Case Study: November 2025 Hawaii Meetings

Background Context

The November 18-20, 2025 maritime security talks in Hawaii represent a critical juncture in US-China military relations during a period of heightened tensions. These working-level meetings under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) framework occurred against a backdrop of:

• Several months of trade tensions between the superpowers
• Increased Chinese military activity around Taiwan
• Ongoing US freedom-of-navigation operations in contested waters
• A gradual thaw in military-to-military communications after an April 2025 meeting

Key Meeting Characteristics

Participants: Working-level military officials from both the US Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy

Format: The twice-yearly MMCA working group meetings, designed to maintain operational-level military dialogue

Tone: Described by China as “frank and constructive” – diplomatic language suggesting both sides aired grievances while maintaining professional dialogue

Core Issues Discussed

1. Maritime and Air Security Situation: Current operational dynamics in areas where both militaries operate, particularly the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait
2. Incident Management: Review of typical cases of naval and air encounters to establish protocols for professional and safe interactions between front-line forces
3. Competing Claims:
   • China reiterated opposition to US freedom-of-navigation operations
   • US concerns about Chinese military modernization and regional posture
   • Tensions over Taiwan, which China claims as its territory

Significance of This Engagement

This meeting is significant for several reasons:

Restoration of Dialogue: After disruptions during trade tensions, these talks represent institutional commitment to maintaining military channels even when broader bilateral relations are strained.

Operational Safety: The focus on front-line encounters acknowledges that regardless of political tensions, both militaries need protocols to prevent accidents or miscalculations that could escalate into broader conflicts.

Predictability: Regular meetings create predictability in an otherwise uncertain security environment, allowing both sides to understand each other’s positions and red lines.

Outlook: Future Trajectory of US-China Military Relations

Short-Term Outlook (2025-2026)

Continued Dialogue but Persistent Tensions: The commitment to a follow-up meeting in 2026 suggests both nations recognize the value of maintaining communication channels. However, fundamental disagreements remain unresolved:

• US will likely continue freedom-of-navigation operations as a matter of principle regarding international waters
• China will continue its military build-up around Taiwan and in the South China Sea
• Both sides will maintain their positions while seeking to manage risks

Taiwan as Flashpoint: With China steadily boosting air, naval, and coast guard deployments around Taiwan, the island remains the most dangerous potential trigger for conflict. Japan’s recent statements about Taiwan representing an existential crisis demonstrate growing regional alarm.

Medium-Term Outlook (2026-2028)

Institutionalization vs. Crisis Management: The success of MMCA meetings depends on whether they evolve from crisis management tools into genuine confidence-building measures. Key indicators to watch:

• Frequency and level of military exchanges beyond MMCA
• Implementation of agreed protocols during actual encounters
• Transparency in military exercises and deployments
• Progress on nuclear weapons communication

Technology and Competition: The military dimension increasingly intertwines with technological competition in areas like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and hypersonic weapons. This could either drive cooperation on arms control or accelerate an arms race.

Regional Alliance Dynamics: US efforts to strengthen partnerships with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia (through AUKUS) will shape China’s strategic calculations and potentially increase pressure for dialogue to prevent encirclement.

Long-Term Strategic Considerations

Structural Factors Driving Competition:

• China’s continued military modernization and pursuit of regional hegemony
• US commitment to maintaining Indo-Pacific presence and alliances
• Unresolved territorial disputes in South China Sea
• The fundamental question of Taiwan’s status

Potential Pathways:

1. Managed Competition: Both sides maintain dialogue, establish rules of engagement, and compete without direct conflict – similar to Cold War US-Soviet naval incidents agreements
2. Escalatory Spiral: Incidents at sea or in the air lead to casualties, nationalist pressures override diplomatic channels, and crisis escalates
3. Diplomatic Breakthrough: Broader political accommodation on Taiwan or South China Sea issues enables deeper military cooperation

The most likely scenario remains managed competition with periodic crises, making forums like MMCA increasingly important.

Singapore Impact: Strategic Implications for the City-State

Direct Security Implications

Freedom of Navigation: Singapore’s economy depends on freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, through which approximately one-third of global maritime trade passes. Any disruption to these sea lanes would have immediate economic consequences.

• Singapore’s ports handle cargo worth billions annually that transits these waters
• The city-state’s position as a maritime hub depends on open, secure shipping lanes
• Escalation between US and China could force shipping route diversions, increasing costs and transit times

Military Presence and Basing: Singapore hosts rotational US military assets, including littoral combat ships and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. The state of US-China military relations affects:

• The operational tempo of US forces operating from Singapore
• Potential Chinese pressure on Singapore regarding US access
• Singapore’s careful diplomatic balancing between the two powers

Economic Dimensions

Trade Exposure: Singapore maintains substantial trade relationships with both superpowers:

• China is Singapore’s largest trading partner
• The US is a major investor and trade partner
• Prolonged US-China tensions create supply chain uncertainty

Financial Hub Status: As regional incidents increase, Singapore’s role as a stable financial center becomes more valuable, but also more vulnerable to capital flight during crises.

Defense Industry: Singapore’s defense industry, which exports to regional partners, could see increased demand as neighbors modernize militaries in response to great power competition.

Strategic Positioning Challenges

Neutrality Under Pressure: Singapore’s traditional policy of not taking sides between great powers faces increasing strain:

• Both US and China may seek more explicit support or commitments
• ASEAN unity on South China Sea issues remains elusive, limiting multilateral options
• Singapore must maintain credibility with both powers while preserving sovereignty

ASEAN Leadership Role: As a respected ASEAN voice, Singapore can:

• Advocate for peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms
• Promote ASEAN centrality in regional security architecture
• Support completion of a meaningful Code of Conduct for South China Sea

However, ASEAN’s effectiveness is limited by divergent member interests regarding China.

Military and Defense Policy Implications

Defense Modernization: Singapore continues investing in military capabilities, partly driven by regional uncertainty:

• Advanced air and naval assets to protect sea lanes
• Cybersecurity and information warfare capabilities
• Enhanced surveillance and maritime domain awareness

Bilateral Defense Relationships: Singapore maintains defense relationships with multiple partners:

• US: Training facilities, logistics support, rotational deployments
• China: Growing defense exchanges and exercises
• Regional partners: Five Power Defence Arrangements, bilateral exercises

The challenge is maintaining these relationships as US-China competition intensifies.

Policy Recommendations for Singapore

Diplomatic Track:

• Continue advocating for rules-based international order and UNCLOS principles
• Strengthen ASEAN mechanisms for conflict prevention
• Maintain dialogue with both US and China on security concerns

Economic Track:

• Diversify trade relationships to reduce dependence on any single partner
• Develop contingency plans for supply chain disruptions
• Position Singapore as a neutral ground for US-China business engagement

Defense Track:

• Maintain robust, independent defense capabilities
• Expand defense diplomacy across the region
• Invest in domains where small states can be effective: cyber, intelligence, maritime surveillance

Regional Engagement:

• Work with like-minded ASEAN partners on common positions
• Engage middle powers (Japan, South Korea, Australia, India) on regional stability
• Support Track II dialogues and confidence-building measures

Opportunities Amid Challenges

While US-China tensions create risks, they also present opportunities for Singapore:

Convening Power: Singapore’s reputation for neutrality and efficiency makes it an ideal venue for dialogue, conferences, and negotiations between the superpowers.

Economic Hedging: Companies seeking to de-risk from overexposure to either US or China may choose Singapore as a regional headquarters or production base.

Security Services: Demand for Singapore’s port services, ship repair, and maritime security expertise may grow as both powers maintain regional presence.

Conclusion

The November 2025 Hawaii maritime security talks represent a small but significant step in managing US-China military tensions. For Singapore, the key is maintaining strategic relevance and relationships with both powers while preserving autonomy and advancing national interests.

The city-state’s future security and prosperity depend on sustained freedom of navigation, regional stability, and effective multilateral mechanisms – all of which require the kind of military dialogue exemplified by the MMCA meetings. Singapore must continue playing its part in encouraging such engagement while preparing for scenarios where dialogue fails.

The outlook remains one of managed competition rather than cooperation or conflict, placing a premium on Singapore’s diplomatic skill, military readiness, and economic resilience in navigating an increasingly complex regional security environment.

Long-Term Solutions: Building Sustainable Peace Architecture (2030-2050)

Multilateral Security Framework Solutions

1. Enhanced ASEAN-Led Security Architecture

ASEAN Maritime Security Cooperation Mechanism:

• Establish a permanent ASEAN Maritime Security Center headquartered in Singapore
• Create joint maritime domain awareness system sharing real-time data on shipping, incidents, and environmental threats
• Develop ASEAN Coast Guard Forum with standardized protocols for cooperation
• Institute annual ASEAN-US-China trilateral maritime exercises focused on non-traditional security (piracy, disaster relief, search and rescue)

Code of Conduct Implementation:

• Move beyond principles to binding arbitration mechanisms for South China Sea disputes
• Establish joint development zones for contested areas, with revenue-sharing formulas
• Create “zones of peace” where military activities are restricted by mutual agreement
• Implement confidence-building measures including prior notification of exercises, hotlines, and observer exchanges

2. Indo-Pacific Security Concert Model

Similar to the Concert of Europe that maintained relative peace post-1815, establish an inclusive multilateral framework:

Core Principles:

• Recognition of legitimate security interests of all parties
• Commitment to peaceful dispute resolution
• Balance of power maintained through dialogue rather than arms races
• Regular summits at head-of-state level (annually) and foreign/defense minister level (quarterly)

Membership: US, China, Japan, India, Russia, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, plus rotating ASEAN representatives

Mechanisms:

• Crisis prevention center with 24/7 hotlines
• Joint threat assessment on non-traditional security challenges
• Arms control dialogue focused on destabilizing technologies
• Economic interdependence protocols to raise costs of conflict

Functional Cooperation Approaches

3. Maritime Commons Management System

Joint Resource Management:

• Establish South China Sea Marine Resources Authority with representation from all claimant states
• Create science-based fishing quotas to prevent resource depletion
• Develop joint environmental monitoring for coral reefs, marine biodiversity
• Share revenues from sustainable fishing, oil/gas exploration in disputed zones

Infrastructure Cooperation:

• Build joint search and rescue facilities on various islands/features
• Establish shared weather monitoring and tsunami warning systems
• Create common protocols for maritime pollution response
• Develop joint port facilities for emergency use by all nations

4. Technology Governance Frameworks

AI and Autonomous Systems Treaties:

• Prohibit fully autonomous weapons systems in naval/air encounters
• Require human-in-the-loop for weapons release decisions
• Establish technical standards for identification systems to prevent accidents
• Create joint research programs on safety mechanisms for military AI

Space and Cyber Norms:

• Agreements on non-interference with navigation, communication satellites
• Establish attribution mechanisms for cyber incidents
• Create buffer zones in cyberspace similar to demilitarized zones
• Joint development of secure communication channels immune to disruption

Economic Interdependence Solutions

5. Regional Economic Integration Deepening

Comprehensive Free Trade Architecture:

• Build on RCEP to create deeper integration including services, investment, labor mobility
• Establish supply chain resilience mechanisms that incentivize diversification without decoupling
• Create regional infrastructure investment fund (China, US, Japan as major contributors)
• Develop common standards for digital economy, green technology

Economic Peace Dividend Mechanism:

• Tie trade benefits to peaceful behavior and dispute resolution participation
• Create regional development fund that loses funding during military escalations
• Establish business-to-business peace councils with major corporations from all countries
• Institute Track 1.5 dialogues linking economic and security agendas

6. Financial Architecture for Stability

Asian Monetary Fund Concept:

• Create regional financial institution that doesn’t exclude any major power
• Provide stability during crises, reducing vulnerability to external shocks
• Link lending to peaceful dispute resolution (conditionality for peace)
• Build financial interdependence that makes conflict economically catastrophic

Institutional Capacity Building

7. Singapore-Based Regional Institutions

Centre for Maritime Security Studies:

• Independent research institution analyzing regional security trends
• Training programs for regional coast guards, navies on international law
• Track II dialogue facilitation bringing together retired officials, academics
• Early warning system for potential maritime flashpoints

Asian Institute for Peace and Reconciliation:

• Address historical grievances between Asian nations systematically
• Create forums for Japanese-Chinese-Korean reconciliation similar to European models
• Develop shared historical narratives on contested events
• Youth exchange programs building people-to-people ties across the region

Regional Cybersecurity Cooperation Centre:

• Joint threat intelligence sharing on non-political cyber threats
• Incident response coordination across borders
• Standards development for critical infrastructure protection
• Confidence-building through transparency in cyber capabilities

People-to-People Solutions

8. Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs

Asian Youth Peace Corps:

• Large-scale exchange program sending young people across the region for service projects
• Joint US-China-ASEAN funding for scholarships, internships
• Focus on building personal relationships that transcend national rivalries
• Create alumni network of future leaders with cross-cultural understanding

Academic Cooperation:

• Joint research universities focused on common challenges (climate, health, energy)
• Exchange programs specifically for military academy students
• Collaborative degree programs requiring study in multiple countries
• Research funding prioritizing multinational teams

9. Track II Diplomacy Institutionalization

Permanent Conflict Resolution Mechanisms:

• Establish semi-official channels that maintain dialogue when official channels freeze
• Create rosters of respected mediators acceptable to all parties
• Fund regular workshops bringing together former officials, military officers
• Develop proposals for official channels during more favorable political climates

Taiwan-Specific Solutions

10. Taiwan Strait Stabilization Mechanisms

Status Quo Formalization:

• Codify unofficial understandings into more formal (though still unofficial) agreements
• Establish military confidence-building measures specific to Taiwan Strait
• Create economic integration between Taiwan and mainland that makes conflict devastating
• Develop face-saving formulas allowing indefinite continuation of current arrangements

Creative Constitutional Solutions (Long-term):

• Federal or confederal arrangements providing Taiwan autonomy within greater Chinese framework
• “One country, three systems” expanding Hong Kong formula
• EU-style economic union with political distinctiveness
• Special administrative region with defense guarantees from multiple powers

These solutions require China, US, and Taiwan flexibility that may not exist currently, but demographic and economic pressures could create openings by 2040-2050.

Environmental Cooperation as Peace Builder

11. Climate Change Adaptation Partnership

Shared Vulnerability Recognition:

• Rising seas threaten all coastal nations regardless of political system
• Create joint research programs on climate impacts on maritime security
• Develop cooperative frameworks for climate refugee management
• Build resilience infrastructure that requires multinational cooperation

Blue Economy Development:

• Shift focus from territorial control to sustainable ocean resource management
• Joint investment in renewable ocean energy (wave, tidal, offshore wind)
• Create marine protected areas requiring cooperative enforcement
• Develop economic models where cooperation is more profitable than competition

Military-to-Military Solutions

12. Professional Military Education Integration

Joint Professional Development:

• Create Asia-Pacific Defense University with modules from multiple countries
• Exchange programs for mid-career officers spending 6-12 months in other countries
• Joint doctrinal development on rules of engagement, incident management
• War gaming and simulation exercises with mixed teams addressing common threats

Operational Cooperation on Non-Traditional Threats:

• Piracy suppression requiring coordinated patrols
• Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as trust-building exercise
• Counter-narcotics operations in regional waters
• Search and rescue standardization across all militaries

Singapore’s Facilitation Role in Long-Term Solutions

13. Singapore as Honest Broker

Unique Positioning:

• Host permanent secretariat for Indo-Pacific Security Concert
• Provide neutral ground for sensitive negotiations
• Offer technical expertise on maritime law, port operations, finance
• Maintain credibility through consistent adherence to international law

Capacity Building Support:

• Train diplomats, military officers from smaller ASEAN states
• Provide technical assistance for maritime domain awareness systems
• Share expertise in creating efficient, corruption-free institutions
• Offer Singapore model of multi-racial harmony as example of managing diversity

Convening Power:

• Annual Shangri-La Dialogue expansion into year-round process
• Host business, academic, military, diplomatic tracks simultaneously
• Create safe spaces for unofficial contacts during official tensions
• Develop reputation as indispensable venue for regional conflict resolution

Realistic Implementation Pathways

Phase 1 (2025-2030): Foundation Building

• Strengthen existing MMCA-type dialogues
• Establish non-controversial functional cooperation (environment, piracy, disaster relief)
• Build people-to-people ties through education, culture
• Create independent research institutions analyzing security issues

Phase 2 (2030-2040): Institutionalization

• Launch Indo-Pacific Security Concert with crisis prevention mechanisms
• Implement South China Sea Code of Conduct with binding provisions
• Establish joint resource management authorities
• Create permanent Track II dialogue mechanisms

Phase 3 (2040-2050): Comprehensive Architecture

• Functioning multilateral security framework managing great power competition
• Economic interdependence making conflict prohibitively costly
• New generation of leaders with cross-cultural experience in power
• Taiwan situation evolving toward stable long-term arrangement

Critical Success Factors

Political Will: Leadership in Beijing, Washington, and regional capitals must prioritize long-term stability over short-term advantage.

Economic Incentives: Benefits of cooperation must clearly outweigh benefits of competition.

Generational Change: New leaders less invested in historical grievances must emerge.

Crisis Prevention: Avoiding major military incidents that could derail progress.

Inclusive Processes: All stakeholders must see their interests reflected in solutions.

Sustained Commitment: Solutions require decades of consistent implementation, surviving political transitions.

Conclusion: A Vision for Regional Peace

The path from today’s managed competition to sustainable peace architecture is long and uncertain. However, the alternatives—continued military buildups, heightened risk of conflict, economic decoupling—are far worse for all parties.

Singapore’s role is to consistently advocate for these long-term solutions while contributing materially to their development. By hosting institutions, facilitating dialogue, providing expertise, and modeling successful multi-ethnic governance, Singapore can punch above its weight in building regional peace.

The 2025 Hawaii maritime talks represent small steps. The vision outlined above charts a course toward transforming the Indo-Pacific from a region of potential conflict into a zone of durable peace and shared prosperity. Achieving this vision requires patience, creativity, and unwavering commitment from all stakeholders over decades—but the prize is worth the effort.

Analysis of China’s Approach to South China Sea Disputes and Regional Leadership Ambitions

Current Strategy and Its Contradictions

https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/xis-golden-opportunity-to-be-the-bigger-person-in-the-south-china-sea-row

Based on the article, China’s approach to the South China Sea disputes reveals a fundamental contradiction in its regional leadership ambitions. While President Xi Jinping emphasises diplomacy, economic partnership, and anti-hegemonic rhetoric during his Southeast Asian tour, China’s actions in the disputed waters tell a different story.

The China Coast Guard (CCG) has significantly increased its presence in the region, with 1,939 patrolling days in 2024, up from 1,652 in 2023. This aggressive maritime enforcement is undermining China’s diplomatic efforts and reinforcing regional anxieties about its intentions, even as Beijing tries to position itself as a more reliable partner than the United States under Trump.

Regional Perception and Concerns

The article cites the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s 2025 report, which shows that China’s behaviour in the South China Sea has become the top concern for regional governments, surpassing even the Israel-Hamas conflict. This suggests that despite economic cooperation and diplomatic overtures, China’s maritime assertiveness remains the primary obstacle to its acceptance as a regional leader.

Southeast Asian nations, such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia, perceive China’s actions as contradicting its diplomatic messaging. While they welcome economic engagement, they remain wary of China’s territorial ambitions and perceive its claims as being asserted through heavy-handed tactics.

The Code of Conduct Stalemate

The decades-long negotiations for a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China appear to have made little substantive progress despite recent claims of completing a “third reading.” The article suggests China may be deliberately slow-walking these negotiations while strengthening its position on the ground through island-building and militarization.

This approach reflects a strategy of buying time rather than seeking genuine resolution, undermining China’s credibility as a responsible stakeholder interested in a rules-based order.

Strategic Opportunities Missed

The article argues that China has a unique opportunity to demonstrate statesmanship given the current US administration’s focus on mercantilism rather than strategic engagement. By continuing aggressive maritime enforcement instead of showing restraint, China is missing an opportunity to solidify its regional leadership role during a period when the US appears distracted.

The author suggests specific actions that would enhance China’s standing:

• Reducing CCG patrolling throughout the nine-dash line area
• Accelerating Code of Conduct negotiations with genuine compromises
• Taking a more measured approach toward the Philippines despite provocations

Conclusion

China’s approach to the South China Sea reveals the tension between its desire for regional leadership and its unwillingness to compromise on territorial claims. While its economic initiatives and diplomatic rhetoric promote a vision of harmonious cooperation, its maritime enforcement actions project a different message entirely.

If China truly aspires to regional leadership, the article suggests it needs to recognise that authentic leadership requires restraint and magnanimity, not just economic leverage and military power. The current moment presents a strategic opportunity for China to “go high” while others “go low”; however, this would require significant adjustments to its South China Sea strategy, which, thus far, appears unlikely.

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The Contradiction Between Chinese Rhetoric and Actions in the South China Sea

The Fundamental Disconnect

The article highlights a striking contradiction in China’s regional approach: President Xi Jinping condemns “unilateral bullying,” “hegemony,” and “power politics” during diplomatic visits, while simultaneously directing what many regional states perceive as precisely these behaviours in the South China Sea. This disconnect manifests in several ways:

• Diplomatic messaging vs. maritime enforcement: Xi speaks of harmony and cooperation while the China Coast Guard intensifies its presence in disputed waters
• Economic partnership vs. territorial aggression: China positions itself as a reliable economic partner while challenging neighbours’ maritime rights
• Anti-hegemonic rhetoric vs. hegemonic behaviour: China criticises US dominance while attempting to establish regional dominance of its own kind

Possible Causes and Motivations

Domestic Political Considerations

One likely driver is domestic politics. The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy increasingly draws on nationalism and territorial integrity. Any perceived softening on sovereignty claims could be interpreted as weakness by domestic audiences. The South China Sea has become symbolically crucial in Chinese national identity as part of the “century of humiliation” narrative and subsequent national rejuvenation.

Strategic Ambiguity as Policy

The contradiction might be intentional rather than accidental. This “strategic ambiguity” allows China to reap benefits from:

• Maintaining positive economic relationships while advancing territorial goals
• Creating uncertainty about its true intentions, complicating regional coordination against its actions
• Preserving flexibility to dial tensions up or down as circumstances require

Bureaucratic Fragmentation

Multiple agencies shape China’s approach to the South China Sea, including the military, coast guard, foreign ministry, and economic planners. These entities may have different priorities and approaches, leading to uncoordinated and sometimes contradictory policies. The article’s observation that CCG patrols decreased near Second Thomas Shoal after a political agreement suggests central control exists but may not be consistently exercised.

Historical Timeline and Long-term Strategy

China may view its current approach as part of a long-term strategy, believing time is on its side. From this perspective, maintaining claims through coast guard presence while slowly building economic dependencies creates leverage that will eventually make resistance to Chinese territorial claims too costly for smaller neighbours.

Security Concerns

China genuinely perceives American containment as a threat to its core interests. Control of the South China Sea represents a security buffer that protects mainland China and secures vital shipping lanes. From this perspective, Chinese leaders may believe they cannot afford to compromise on maritime claims despite the diplomatic costs.

The Cost-Benefit Calculation

The persistence of this contradiction suggests Chinese leadership has calculated that the benefits outweigh the costs. However, as the article points out, this calculation may be flawed. The approach is:

• Creating precisely the regional anxiety that drives closer security relationships with the United States
• Undermining China’s soft power and credibility when it has an opportunity to present itself as a more reliable partner than a mercurial United States
• Generating solidarity among ASEAN members who might otherwise have divergent interests

China appears to be prioritising absolute gains in territorial control over relative gains in regional influence and soft power. This suggests a hierarchy of priorities where sovereignty claims take precedence over diplomatic advantages, at least in the near term.

The contradiction remains unresolved because China has yet to find a formula that allows it to assert maritime claims without undermining its broader regional leadership ambitions. Until Chinese leadership determines that the diplomatic costs outweigh the territorial benefits, this contradiction is likely to persist as a defining feature of regional geopolitics.

How Trump’s Approach Inadvertently Creates Space for Chinese Regional Expansion

The Opportunity Created by American Retreat

The article suggests that Trump’s “tariff madness” and “grand caper” create a strategic opening for China to strengthen its regional position. This ironic dynamic works in several ways:

Diplomatic Vacuum

When Trump focuses narrowly on mercantilism and bilateral trade relationships rather than regional security architecture, he creates a diplomatic vacuum that China eagerly fills. The article directly references this opportunity, noting that Xi has “a rare window of opportunity” to “cement its soft-power hold on the region, while Mr Trump remains fixated on mercantilist priorities rather than preserving his country’s strategic dominance.”

This retreat from America’s traditional role as a regional security guarantor allows China to position itself as a more reliable and consistent partner, despite its territorial assertiveness. Xi’s three-nation tour exemplifies China’s efforts to capitalise on this vacuum through active diplomatic engagement.

Undermining Alliance Credibility

Trump’s transactional approach to alliances fundamentally undermines confidence in the United States’ security commitments. When a key ally like the Philippines observes unpredictable American leadership focused primarily on economic grievances, it may calculate that resolute resistance to Chinese territorial claims becomes riskier without guaranteed US support.

The article hints at this reality by noting that China has an opportunity to improve relations with the Philippines while Washington appears to be distracted. This distraction weakens the primary external counterbalance to Chinese maritime assertiveness.

Economic Alternatives

As Trump imposes tariffs and pursues protectionist policies, China can present itself as the guardian of open trade and economic integration in Asia. The article describes Xi condemning “shocks to global order and economic globalisation” during his tour – a clear contrast to Trump’s approach. This positioning enables China to deepen its economic dependencies, which may ultimately translate into political influence.

Strategic Miscalculation

Perhaps most ironically, Trump’s bullying trade tactics may be having the opposite of their intended effect. Rather than forcing Chinese concessions, they may be reinforcing Chinese leaders’ belief that they must secure their near-abroad against an unpredictable America. This could actually accelerate China’s determination to establish dominance in the South China Sea as a strategic buffer.

The Limitations of the Opportunity

However, the article also suggests that China isn’t fully capitalising on this opening because of its own counterproductive approach in the South China Sea. The opportunity created by Trump’s policies is partially squandered by China’s inability to moderate its maritime assertiveness.

The author argues that China could truly consolidate regional leadership by showing restraint in the disputed waters – “pulling its punches” when everyone already knows its strength. Instead, Beijing’s aggressive coast guard deployments validate regional concerns and prevent China from fully exploiting America’s diplomatic retreat.

The Resulting Regional Dynamics

The combination of Trump’s mercantilism and China’s territorial assertiveness creates a complex environment for Southeast Asian nations, who find themselves with:

1. A traditional security partner (US) that seems unreliable and transactional
2. An economic partner (China) that presents security challenges through its maritime claims

This forces regional states into careful hedging strategies rather than precise alignment with either power. The article implies that if either great power modified its approach – Trump by recommitting to regional security, or China by moderating its maritime claims – it could significantly shift regional dynamics in its favour.

The ultimate irony may be that Trump’s bullying behaviour creates an opening for China, but China’s own bullying in the South China Sea prevents it from fully exploiting that opportunity.

How Empires Emerge from Regional Leadership Aspirations

The Evolution from Regional Power to Empire

The dynamics described in the article about China’s approach to the South China Sea illuminate a broader historical pattern in how empires often emerge. Regional leadership frequently serves as the first step toward imperial expansion, not necessarily through deliberate design but through the gradual accumulation of power and influence.

Security-Driven Expansion

Many empires begin with legitimate security concerns. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea reflects a classic security motivation – controlling buffer zones to protect the homeland. Similarly, the Roman Empire’s initial expansion beyond Italy was partly motivated by eliminating threats from neighbouring powers, such as Carthage. The United States followed this pattern with the Monroe Doctrine, asserting regional hegemony to prevent European powers from establishing footholds near American borders.

This “security dilemma” often leads to a cycle where:

1. A rising power seeks security through limited regional control
2. This creates insecurity among neighbours who then seek countermeasures
3. The rising power perceives these countermeasures as threatening
4. Further expansion becomes necessary to address these new “threats”

Economic Integration as Imperial Foundation

The article highlights China’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia, characterised by deep trade relationships and significant infrastructure investments. This pattern has historical precedents in empire building:

• The British Empire began as trading outposts that gradually required more direct control to protect commercial interests
• Japan’s early 20th-century “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” was initially framed as a regional economic cooperation initiative but ultimately evolved into a military occupation.
• The Soviet Union maintained its empire, in part, through economic integration via the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

Economic integration creates dependencies that can be leveraged for political influence, forming a foundation for imperial relationships without formal colonisation.

The Role of Prestige and Status

Nations pursuing regional leadership, like China today, often seek status recognition. The article references China’s desire to be seen as the “elder statesman” of Asia. This quest for prestige and recognition has been a consistent driver of imperial expansion throughout history:

• The British justified their empire through a “civilising mission”
• The United States framed its expansion as promoting democracy and development
• The Soviet Union positioned itself as the leading socialist development

Status competition often pushes regional powers to demonstrate their capabilities through territorial control, military projection, or imposing their values on neighbouring states.

The Slippery Slope to Empire

What begins as regional leadership can evolve into imperial control through incremental steps that seem individually justified:

1. Establishing economic partnerships
2. Creating security arrangements
3. Mediating regional disputes
4. Deploying forces to maintain “stability”
5. Directly intervening inthe internal affairs of weaker states
6. Creating formal or informal vassalage relationships

China’s approach in the South China Sea shows this progression in action. What began as economic engagement has evolved into territorial claims, military deployments, and increasingly assertive behaviour toward smaller neighbours.

The Regional Response: Balancing, Bandwagoning, or Hedging

The article reveals Southeast Asian nations employing sophisticated hedging strategies between China and the United States. Throughout history, smaller states near rising powers have faced similar choices:

• Balancing: Forming coalitions against the dominant power (as some regional states do with the U.S)
• Bandwagoning: Aligning with the rising power (as Cambodia appears to do with China)
• Hedging: Maintaining relationships with multiple powers (as Malaysia and Vietnam attempt)

The collective response of regional states often determines whether regional leadership evolves into imperial control or remains limited to influence without domination.

Contemporary Constraints on Empire

Modern constraints make traditional empire-building more difficult, though not impossible:

• International norms against territorial conquest
• Economic interdependence makes military control less necessary
• Information technology empowering resistance movements
• Nuclear weapons limiting great power direct confrontation

However, these constraints may simply channel imperial ambitions into new forms, such as China’s “debt diplomacy” or Russia’s “near abroad” doctrine – approaches that establish control without formal colonisation.

The contradictions in China’s approach, highlighted in the article – between peaceful rhetoric and assertive behaviour – demonstrate the challenges of pursuing regional leadership in a world where traditional empires are delegitimised but the impulses driving imperial expansion remain potent.

Implications for Current US-China Competition

Applied to the current situation, these historical patterns suggest:

1. Economic Foundations
   • Manufacturing capacity shifts to China mirror previous imperial transitions
   • Financial system control remains firmly American, unlike previous transitions
   • Technological competition is more balanced than in previous transitions
2. Institutional Competition
   • China is creating parallel institutions (AIIB, BRI), while the US maintains control over its legacy system.
   • Neither power has the clear institutional advantage characteristic of previous transition.s
   • Regional subsystems (like ASEAN) have more agency than in previous transition.s
3. Conflict Acceleration Risk
   • Historical transitions have rarely occurred peacefully
   • The current trade war could represent the early stages of a more comprehensive competition
   • Nuclear weapons create restraints absent in previous transitions

While historical analogies have limitations, particularly given nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, the pattern of global conflicts accelerating imperial transitions suggests the current US-China trade tensions could represent an early phase of a more fundamental power realignment.

Strategic Infrastructure Integration

1. Physical Connectivity: China’s infrastructure proposals create lasting dependencies:
   • The Vietnamese rail links would enable “Vietnam to plug into transcontinental rail networks”
   • These projects represent “strategic infrastructure cooperation” that binds economies together
2. Supply Chain Integration: The 45 agreements with Vietnam specifically cover supply chains, creating mutual economic interests that are difficult to unwind.
3. Long-Term Alignment: Infrastructure projects have decades-long timeframes, effectively locking in Chinese influence regardless of political changes.

Forcing Difficult Diplomatic Calculations

1. Balanced Approach Becomes Harder: ASEAN’s traditional strategy of balancing great powers becomes more difficult:
   • The article notes these countries “cannot afford to anger Mr Trump, given the size of the US market”
   • Yet they also “welcome Chinese investments”
   • This creates internal tension in their foreign policy
2. Path of Least Resistance: As maintaining balanced relationships becomes more challenging, the consistent Chinese approach may appear more appealing than the volatile US stance.
3. Collective Security Concerns: ASEAN unity faces pressure as individual nations make different calculations about how to respond to US tariffs.

Regional Identity Reinforcement

1. Shared Asian Experience: Trump’s broad tariffs on multiple Asian countries reinforce a sense of common cause:
   • China can position itself as a fellow Asian power, understanding regional concerns
   • The contrast between Western and Eastern approaches becomes more pronounced
2. Alternative Regional Order: China can present ASEAN-China cooperation as part of a broader Asian century narrative:
   • The article notes Beijing’s strategy of “wresting influence from the US”
   • China offers a vision where Asian nations determine their own economic future
3. Shared Adversity: Facing standard US pressure creates solidarity that China can leverage diplomatically.

Long-Term Implications for Regional Architecture

1. Economic Integration Acceleration: US tariffs may inadvertently accelerate the region’s economic integration with China:
   • The article mentions China has “already diversified trade to reduce its reliance on the US”
   • ASEAN nations may follow this model out of necessity
2. Alternative Frameworks: Pressure may increase ASEAN’s receptiveness to China-led initiatives, such as the RCEP,P while decreasing enthusiasm for US-led frameworks.
3. Diplomatic Realignment: The article suggests China sees the trade war as “just one front in a much larger contest for global influence” – and Trump’s approach appears to be unintentionally ceding ground in this contest.

Conclusion

While ASEAN nations will continue attempting to balance relations with both powers, Trump’s aggressive tariff approach appears to be creating conditions that make closer alignment with China both economically necessary and diplomatically appealing in the short term. This runs counter to the stated US strategic objectives in the region and demonstrates how economic coercion, lacking diplomatic finesse, can produce counterproductive outcomes in complex regional environments.

The article suggests that China is well aware of this dynamic, with Xi carefully playing the long game of regional influence. At the same time, Trump focuses on immediate economic confrontation—a contrast that may ultimately shift the regional centre of gravity toward Beijing, despite Washington’s intentions.

Science Fiction’s Vision of Eastern Power Ascendance

Many science fiction works have indeed explored scenarios where global power shifts eastward following major conflicts or societal transformations. This trend reflects both geopolitical anxieties and observations about changing global dynamics.

Major Science Fiction Works Depicting Eastern Ascendance

Classic Works

1. Frank Herbert’s “Dune” series (1965-): This series takes place in a future where Eastern and Islamic cultural influences have merged with Western elements, with concepts like “Zensunni” philosophy demonstrating the enduring influence of Eastern thought.
2. Philip K. Dick’s “The Man in the High Castle” (1962): While focusing on Japanese/German victory in WWII rather than WWIII, it explores themes of Eastern cultural and political influence in America.

Cyberpunk Movement

1. William Gibson’s “Neuromancer” and the Sprawl trilogy (1984-1988:depicts a world dominated by Japanese zaibatsu (corporations), with Eastern economic and technological supremacy following the decline of American dominance.
2. Neal Stephenson’s “Snow Crash” (1992): Features remnants of America under heavy East Asian influence, particularly from Chinese and Japanese corporate entities.

Contemporary Works

1. Liu Cixin’s “The Three-Body Problem” trilogy (2008-2010): Although not explicitly set in the post-WWII era, it presents China as a central power in humanity’s response to existential threats.
2. David Wingrove’s “Chung Kuo” series (1989-1997): Set in a future where China has become the dominant world power and restructured global society.
3. Kim Stanley Robinson’s “Red Mars” trilogy (1992-1996): Features China as one of the dominant powers in space colonisation efforts.

Common Themes in Eastern Ascendance Fiction

1. Technological Leadership: Many works portray Eastern nations, particularly China, Japan, and a pan-Asian coalition, as technological innovators, especially in robotics, cybernetics, and artificial intelligence.
2. Cultural Resilience: Eastern philosophical systems and social structures are often depicted as more adaptable to post-apocalyptic or resource-scarce environments.
3. Economic Dominance: The Eastern economic model, often featuring state capitalism or a corporate-state hybrid, frequently supplants Western economic systems.
4. Demographic advantages, as some studies emphasise, are factors in post-conflict resilience, particularly among Eastern populations and in promoting social cohesion.

Historical Context for These Predictions

Science fiction’s vision of Eastern ascendance reflects several real-world trends and anxieties:

1. Cold War Anxieties: Earlier works often responded to the perceived decline of the West in the face of Soviet and Eastern bloc advancement.
2. Japan’s Economic Rise: The 1980s, in particular, reflected American anxiety about Japan’s growing economic power.
3. China’s Growth Trajectory: Recent works reflect observations about China’s increasing economic and technological influence.
4. Post-Western World Order: Contemporary science fiction increasingly portrays multipolar worlds where Western dominance has come to an end.

While these fictional scenarios don’t predict actual World War 3 outcomes (since that conflict hasn’t occurred), they do reflect ongoing speculation about how global power dynamics might evolve following major systemic disruptions.

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