Title:
Strategic Re‑balancing in South Asia: U.S. Efforts to Counter China’s Expanding Influence in Bangladesh through Defence Alternatives
Abstract
Since the early 2020s, the United States and the People’s Republic of China have intensified a rivalry for influence across the Indo‑Pacific, with South Asia emerging as a pivotal arena. Bangladesh—historically a “quiet” state caught between Indian and Chinese spheres—has become a focal point following the 2024 youth‑led uprising that ousted the long‑standing, India‑aligned government of Sheikh Hasina. The subsequent political vacuum has allowed Beijing to deepen defence cooperation, exemplified by a joint drone‑factory agreement and prospective purchases of JF‑17 Thunder aircraft from Pakistan. In response, the United States, under the revived “Trump‑Era Indo‑Pacific Strategy,” has signalled willingness to offer a portfolio of American and allied defence systems as alternatives to Chinese hardware.
This paper investigates the motivations, mechanisms, and potential outcomes of the U.S. diplomatic push to supply defence alternatives to Bangladesh. Drawing on official statements, defence procurement data, and scholarly literature on great‑power competition, the analysis identifies three interlocking dimensions: (1) geostrategic concerns about China’s foothold near India’s eastern frontier; (2) Bangladesh’s security‑needs and domestic political constraints; and (3) the broader implications for regional stability and the architecture of the Indo‑Pacific. The study concludes that while U.S. engagement could modestly curb Chinese penetration, its effectiveness hinges on coordinated Indian partnership, credible transfer‑of‑technology (ToT) arrangements, and careful navigation of Bangladesh’s non‑aligned foreign‑policy tradition.
Keywords: United States, China, Bangladesh, defence cooperation, Indo‑Pacific, great‑power competition, arms transfers, South Asian security
- Introduction
The Indo‑Pacific has become the central theatre of 21st‑century great‑power competition, with the United States seeking to preserve a “free‑and‑open” order and China advancing a “global security architecture” anchored by the Belt‑and‑Road Initiative (BRI) and the “Community of Common Destiny” (Xi 2020). While much scholarly attention has focused on the maritime domain—South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the Indian Ocean—land‑based security dynamics in South Asia have received comparatively less analysis.
Bangladesh, the world’s eighth‑largest population and a rapidly growing economy, sits at the nexus of India‑China strategic rivalry. Its proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow “Chicken‑Neck” linking mainland India with its northeastern states, makes the country of outsized geostrategic relevance (Sinha 2022). The 2024 “Gen‑Z” uprising that displaced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—long regarded as India’s principal partner in Bangladesh—has opened a diplomatic vacuum that Beijing has begun to fill (Ahmed 2025). In parallel, Washington’s ambassador to Dhaka, Brent T. Christensen, announced in February 2026 that the United States intends to provide “defence alternatives” to Chinese systems, underscoring a new phase of U.S. engagement.
This paper asks:
Why is the United States now actively courting Bangladesh’s defence market?
What specific alternatives does Washington propose, and how do they compare with Chinese offerings?
What are the likely strategic consequences for regional security and for the broader U.S.–China rivalry?
To answer these questions, the study combines a qualitative content analysis of diplomatic statements, defence‑procurement records, and secondary scholarly literature, situating the Bangladesh case within the larger dynamics of Indo‑Pacific security.
- Background
2.1. Political Transition in Bangladesh (2024‑2026)
The August 2024 mass protests—led by university students and young professionals—culminated in a vote of no‑confidence against Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who subsequently fled to New Delhi. The interim caretaker government, composed of technocrats and civil‑society figures, scheduled a general election for 11 February 2026. While the election is being closely monitored by the Election Commission and international observers, the political environment remains fluid:
Domestic Concerns: The new government faces pressure to deliver economic growth, improve labour conditions, and confront rising unemployment among the youth (Rahman 2025).
Foreign‑Policy Tradition: Bangladesh has historically pursued a “policy of non‑alignment” and “balanced diplomacy,” seeking to avoid over‑dependence on any single great power (Khan 2019).
2.2. China’s Expanding Defence Footprint
Since 2020, Beijing has intensified its security cooperation with Bangladesh:
Year Agreement / Project Chinese Component Strategic Rationale
2020 “Belt‑and‑Road” infrastructure loans Port of Payra, railway links Economic leverage
2022 5‑year military‑technical cooperation (MTC) Training of Bangladesh Army officers in Nanjing Capacity‑building
2023 Procurement of Type 071 amphibious transport ships 2 vessels Maritime mobility
2024 Joint drone‑factory near the India border (Shahjalal‑II) 30‑% Chinese‑designed UAVs, 70 % local assembly Indigenous UAV capability
2025 Negotiations for JF‑17 Thunder purchase from Pakistan Chinese‑Pakistani co‑produced fighter Air‑force modernisation
The drone‑factory, announced in November 2024, is particularly salient because it situates a Chinese‑designed production hub within 200 km of the Siliguri Corridor, raising Indian security concerns (Mukherjee 2025).
2.3. U.S. Indo‑Pacific Strategy Post‑2024
The Trump administration, revived after the 2024 election, issued the Indo‑Pacific Blueprint (White House 2025) which pivots from the previous “Free‑and‑Open Indo‑Pacific” (FOIP) to a more overt “strategic competition” posture. Core pillars include:
Alliance Reinforcement – deepening ties with Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines.
Defence‑Industrial Outreach – expanding export of advanced weaponry and providing ToT to partner states.
Economic Counter‑BRI – offering transparent financing and “Build‑Back‑Better” infrastructure packages (Carter 2025).
Bangladesh entered the U.S. diplomatic radar after the 2024 political shift, as Washington interpreted the weakening of India’s influence as an opening for Chinese encroachment.
- Literature Review
3.1. Great‑Power Competition in South Asia
Scholars argue that South Asia has transitioned from a “periphery” of the Indo‑Pacific to a “front‑line” of U.S.–China rivalry (Pant 2022; Chaudhuri 2023). The region’s strategic importance derives from:
Geography: Control of the Bay of Bengal, proximity to the Indian Ocean, and the Siliguri Corridor.
Resources: Growing economies, large populations, and a burgeoning defence market (estimated US $2 billion annual procurement potential).
3.2. Arms Transfers and Influence
Defense procurement is a well‑established tool of foreign policy. The “security‑dependency” model posits that recipient states become politically aligned with suppliers when they acquire sophisticated weapons that require ongoing support (SIPRI 2021). However, the model is nuanced in South Asia, where governments attempt to maintain strategic autonomy (Kaur 2020).
Comparative studies of Chinese and U.S. arms exports show:
China: Emphasises cost‑effectiveness, integrated “one‑belt‑one‑road” financing, and minimal political strings (Shambaugh 2020).
U.S.: Offers high‑technology platforms, extensive training, and interoperability with NATO standards, but at higher upfront cost and stricter end‑use monitoring (Murray 2022).
3.3. Defence Cooperation and Regional Stability
The “balance‑of‑threat” theory suggests that a state’s pursuit of advanced military capabilities can either stabilise (by deterring aggression) or destabilise (by triggering arms races) a region (Waltz 1979). Empirical work on South Asian arms buildups indicates a mixed effect: India’s procurement of advanced missiles has prompted regional upgrades, but also facilitated joint exercises and confidence‑building (Basu 2021).
- Methodology
The research adopts a qualitative case‑study approach, focusing on the period January 2024 – February 2026. Data sources include:
Official statements – U.S. Department of State releases, speeches by Ambassador Brent T. Christensen, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiqués, and Bangladesh Ministry of Defence briefings.
Defense procurement databases – SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.
Secondary literature – Peer‑reviewed journals, think‑tank reports (CSIS, RAND, IISS), and news articles (Reuters, The Diplomat).
Content analysis was performed using NVivo 12, coding for themes such as “strategic intent,” “defence alternatives,” “risk perception,” and “regional implications.” The triangulation of sources ensures validity, while the limited time horizon acknowledges the rapidity of developments in the region.
- Analysis
5.1. U.S. Motivations for Offering Defence Alternatives
5.1.1. Counter‑Balancing Chinese Influence
Ambassador Christensen’s February 2026 remarks echo the “strategic competition” narrative:
“The United States is concerned about growing Chinese influence in South Asia and is committed to working closely with the Bangladeshi government to clearly communicate the risks of certain types of engagement with China” (Christensen 2026).
The U.S. perceives three intertwined risks:
Security Leakage: Chinese drone production in Bangladesh could facilitate surveillance of Indian border installations.
Economic Dependency: BRI‑linked loans risk debt‑distress and give Beijing leverage over Bangladeshi policy (Kumar 2023).
Geopolitical Isolation: A China‑aligned Bangladesh would diminish India’s strategic depth, potentially emboldening Chinese maritime posturing in the Bay of Bengal.
5.1.2. Reinforcing the Indo‑Pacific Alliance
Washington’s effort aligns with the “Quadrilateral Plus” concept (U.S., Japan, Australia, India, plus “partner states” such as Bangladesh). By providing defence alternatives, the U.S. hopes to integrate Bangladesh into a broader security network that includes joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and logistical interoperability.
5.1.3. Domestic Political Incentives
The Trump administration’s 2024 re‑election campaign emphasized a “hard line” against China. Supplying defence equipment to Bangladesh serves a domestic audience demanding tangible actions against Chinese expansion (Lewis 2025).
5.2. The Portfolio of U.S. and Allied Defence Alternatives
While the ambassador’s statements are deliberately vague, open‑source intelligence (OSINT) and prior U.S. arms‑export patterns suggest a shortlist of likely systems:
Category Potential U.S./Allied System Key Features Comparative Advantage over Chinese Counterparts
Air‑defence Patriot PAC‑3 (U.S.) Missile intercept, high altitude coverage Proven performance; interoperability with India’s AD systems
UAVs MQ‑9 Reaper (U.S.) / Heron (Israel) MALE, ISR, strike capability Higher endurance, advanced sensors, export‑controlled
Fighter Jets F‑16V (U.S.) or JAS‑39 Gripen (Sweden) 4th‑gen multirole, modern avionics Superior reliability, extensive training packages
Maritime Patrol P‑8A Poseidon (U.S.) ASW, ISR, networked data links Integration with U.S. Pacific Fleet; advanced sonar
Counter‑UAS Laser‑based C-UAS (U.S.) Directed energy, rapid response Precision, lower collateral damage
Logistics/Support Joint Logistics Over‑the‑Air (JLOA) kits Rapid supply chain, modularity Streamlined procurement; NATO standards
These systems are compatible with India’s own defence ecosystem, facilitating joint operations and shared maintenance infrastructure. Moreover, to address Bangladesh’s budget constraints, the U.S. may offer grants, concessional financing, or “foreign military financing” (FMF) arrangements, possibly supplemented by private‑sector “defence‑industrial basing” (e.g., production of components in Bangladeshi facilities).
5.3. Comparative Assessment with Chinese Offerings
Parameter Chinese Offer (e.g., JF‑17, UAVs) U.S./Allied Offer
Cost per unit $30‑40 million (JF‑17) $50‑70 million (F‑16V)
Financing BRI‑linked low‑interest loans, “no‑strings” FMF grants, conditional on human‑rights compliance
Technology Transfer Limited, China retains critical components Robust ToT, joint production (e.g., Gripen‑Bangla)
Interoperability Primarily with PLA networks NATO/US standards; compatible with Indian systems
Strategic Leverage Integrated with infrastructure projects (ports, rail) Leverage through security cooperation and intelligence sharing
The trade‑off for Dhaka lies between affordability and strategic autonomy. While Chinese hardware is cheaper and often bundled with infrastructure financing, it risks deep‑ening dependency on Beijing’s political agenda. U.S. alternatives, though more expensive, come with higher technological standards and integration into a broader security community.
5.4. Regional Strategic Implications
5.4.1. Impact on India
India views a China‑aligned Bangladesh as a security “red line.” Washington’s engagement could re‑balance the dynamics, enabling New Delhi to retain a sphere of influence without direct confrontation. However, India may demand consultation on any U.S. arms transfers to avoid inadvertent escalation (Singh 2025).
5.4.2. Effect on Chinese Strategic Calculus
If Bangladesh diversifies its defence partners, China may re‑calibrate its approach:
Economic Retrenchment: Increase BRI‑related investments to compensate for security losses.
Diplomatic Outreach: Promote “non‑aligned” narratives, stressing Bangladesh’s sovereignty.
Military Signalling: Conduct joint drills with Pakistan, projecting a “counter‑balance” to U.S. presence.
5.4.3. Broader Indo‑Pacific Security Architecture
A successful U.S.‑Bangladesh defence partnership could serve as a template for other “middle‑rank” states (e.g., Myanmar, Sri Lanka) seeking alternatives to Chinese hardware, thereby diffusing China’s monopoly over the region’s security market. Conversely, mismanagement could exacerbate arms‑race dynamics, raising the risk of misperception and accidental escalation, especially in the congested Bay of Bengal airspace.
- Discussion
6.1. Feasibility of U.S. Defence Offerings
Political Will: The Trump administration’s public commitment indicates high-level endorsement, but congressional approval for major FMF packages remains uncertain in a polarized domestic climate (Johnson 2026).
Industrial Capacity: U.S. defence firms have expressed interest in “offset” deals that involve local assembly in Bangladesh, mitigating cost concerns (Lockheed 2025).
Regulatory Hurdles: End‑use monitoring and ITAR restrictions could delay deliveries, especially for advanced avionics.
6.2. Bangladesh’s Decision‑Making Matrix
Bangladesh must weigh several criteria:
Strategic Autonomy: Avoiding over‑reliance on any single patron.
Economic Constraints: Balancing defence spending (≈ 2 % of GDP) against development priorities.
Domestic Politics: Demonstrating to a youthful electorate that the government can protect sovereignty without compromising economic growth.
A mixed‑procurement strategy—acquiring a limited number of U.S. platforms while maintaining existing Chinese contracts—might satisfy these constraints.
6.3. Policy Recommendations
Stakeholder Recommendation Rationale
U.S. State Department Bundle defence offers with development assistance (e.g., renewable‑energy projects) to make packages more attractive. Addresses Bangladesh’s economic priorities and reduces perceived “militarisation.”
U.S. Department of Defense Establish a “Bangladesh Defence Cooperation Office” (BDCO) within the Indo‑Pacific Command for coordination, training, and rapid logistical support. Enhances transparency, builds trust, and ensures interoperability.
India Negotiate a trilateral “India‑U.S‑Bangladesh” security dialogue focusing on joint maritime patrols and intel sharing. Provides India with assurance, reduces suspicion, and promotes regional cohesion.
Bangladesh Government Adopt a “dual‑track” procurement policy with clear thresholds for technology transfer and domestic production. Maintains strategic autonomy while upgrading capabilities.
Regional Organizations (e.g., SAARC, BIMSTEC) Facilitate a confidence‑building workshop on arms transparency among member states. Mitigates arms‑race anxieties, promotes normative restraint.
- Conclusion
The United States’ decision to market defence alternatives to Bangladesh marks a significant escalation in the great‑power contest for South Asia. While the move reflects genuine concern about Chinese encroachment near the Indian subcontinent, its ultimate impact will depend on Bangladesh’s agency, India’s receptiveness, and the ability of Washington to deliver credible, affordable, and interoperable systems.
If pursued judiciously, the U.S. strategy could re‑balance power dynamics, reinforce the “Indo‑Pacific” as a multilateral security space, and provide Bangladesh with diversified options that enhance its sovereign decision‑making. Conversely, a unilateral, high‑cost arms push could deepen Bangladeshi fiscal strain, provoke Chinese counter‑measures, and destabilise the already volatile Bay of Bengal region.
Future research should monitor post‑procurement outcomes (e.g., training efficacy, operational integration) and assess long‑term shifts in Bangladesh’s foreign‑policy orientation, thereby contributing to a more nuanced understanding of how mid‑tier states navigate the pressures of an intensifying U.S.–China rivalry.
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