CASE STUDY
with Analysis of Impact on Singapore
Prepared: February 2026
Sources: AFP, World Bank, CSIS, ISW, UNHCR, Kiel Institute, IMF
Executive Summary
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 triggered the most consequential armed conflict in Europe since World War II, with cascading effects that have redrawn geopolitical alignments, shattered energy markets, disrupted global food supply chains, and accelerated deglobalisation trends. Four years on, the war remains unresolved, with approximately 19.5% of Ukrainian territory under Russian occupation and no credible ceasefire framework in sight.
This case study provides a structured analytical review of the conflict’s economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions, with particular attention to the war’s specific impact on Singapore — a small, open, trade-dependent city-state uniquely exposed to the conflict’s second- and third-order effects.
- Military Dimension
1.1 Territorial Overview
Russia’s military campaign initially aimed for rapid regime change in Kyiv but failed within the first month, pivoting to a grinding war of attrition in Ukraine’s east and south. As of mid-February 2026:
Metric Data Point Source
Russian-controlled territory ~19.5% of Ukraine ISW, Feb 2026
Pre-invasion occupied territory ~7% (Crimea + Donbas) ISW
Net territorial gain since Feb 2022 ~12.5% of Ukraine ISW
Healthcare facilities attacked 2,800+ verified WHO
Area contaminated by mines/UXO ~20% of Ukraine UNMAS
Russia’s largest territorial advances came in 2024, though the pace of advance slowed considerably entering 2025–2026. Key urban centers including Bakhmut, Toretsk, and Vovchansk have been reduced to rubble, representing some of the most intense urban warfare in modern history.
1.2 Human Losses
Neither side releases reliable, real-time casualty data. The following reflects the best available open-source and institutional estimates as of early 2026:
Category Estimate Source / Notes
Ukrainian soldiers killed 100,000–140,000 CSIS estimate
Ukrainian soldiers killed (Zelensky) ~55,000 Widely considered underestimate
Russian soldiers killed (verified) 177,000+ BBC / Mediazona (obituaries)
Russian soldiers killed (estimated) Up to 325,000 CSIS high estimate
Ukrainian civilians killed (verified) 15,000+ UN (likely undercounts occupied areas)
Children forcibly displaced/kidnapped ~20,000 Kyiv government estimates
The casualty asymmetry — with Russian military deaths estimated at roughly double Ukrainian military deaths — reflects Ukraine’s defensive positional advantages and significant Western intelligence and targeting support. However, Russia’s willingness to absorb losses reflects both coercive mobilisation policies and a numerical manpower advantage.
1.3 Allied Military Contributions
The conflict has become a proxy theatre for superpower competition:
Western bloc (NATO/EU): EUR 201 billion in total aid from Europe since 2022 (Kiel Institute). The United States contributed $115 billion in total support, though the Trump administration partially suspended arms deliveries in early 2025.
North Korea: Thousands of soldiers deployed alongside Russian forces; millions of artillery shells supplied to Moscow — representing Pyongyang’s deepest military entanglement outside the Korean Peninsula.
Iran: Supplied drone technology (Shahed series) to Russia, which has been used extensively against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
China: Maintained economic partnership with Moscow, providing critical import substitution to offset Western sanctions. China has been accused by Western governments of knowingly facilitating sanction evasion.
- Economic Dimension
2.1 Ukraine’s Economic Collapse and Dependency
Ukraine’s economy contracted by nearly one-third in the year immediately following the full-scale invasion — one of the most severe wartime economic collapses recorded outside hyperinflationary contexts. Recovery has been partial and structurally precarious:
Indicator Pre-War (2021) 2023–2025 Status
GDP contraction Baseline ~30% drop in 2022; partial recovery since
Government fiscal status Moderate deficit Fully dependent on IMF/foreign lenders for current expenditure
Reconstruction cost estimate N/A $588 billion over 10 years (World Bank, Feb 2026)
Refugee displacement N/A 5.9M external; 3.7M internally displaced
Energy infrastructure Intact Repeatedly targeted; millions without heating/power
The $588 billion reconstruction estimate from the World Bank — equivalent to roughly three to four times Ukraine’s pre-war GDP — underscores that reconstruction is not a domestic policy challenge but a multi-decade international financing question. The IMF Extended Fund Facility and bilateral loans from EU member states have become the primary mechanism for keeping Ukraine’s public sector solvent.
2.2 Russia: Wartime Stimulus and Structural Deterioration
Russia’s economy has proven more resilient than Western policymakers initially anticipated, largely due to a combination of trade reorientation toward China, India, and the Global South, and a massive fiscal stimulus programme anchored in military spending of up to 9% of GDP.
Indicator 2022–2023 (Peak) 2024–2025 (Slowing)
GDP growth ~4-5% (war stimulus) ~1% (2025)
Military spending as % of GDP ~6-7% ~9%
Oil & gas revenue Elevated (pre-price cap) 5-year low (2024-2025)
Inflation Moderate Rising sharply; CBR rate >20%
Western sanctions packages First wave 14+ packages (EU)
Domestic dissent prosecutions Emerging 10,000+ cases (Mediazona, 2024)
Russia’s economic model has evolved into a form of military Keynesianism — sustaining demand through defence procurement at the cost of severe capital misallocation, structural inflation, and hollowing-out of the civilian manufacturing base. Oil and gas revenues, which historically provide approximately a quarter of federal budget income, fell to a five-year low in 2024 due to G7 price caps on Russian crude, Ukrainian drone attacks on refineries, and redirected export flows at discounted prices.
The Central Bank of Russia has responded to inflationary pressure with interest rates exceeding 20%, suppressing credit and consumer demand. Economists broadly assess that Russia’s economy is approaching a stagflationary trap — war-driven demand unable to substitute for the structural erosion in civilian productive capacity.
2.3 Global Economic Spillovers
Food Security
Ukraine and Russia together accounted for approximately 30% of global wheat exports and 50–60% of sunflower oil exports prior to the war. The conflict’s disruption to Black Sea shipping routes caused a global food price shock in 2022 that disproportionately affected lower-income nations in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. The UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative temporarily mitigated disruptions but was abandoned by Russia in July 2023, re-tightening supply.
Energy Markets
Russia’s curtailment of natural gas supplies to Europe following the invasion — and the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022 — triggered Europe’s worst energy crisis since the 1970s. LNG spot prices surged, diverting global LNG cargoes to Europe and tightening supply for Asian markets. Europe’s accelerated push to diversify away from Russian energy has structurally realigned long-term LNG contracting, benefiting producers in Qatar, the United States, and Australia while raising baseline energy costs.
- Diplomatic Dimension
3.1 Multilateral Architecture Under Strain
The Russia–Ukraine war has severely tested multilateral institutions designed to manage great-power conflict. The UN Security Council has been effectively paralysed by Russia’s veto power. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President Vladimir Putin in March 2023 for the alleged forcible deportation of Ukrainian children — the first ICC warrant for a sitting P5 leader — but enforcement remains unrealistic in practice.
3.2 NATO Expansion and Alliance Cohesion
Paradoxically, Russia’s stated objective of preventing NATO expansion has accelerated it. Finland joined NATO in April 2023 and Sweden in March 2024, adding over 1,300 km of new NATO-Russia border. Baltic states have dramatically increased defence spending. Germany reversed decades of post-war strategic restraint, committing to 2%+ GDP defence expenditure.
Alliance cohesion has nonetheless been complicated by the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency in January 2025. Trump’s administration has introduced significant uncertainty into US security commitments, partially suspended arms deliveries to Ukraine, and initiated direct bilateral contacts with Moscow — bypassing Kyiv and European partners in early negotiation rounds held in Istanbul, Abu Dhabi, and Geneva, all of which failed to produce a framework deal.
3.3 Peace Negotiations: Structure of Failure
The structural obstacles to a negotiated settlement remain formidable:
Russian Demand Ukrainian/Western Counter-Position Bridgeability
Full control of Donetsk region Constitutionally inadmissible; militarily unresolved Very Low
Ban on Western military support to Ukraine Core NATO/EU commitment; legally and politically impossible to enforce Very Low
No NATO membership for Ukraine Ukraine’s constitution (2019 amendment) mandates NATO pursuit Low–Medium
Sanctions relief Conditional on verified withdrawal; US/EU divided Medium
Recognition of territorial gains Rejected by Ukraine, EU, US (formally) Very Low
The negotiation landscape reflects a classic ‘commitment problem’ in war termination theory: neither side has sufficient confidence that a ceasefire would be verifiably maintained, and each assesses continued fighting as potentially improving its relative position. Russia’s maximalist demands function as a face-saving framework for domestic consumption rather than a serious opening position.
3.4 Global South Positioning
A geopolitically significant feature of the conflict has been the refusal of most Global South nations — including India, Brazil, South Africa, and the Gulf states — to align with Western sanctions or condemnation frameworks. India in particular has deepened energy trade with Russia, importing discounted Russian crude at record volumes. This has both undermined the comprehensive effect of Western sanctions and accelerated a broader multipolar realignment that predates but has been catalysed by the conflict.
- Singapore: Specific Impact Assessment
4.1 Singapore’s Structural Exposure
Singapore occupies a uniquely exposed position in this conflict due to its structural characteristics: a small, highly open economy dependent on entrepôt trade, energy imports, and financial intermediation. As the region’s premier financial centre and logistics hub, Singapore’s exposure to the Russia–Ukraine war operates through multiple transmission channels.
4.2 Trade and Supply Chain Impact
Channel Impact on Singapore Severity
Wheat & food commodity prices Singapore imports ~90% of food; global wheat/edible oil price spikes increased food CPI meaningfully in 2022–2023 Moderate-High
Energy prices (LNG/oil) Electricity generation costs rose; industrial competitiveness affected; ASEAN LNG market tightened High
Fertiliser prices Russia is a major fertiliser exporter; price spikes transmitted into regional agricultural costs, affecting food import costs Moderate
Shipping/logistics disruption Black Sea route closures increased rerouting costs; global freight rate volatility persisted Moderate
Semiconductor supply chains Neon gas (Ukraine-sourced) is critical for semiconductor lasers; shortage created chip production cost pressures Moderate
4.3 Financial Sector Exposure
Singapore’s status as a major international financial centre created specific risks and compliance obligations:
MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore) implemented targeted financial sanctions aligned broadly with international norms, freezing assets of designated Russian individuals and entities, while maintaining a more limited sanctions perimeter than the US/EU.
Several Singapore-registered entities were identified in Western media and government reports as having facilitated Russian trade finance or commodity transactions, drawing scrutiny from US authorities under extraterritorial secondary sanctions frameworks.
Russian oligarch asset flows: Singapore’s wealth management sector was scrutinised for potential inflows of Russian capital seeking shelter from Western asset freezes. The MAS issued heightened KYC/AML guidance specific to Russia-linked risks.
Interest rate transmission: The US Federal Reserve’s aggressive rate hiking cycle (2022–2023), partly driven by war-induced inflation, transmitted directly into Singapore’s interest rate environment through its USD currency board peg mechanism, raising borrowing costs for households and businesses.
4.4 Energy Security Implications
Europe’s energy crisis and the structural reorientation of global LNG flows has had complex effects on Singapore:
Short-term: LNG spot price spikes (European TTF hub prices reached record highs in August 2022) diverted cargoes from Asia to Europe, tightening supply and raising costs for Singapore’s gas-fired power sector.
Medium-term: The acceleration of European LNG contracting with new suppliers (US, Qatar, Australia) has locked in long-term supply that may reduce spot market availability for Asian buyers, structurally elevating Singapore’s energy procurement costs.
Opportunity: Singapore’s role as an LNG bunkering hub and energy trading centre has grown in importance as the market restructures. Keppel and Sembcorp entities have benefited from increased demand for LNG infrastructure and services.
4.5 Geopolitical and Diplomatic Positioning
Singapore has navigated the conflict with characteristic pragmatic balancing, reflecting its longstanding foreign policy doctrine of maintaining constructive relations with all major powers:
Policy Dimension Singapore’s Position Strategic Rationale
UN votes condemning Russia Voted YES on key resolutions (March 2022, etc.) Rule of law commitment; UN Charter principles
Sanctions alignment Targeted financial sanctions; not full Western sanctions package Avoid secondary sanctions risk; preserve trade relationships
Arms to Ukraine No arms transfers (consistent with long-standing policy) Non-interventionist posture; ASEAN norms
Russia economic relationship Suspended certain trade/financial flows; limited engagement Compliance with multilateral obligations
Diplomatic channel Maintained communication with both sides Mediation capacity preservation
Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan articulated Singapore’s position explicitly: while Singapore condemns violations of UN Charter principles — including the prohibition on the use of force against territorial integrity — Singapore also recognises that a small state’s survival depends on consistent adherence to international law irrespective of power politics. This principle-based approach has broadly preserved Singapore’s international standing without triggering secondary sanctions exposure.
4.6 Inflation and Cost of Living Impact
The war’s contribution to Singapore’s inflation surge in 2022–2023 was significant:
MAS Core Inflation peaked at 5.5% in early 2023, the highest in over a decade, with war-driven energy and food commodity prices as major contributors.
The government deployed targeted cost-of-living support measures (utility rebates, GST vouchers, Assurance Package) partly in response to war-induced price pressures.
Housing costs also spiked, partly as a consequence of global supply chain disruptions affecting construction materials — exacerbated by war-related disruptions to steel and aluminium markets.
4.7 Long-Term Strategic Implications for Singapore
Beyond immediate economic impacts, the Russia–Ukraine war has accelerated several structural trends with long-term implications for Singapore’s strategic position:
Weaponisation of finance: The freezing of ~$300 billion in Russian central bank reserves has demonstrated that USD-denominated assets are subject to political risk. This has prompted discussion in Singapore’s sovereign wealth management community about reserve diversification strategies.
Deglobalisation acceleration: The conflict has reinforced supply chain regionalisation trends, reshaping Singapore’s role in global logistics. Singapore is adapting by positioning as a ‘trusted hub’ amid great-power fragmentation.
Defence spending normalisation: Europe’s rearmament has global arms market implications. Singapore’s defence industry and procurement relationships are adjusting to a higher-spending, more proliferated arms market environment.
Great-power competition intensification: The war has deepened US-China strategic rivalry (given China’s support for Russia), complicating Singapore’s perennial challenge of maintaining balanced relations with both Washington and Beijing.
- Aggregate Losses: Comparative Summary
5.1 Human Cost
Category Estimated Figures (as of Feb 2026)
Ukrainian military deaths 100,000–140,000 (CSIS); 55,000 per Zelensky (underestimate)
Russian military deaths 177,000+ verified; up to 325,000 estimated (CSIS)
Ukrainian civilian deaths (verified) 15,000+ (UN; likely significantly higher)
Ukrainian refugees (external) ~5.9 million (UNHCR)
Internally displaced Ukrainians ~3.7 million (UNHCR)
Children abducted/forcibly displaced ~20,000 (Kyiv government estimates)
5.2 Material and Economic Cost
Category Estimated Figures
Ukraine reconstruction cost $588 billion over 10 years (World Bank, Feb 2026)
Ukraine GDP contraction (2022) ~30% in year of invasion
Total Western aid to Ukraine EUR 201B (Europe) + $115B (US)
Russian oil/gas revenue loss 5-year low in 2024-2025 (approx. 25% of federal budget affected)
Energy infrastructure attacks Millions without heating/power (WHO / Ukrainian government)
Ukrainian territory mined/contaminated ~20% of country (UNMAS)
- Analytical Conclusions
The Russia–Ukraine war at its four-year mark represents a paradigmatic case of strategic miscalculation with disproportionate global consequences. Russia’s failure to achieve its rapid campaign objectives has produced a protracted attritional conflict consuming resources from both belligerents and distorting global commodity, energy, and capital markets at scale.
For Ukraine, the war has produced a tragic paradox: the country has demonstrated extraordinary military resilience and consolidated national identity, yet faces a reconstruction challenge and dependency on external financing that will constrain sovereignty for a generation. For Russia, the war has achieved neither its military objectives nor the anticipated fracturing of Western alliance cohesion — and has instead triggered a geopolitical counter-reaction (NATO expansion, European rearmament, accelerated energy transition) that likely worsens Russia’s long-term strategic position.
For Singapore, the war serves as a high-fidelity stress test of the assumptions underlying its development model: that global rules-based order, open trade, and energy market stability are reliable structural constants. The conflict has demonstrated these are contingent rather than permanent features of the international system, with significant policy implications for Singapore’s energy security strategy, reserve management, supply chain positioning, and diplomatic capital management.
The conflict’s enduring lesson for small states is the urgent imperative of building resilience across multiple dimensions — economic, energy, diplomatic, and social — in an era where the assumption of great-power restraint can no longer be taken for granted.