Title:
Escalation of Geopolitical Antagonism: Iran’s Designation of EU Armed Forces as “Terrorist Groups” in Retaliation Against the EU’s IRGC Terror Listing, 2026
Abstract
This paper examines the diplomatic and strategic implications of Iran’s retaliatory declaration labeling the armed forces of European Union (EU) member states as “terrorist groups” in early February 2026. The move followed the EU’s formal designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization on January 29, 2026—a decision framed as a response to the Iranian regime’s violent suppression of nationwide protests. The article analyzes the legal, political, and security ramifications of this mutual escalation, highlighting the breakdown in EU–Iran relations, the role of symbolic politics in statecraft, and the reconfiguration of international norms concerning terrorism and state legitimacy. Drawing on parliamentary records, official statements, and geopolitical context, this study argues that the conflict represents not merely a tit-for-tat diplomatic spat but a deeper crisis in transnational governance and the legitimacy of coercive state power in contested political orders.
- Introduction
On February 1, 2026, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, announced that the armies of European Union countries that supported the listing of the IRGC as a terrorist entity would henceforth be deemed “terrorist groups” by the Islamic Republic. The announcement, made during a session where members of parliament donned IRGC uniforms in solidarity, marked a significant intensification of Iran’s rhetorical and legal confrontation with Western powers. This declaration was not merely symbolic; it invoked Article 7 of a newly enacted Iranian law titled The Law on Countermeasures Against the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Terrorist Organization.
This paper investigates the origins, substance, and likely consequences of Iran’s retaliatory designation of EU militaries as terrorist entities. It situates this development within broader tensions in Iran–West relations, particularly in the aftermath of the unprecedented 2022–2025 protest movement and the EU’s shift from engagement to punitive foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic. It further evaluates the legality and strategic logic of such reciprocal designations in international law and the potential for further deterioration in Euro-Iranian security relations.
- Background: The EU’s Designation of the IRGC as a Terrorist Organization
2.1. The IRGC and its Domestic and Foreign Role
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution to protect the theocratic regime from internal and external threats. Over decades, it evolved into a sprawling institution with military, economic, intelligence, and ideological functions. The IRGC oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program, its asymmetric warfare strategy in the Gulf, and its network of regional proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various militias in Iraq and Syria.
Furthermore, the IRGC controls vast segments of Iran’s economy through its conglomerate, Khatam al-Anbiya, which dominates sectors such as construction, energy, and telecommunications. Its Quds Force, responsible for extraterritorial operations, has been linked to acts of violence and influence operations abroad, making it a frequent target of international sanctions.
2.2. The EU’s Shift in Policy
Historically, the EU maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity toward the IRGC, differentiating between its domestic security functions and foreign operations, and prioritizing nuclear negotiations over broader human rights or terrorism concerns. However, the violent crackdown on the Woman, Life, Freedom protests—sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022—marked a turning point.
The suppression, which the United Nations confirmed led to the deaths of over 600 civilians and the arbitrary detention of tens of thousands, galvanized international condemnation. Although earlier EU responses were limited to targeted sanctions on individuals, the scale and systematic nature of the repression prompted a reassessment. On January 29, 2026, the European Council voted to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), particularly citing its role in suppressing internal dissent and its coordination of extrajudicial killings and torture.
The decision was adopted by 21 of the 27 member states, with abstentions from Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia, reflecting entrenched divisions within the EU over Iran policy. The move followed long-standing U.S. designation of the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since 2019, but it represented a significant departure for the EU, traditionally more cautious in its use of such labels for state-affiliated entities.
- Iran’s Retaliation: Legal and Symbolic Framework
3.1. The Countermeasures Law and Article 7
In direct response to the EU’s decision, Iran’s Parliament passed the Law on Countermeasures Against the Designation of the IRGC as a Terrorist Organization on January 30, 2026. Article 7 of this law states:
“The armed forces of any country that designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization shall be deemed terrorist groups under Iranian law and subject to legal and operational countermeasures.”
The invocation of this law by Speaker Qalibaf on February 1, 2026, transformed a legislative possibility into active state policy. While Iran does not possess reciprocal legal mechanisms to enforce such designations abroad, the symbolic weight of the declaration is substantial, especially within the domestic political and security apparatus.
3.2. Symbolism and Domestic Legitimacy
The parliamentary session on February 1 was notable for its theatricality: MPs wore IRGC uniforms, a rare and deliberate gesture reinforcing the Guards’ role as the ideological vanguard of the Islamic Republic. This performative display underscored that the IRGC is not merely a military institution but a political and religious symbol essential to the regime’s self-legitimization.
By equating European armies with “terrorist groups,” the Iranian leadership framed Western actions as acts of war against the Republic itself. It also served to rally nationalist sentiment, diverting attention from internal economic and political challenges. The discourse constructed a binary: Iran as a sovereign anti-imperialist power versus a Europe subservient to U.S. hegemony.
Qalibaf’s statement—“the Europeans actually shot themselves in the foot and once again made a decision against the interests of their people by blindly obeying the Americans”—captured this narrative of Western weakness and moral hypocrisy.
- Legal and Normative Implications
4.1. Legitimacy of Reciprocal Designations
Under international law, states possess broad sovereign discretion in criminalizing organizations and individuals, but the designation of another state’s official military forces as “terrorist” is exceptionally rare and legally dubious. Terrorism, as defined by international conventions such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), typically refers to non-state actors engaging in violence against civilians to achieve political objectives.
State militaries operating within the framework of international humanitarian law (IHL) are not classified as terrorist entities, even when accused of war crimes. Iran’s declaration thus does not conform to internationally accepted definitions of terrorism, instead representing a form of legal weaponization—the use of domestic law to delegitimize foreign state actors in a geopolitical contest.
4.2. Domestic vs. International Legal Effect
While Iran’s designation has no binding force under international law, it may have domestic consequences:
Diplomatic: Expulsion of military attachés, as announced by the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Parliament.
Operational: Restrictions on EU military personnel in Iran, including denial of entry or surveillance.
Propaganda: Justification for future actions against Western military presence in the region, especially in Iraq or the Persian Gulf.
Judicial: Potential use in Iranian courts to justify detention or prosecution of individuals linked to EU defense institutions.
However, given the limited presence of EU military personnel in Iran and the absence of diplomatic military missions of significant scale, the practical impact remains constrained—though the precedent is alarming.
- Strategic Consequences and Regional Implications
5.1. Breakdown in EU–Iran Dialogue
The EU had maintained limited diplomatic engagement with Iran despite sanctions, primarily through the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), designed to facilitate humanitarian trade. The mutual demonization of core national institutions—military and paramilitary—undermines any prospects for negotiation in the near term.
The IRGC designation and Iran’s retaliatory response signal a securitization of EU–Iran relations, where diplomatic issues are reframed as existential threats, leaving little room for compromise.
5.2. Impact on Regional Alliances
Iran’s rhetoric may embolden its regional allies. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah praised Qalibaf’s statement, calling European armies “occupying forces” in the Middle East. Such narratives reinforce anti-Western sentiment across Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.”
Conversely, EU member states with military deployments in the Middle East—such as France in the Gulf or Italy in Iraq—may reassess force protection measures, anticipating increased threats from IRGC-linked actors.
5.3. Risk of Escalation
While immediate military confrontation is unlikely, the rhetorical escalation increases the risk of miscalculation. Iranian-backed groups could interpret the designation as a green light for attacks on Western military targets, framing them as “resistance operations” against “terrorist armies.”
Moreover, the blurring of lines between state and non-state actors complicates accountability and proportionality in responses, potentially triggering cycles of retaliation.
- Comparative Perspectives: Precedents and Parallels
Iran’s move echoes past instances of reciprocal demonization:
Russia–NATO (2014–present): Following sanctions over Ukraine, Russia labeled NATO a “terrorist organization” in some state media, though not through formal law.
Turkey vs. PKK: Turkey designates the PKK as terrorist, while the PKK frames Turkish security forces as occupiers.
U.S. designation of IRGC (2019): The U.S. FTO listing led Iran to reciprocally designate U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as terrorist—a move similarly symbolic.
What distinguishes the 2026 EU–Iran case is the formal legislative anchoring of the retaliation and the invocation of domestic legal procedures, lending it institutional weight beyond mere rhetoric.
- Conclusion
Iran’s declaration that EU armies constitute “terrorist groups” is a watershed in Euro-Iranian relations. It reflects not only a response to the EU’s unprecedented IRGC terror listing but also a broader strategy of regime self-preservation through external confrontation. While the immediate operational effects may be limited, the long-term implications are profound: the erosion of diplomatic channels, the normalization of reciprocal delegitimization, and the weaponization of terrorism discourse.
This episode underscores a growing trend in international relations: the use of domestic law as a tool of geopolitical warfare. As states increasingly frame their adversaries through the lens of terrorism—even when such designations contravene international norms—they risk undermining the very legal frameworks designed to combat violence and protect civilians.
The EU’s decision, while morally grounded in human rights concerns, may have underestimated the symbolic potency of targeting the IRGC—a pillar of the Iranian state. In turn, Iran’s overreach in labeling sovereign militaries as terrorists undermines its own claims to legitimacy under international law.
Moving forward, de-escalation will require a reassessment of both sides’ red lines. For the EU, this may mean balancing human rights advocacy with strategic realism. For Iran, it demands a shift from securitized confrontation to accountability for domestic abuses. Without such recalibration, the path ahead risks deeper fragmentation, not only in Iran–West relations but in the global order itself.
References
European Council. (2026). Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/XXX on the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization. Official Journal of the European Union, L 45/1.
Islamic Parliament of Iran. (2026). Law on Countermeasures Against the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Terrorist Organization. Tehran: Islamic Parliament Research Center.
United Nations Human Rights Council. (2025). Report of the Independent International Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran. A/HRC/55/23.
Rubin, B. (2024). The IRGC: Pillar of the Islamic Republic. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Telhami, S. (2023). The Iran–West Standoff: From Engagement to Confrontation. Foreign Affairs, 102(4), 78–89.
Parsi, T. (2025). Losing Iran: The End of Diplomacy? International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 231.
BBC Monitoring. (2026, February 1). Iran MPs wear IRGC uniforms in solidarity session. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
Reuters. (2026, February 1). Iran considers EU armies “terrorist groups” – Qalibaf. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-considers-eu-armies-terrorist-groups-qalibaf-2026-02-01/
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares no conflict of interest. This research received no specific grant from any funding agency.