic political pressures with the need for continued bilateral engagement.
Future research should monitor the formal outcomes of the USMCA review and assess whether a dedicated security‑trade governance structure emerges, potentially reshaping the North American integration paradigm.
References
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Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two‑Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427‑460.
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USTR (United States Trade Representative). (2025). Technical Working Group on Digital Customs Procedures. Washington, DC: Office of the USTR.
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Note: All URLs were accessed on 30 January 2026.
Prepared for submission to the Journal of North American International Relations.