China-Russia Strategic Cooperation in the Context of the Ukraine Conflict - Maxthon

Executive Summary

This case study examines the intensifying strategic partnership between China and Russia, particularly in light of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s December 2024 warnings about Russia ceding sovereignty to Beijing. The analysis explores the nature of this cooperation, its future trajectory, potential solutions to address the challenges it poses, and specific implications for Singapore as a small state navigating great power competition.

1. Background and Context

The “No Limits” Partnership

In February 2022, just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia announced a “no limits” strategic partnership. This declaration marked a significant departure from their traditionally pragmatic relationship, signaling deeper alignment on geopolitical issues and a shared vision of challenging the Western-led international order.

Evolution of the Relationship

The partnership has evolved through several phases:

Pre-2022: Transactional relationship focused on energy trade and arms sales
2022-2023: Rapid deepening amid Western sanctions on Russia
2024-Present: Military-industrial integration and technology transfers

By 2024, bilateral trade reached $237 billion, with China becoming Russia’s economic lifeline as Western markets closed.

2. Zelenskiy’s Assessment: The Sovereignty Argument

Key Claims

President Zelenskiy’s December 2024 statements, based on Ukrainian intelligence assessments, made several striking claims:

Unprecedented Sovereignty Concessions: Zelenskiy asserted that “in Russian history, no one has ever surrendered sovereignty to such a great extent to China or any other stronger nation.” This represents a fundamental reframing of the relationship, positioning Russia as the junior partner despite its historical status as a great power.

Military-Industrial Dependence: Ukrainian intelligence identified China as the primary supplier of critical military components, with four-fifths of electronics in Russian drones originating from China. At least 20 Russian defense plants received Chinese machine tools, gunpowder, and chemical products.

Strategic Motivation: Zelenskiy characterized these concessions as the price Putin is willing to pay to avoid ending the war, suggesting that Russia’s dependence on China has become a strategic vulnerability that limits Moscow’s freedom of action.

Intelligence Corroboration

Ukrainian claims have been supported by Western intelligence assessments and open-source evidence:

Chinese companies signed confidential contracts worth hundreds of millions for Russian armaments
Technology transfers now flow both ways, with Russia sharing submarine and stealth aircraft technology previously withheld
Joint military exercises expanded significantly through 2024, including the largest Russian naval exercise since the Soviet collapse

3. Nature and Scope of China-Russia Cooperation

Military-Industrial Complex Integration

Defense Equipment Flows:

October 2024 contract for $585 million in armored vehicles and parachute systems
Chinese acquisition of Russian advanced weaponry including Su-35 fighters and S-400 systems
Reverse technology flow: Russia sharing submarine operations, aeronautical design, and missile capabilities

Dual-Use Technology:

China provides 89% of Russia’s microchip imports
47% of chip-making equipment and 58% of spare parts used in Russian facilities are Chinese-origin
Satellite imagery components, military optics, and drone engines flow from China to Russia

Economic Interdependence

Energy Sector:

Power of Siberia gas pipeline reached record daily volumes in December 2024
Russia became China’s largest oil supplier, though trade values declined with falling energy prices
Long-term contracts lock in Russian resource dependence on Chinese market

Trade Structure:

2024 bilateral trade: $237 billion (2.9% growth, down from 32.7% in 2022-2023)
Russia supplies raw materials; China provides manufactured goods and technology
Russian economy increasingly oriented toward Chinese market as Western trade collapsed

Military Coordination

Joint Exercises:

Ocean-2024: Largest Russian naval exercise since Soviet era, with Chinese participation
First joint submarine patrol conducted in 2024
Live-fire drills in South China Sea and bomber patrols near Alaska
Exercises declined in 2025, potentially reflecting Russian resource constraints

Intelligence Sharing:

Coordination on surveillance and reconnaissance
Joint assessment of Western military capabilities
Shared intelligence infrastructure development

Diplomatic Alignment

International Forums:

Coordinated positions in UN Security Council
BRICS expansion and leadership
Shanghai Cooperation Organization activities
Joint opposition to Western “hegemonism”

Regional Issues:

Mutual support on Ukraine and Taiwan
Alignment on Arctic development
Central Asia coordination

4. Outlook: Future Trajectories

Scenario A: Deepening Integration (Probability: High, 60-70%)

Drivers:

Continued Western sanctions pressure on Russia
China’s strategic interest in weakening U.S. global position
Russia’s limited alternatives for advanced technology and markets
Shared authoritarian governance models and threat perceptions

Characteristics:

Further military-industrial integration
Increased technology transfers from Russia to China
Deeper financial system linkages and de-dollarization efforts
More frequent and sophisticated joint military exercises
Potential for joint weapon system development

Implications:

Russia becomes increasingly dependent on Chinese goodwill
Beijing gains leverage over Moscow’s strategic decisions
NATO faces coordinated challenges on multiple fronts
Global bifurcation accelerates between democratic and authoritarian blocs

Scenario B: Transactional Plateau (Probability: Medium, 20-30%)

Drivers:

Chinese concerns about secondary sanctions
Historical Russian suspicion of Chinese intentions in Far East
Limits to mutual technological benefits
China’s desire to maintain economic ties with the West

Characteristics:

Cooperation continues but doesn’t deepen significantly
China maintains strategic ambiguity on Ukraine support
Trade stabilizes at current levels without major expansion
Military exercises continue but remain symbolic
No formal military alliance emerges

Implications:

More manageable challenge for Western coalition
Greater opportunity for diplomatic wedges between Beijing and Moscow
Russia seeks to diversify partnerships (India, Middle East)
China focuses more on Indo-Pacific than European security

Scenario C: Gradual Divergence (Probability: Low, 10-20%)

Drivers:

End of Ukraine conflict reduces Russia’s immediate need
Chinese economic slowdown limits capacity to support Russia
Territorial or resource disputes in Central Asia or Far East
Western diplomatic success in offering China off-ramps

Characteristics:

Return to more transactional pre-2022 relationship
Reduced military cooperation
China distances itself from Russian foreign policy
Trade rebalances toward pre-war patterns

Implications:

Opportunity for Western re-engagement with Russia
Reduced coordination on challenges to international order
China focuses on economic development over geopolitical confrontation

Key Uncertainties

Several factors could shift these probabilities:

War Duration: A protracted conflict in Ukraine deepens Russia’s dependence; a negotiated settlement could reduce it.

Chinese Economic Performance: A robust Chinese economy enables greater support for Russia; stagnation limits Beijing’s capacity and willingness.

Western Policy Coherence: Unified Western sanctions enforcement increases pressure on both nations; divisions provide opportunities for sanctions evasion.

Leadership Changes: Succession in either country could fundamentally alter strategic calculations.

Technological Breakthroughs: Developments in AI, hypersonics, or other domains could shift the value proposition of the partnership.

5. Potential Solutions and Policy Responses

For the International Community

Diplomatic Approaches

1. Strategic Engagement with China

Clearly communicate costs of supporting Russia’s war effort
Offer incentives for Chinese neutrality or constructive mediation
Establish red lines regarding military support that would trigger consequences
Engage China on shared interests (nuclear non-proliferation, climate, economic stability)

2. Multilateral Pressure

Coordinate G7 responses to Chinese dual-use exports to Russia
Leverage international institutions to highlight violations of neutrality
Build coalitions with Global South nations concerned about sovereignty norms
Use ASEAN, EU, and other forums to amplify concerns

3. Mediation and Off-Ramps

Encourage credible third-party mediation (Turkey, UAE, Brazil)
Develop frameworks for face-saving de-escalation
Address legitimate Russian security concerns through negotiation
Create mechanisms for sanctions relief tied to verifiable steps

Economic Measures

1. Targeted Secondary Sanctions

Identify and sanction Chinese entities directly supporting Russian military production
Enforce export controls on critical dual-use technologies
Monitor and restrict financial flows funding military cooperation
Balance enforcement with avoiding complete economic decoupling

2. Supply Chain Resilience

Reduce Western dependence on Chinese critical minerals and manufacturing
Develop alternative suppliers in allied and partner nations
Invest in domestic production of strategic goods
Create redundancy in global supply chains

3. Economic Alternatives for Russia

If conditions permit, offer pathways for Russian economic reintegration
Engage Russian civil society and business community
Support Russian regions seeking economic diversification
Maintain people-to-people contacts

Security Responses

1. NATO Adaptation

Strengthen deterrence on Eastern flank
Develop capabilities to address two-theater scenarios
Enhance intelligence sharing with Indo-Pacific partners
Invest in next-generation weapons systems

2. Indo-Pacific Security Architecture

Deepen AUKUS, Quad, and bilateral partnerships
Increase military exercises and interoperability
Forward-deploy assets to demonstrate resolve
Build partner capacity in Southeast Asia

3. Arms Control

Propose new frameworks addressing China-Russia cooperation
Revive dialogue on strategic stability
Develop confidence-building measures
Address emerging technologies (AI, cyber, space)

For Ukraine

1. Intelligence Operations

Continue exposing China-Russia cooperation to international audiences
Document specific instances of Chinese military support
Share intelligence with partners to enable coordinated responses
Use information warfare to strain Beijing-Moscow relationship

2. Diplomatic Strategy

Engage directly with Chinese leadership on sovereignty principles
Leverage Chinese concerns about territorial integrity precedents
Build support among China’s trading partners to pressure Beijing
Coordinate messaging with Western allies

3. Military Adaptation

Develop capabilities to counter Chinese-origin systems used by Russia
Enhance electronic warfare to address Chinese technology
Seek alternative suppliers to reduce vulnerability to Chinese production disruptions
Share lessons learned with partners facing similar challenges

For Regional Powers (ASEAN, Middle East, etc.)

1. Principled Neutrality

Maintain independence from both Western and China-Russia blocs
Uphold international law and sovereignty norms
Avoid taking sides while protecting own interests
Use convening power for dialogue

2. Economic Hedging

Diversify trade partnerships to avoid over-dependence
Develop indigenous capabilities in strategic sectors
Create regional supply chain alternatives
Balance economic engagement with security concerns

3. Diplomatic Activism

Propose innovative solutions to frozen conflicts
Facilitate Track II dialogues
Bridge gaps between major powers
Protect interests of small and medium states

6. Singapore’s Specific Vulnerabilities and Opportunities

Strategic Vulnerabilities

Economic Exposure

Trade Dependence: Singapore’s economy is deeply integrated with both China and Western markets, creating acute vulnerability to great power competition. China is Singapore’s largest trading partner, accounting for 14.4% of total trade, while the United States and European Union collectively represent 20%. A bifurcated global economy forces Singapore into zero-sum choices.

Supply Chain Disruption: As a major transshipment hub, Singapore depends on stable global trade flows. China-Russia cooperation could lead to competing economic blocs with separate supply chains, potentially reducing Singapore’s centrality. Technology decoupling particularly threatens Singapore’s semiconductor and electronics sectors.

Financial Sector Risks: Singapore’s position as a financial center requires compliance with Western sanctions while maintaining relationships with Chinese financial institutions. Secondary sanctions targeting Chinese banks for Russia support could force Singapore banks to choose between markets.

Security Concerns

Military Balance: Closer China-Russia military coordination complicates Singapore’s strategic environment. Joint exercises in the South China Sea, submarine patrols, and technology sharing shift the regional balance of power, potentially threatening freedom of navigation and increasing coercion risks.

Neutrality Under Pressure: Singapore’s traditional position of engaging all major powers becomes harder to maintain as polarization intensifies. Both sides may demand demonstrations of alignment, threatening Singapore’s carefully cultivated neutrality and its relationship-building approach.

Technology and Cyber: Cooperation between Chinese and Russian cyber capabilities creates heightened risks for Singapore’s digital infrastructure. Increased intelligence sharing between Beijing and Moscow may compromise Singapore’s communications and data security.

Diplomatic Dilemmas

ASEAN Unity: Different ASEAN states may take varying positions on China-Russia cooperation, straining regional unity. Cambodia and Laos lean toward China; Philippines and Vietnam are wary; others seek middle ground. Singapore’s leadership in ASEAN becomes more challenging.

Multilateral Institutions: Singapore champions rules-based international order, but China-Russia cooperation deliberately challenges these frameworks. Singapore faces pressure to take sides in UN votes, standard-setting bodies, and international forums.

Strategic Opportunities

Diplomatic Bridge-Building

Convening Power: Singapore’s neutrality and reputation for competence position it as a potential venue for Track I and Track II dialogues. The 2018 Trump-Kim summit demonstrated Singapore’s value as neutral ground. Similar opportunities may arise for China-West discussions.

ASEAN Coordination: Singapore can lead ASEAN in developing unified responses that protect regional interests without choosing sides. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific provides a framework for constructive engagement with all powers.

Honest Broker Role: Singapore’s willingness to speak candidly to all parties gives it credibility. Quiet diplomacy can help manage escalation risks and identify areas for cooperation on shared challenges like climate change and pandemic response.

Economic Positioning

Neutral Financial Hub: If Singapore maintains strict sanctions compliance while avoiding rhetorical alignment, it could become the preferred location for transactions between East and West, similar to Switzerland’s role during the Cold War.

Supply Chain Intermediary: Companies seeking to navigate competing blocs may use Singapore as a neutral platform for processing, assembly, and distribution, potentially increasing Singapore’s value as supply chains reconfigure.

Green Technology Leadership: Climate cooperation may be one area where China, Russia, and the West can still engage. Singapore’s investments in green tech and carbon markets position it to facilitate these exchanges.

Regional Leadership

ASEAN Centrality: Great power competition increases the importance of ASEAN as a grouping that neither bloc fully controls. Singapore’s leadership in ASEAN becomes more valuable as both sides seek regional legitimacy.

Standard Setting: Singapore can help establish norms for behavior in contested areas: cyber security frameworks, technology governance, maritime conduct, and trade rules that protect small state interests.

Capacity Building: By strengthening ASEAN members’ capabilities to resist coercion and maintain independence, Singapore builds collective resilience that benefits all, including itself.

7. Policy Recommendations for Singapore

Principle 1: Preserve Strategic Autonomy

Avoid Hard Alignment:

Resist pressure from any power to choose sides definitively
Maintain robust relationships with China, United States, Russia, EU, and others
Frame positions around principles (sovereignty, rule of law) rather than personalities
Emphasize Singapore’s unique perspective as a small, multiracial, strategically located state

Diversify Dependencies:

Reduce economic concentration in any single market through FTAs and new partnerships
Develop indigenous capabilities in critical areas (food, water, energy, technology)
Build redundancy in supply chains for essential goods
Invest in strategic reserves and emergency preparedness

Strengthen Deterrence:

Maintain robust defense spending and capability development
Deepen defense partnerships with multiple major powers simultaneously
Enhance Total Defense concept to address hybrid threats
Invest in cyber and cognitive security

Principle 2: Champion International Law and Norms

Principled Consistency:

Apply the same standards regardless of which power is involved
Support UN Charter principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity
Oppose the use of force to change borders
Advocate for peaceful dispute resolution

Uphold Sanctions Obligations:

Strictly enforce UN Security Council sanctions
Comply with domestic legal obligations regarding Western sanctions
Avoid becoming a sanctions evasion hub
Balance compliance with maintaining economic openness

Promote UNCLOS and Maritime Law:

Continue to champion freedom of navigation
Support peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes
Oppose militarization of disputed features
Advocate for code of conduct implementation

Principle 3: Foster ASEAN Unity and Centrality

Build Regional Consensus:

Work to align ASEAN positions on key issues
Prevent great powers from dividing Southeast Asia
Strengthen ASEAN institutions and decision-making processes
Invest in regional connectivity and integration

Enhance Collective Capability:

Support defense and economic capacity building across ASEAN
Share Singapore’s expertise in governance, technology, and development
Create regional mechanisms for mutual support
Develop ASEAN-led frameworks for engagement with external powers

Maintain ASEAN Centrality:

Ensure ASEAN remains the primary platform for regional architecture
Expand East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and ADMM-Plus relevance
Position ASEAN as indispensable to any regional security arrangement
Resist bilateral approaches that bypass ASEAN mechanisms

Principle 4: Engage in Selective Issue-Based Cooperation

Identify Common Ground:

Climate change and environmental protection
Pandemic preparedness and global health
Nuclear non-proliferation
Counter-terrorism
Economic development and poverty reduction

Create Multistakeholder Platforms:

Business forums bringing together East and West
Scientific and academic exchanges
Cultural and people-to-people programs
Track II dialogues on contentious issues

Leverage Singapore’s Neutrality:

Host conferences and negotiations
Facilitate technical cooperation
Provide expertise and good offices
Build personal relationships across divides

Principle 5: Invest in National Resilience

Economic Security:

Accelerate digitalization and innovation to maintain competitiveness
Develop new growth sectors less dependent on great power stability
Strengthen social safety nets to manage disruption
Build financial reserves and fiscal buffers

Social Cohesion:

Reinforce multiracial, multicultural foundations of Singapore society
Strengthen resistance to foreign interference and disinformation
Build national consensus on foreign policy principles
Maintain social trust through transparent governance

Technological Edge:

Lead in AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, and other frontier technologies
Ensure technological sovereignty in critical systems
Develop local talent pipelines
Attract and retain global expertise

Specific Policy Actions

Immediate (0-12 months):

Diplomatic Engagement: Schedule high-level visits to Beijing, Washington, Brussels, and Moscow to communicate Singapore’s positions and understand evolving great power perspectives
ASEAN Coordination: Convene ASEAN discussions on managing China-Russia cooperation impacts, developing coordinated responses, and protecting regional interests
Sanctions Compliance Review: Audit Singapore companies’ exposure to sanctions risks related to China-Russia cooperation; enhance enforcement while protecting legitimate trade
Defense Cooperation: Strengthen military exercises and intelligence sharing with key partners; invest in capabilities to address changing threat environment
Public Communication: Articulate Singapore’s principled positions clearly to domestic and international audiences; explain the rationale for balanced approach

Medium-term (1-3 years):

Supply Chain Resilience: Map critical dependencies; develop alternative suppliers; invest in strategic industries; create emergency stockpiles
Financial Hub Strategy: Position Singapore as the go-to location for cross-bloc transactions; ensure robust compliance infrastructure; build relationships with financial institutions in all camps
Technology Governance: Develop frameworks for AI ethics, data flows, and cyber security that can be adopted regionally; lead standard-setting efforts
Regional Capacity Building: Expand training programs for ASEAN partners; share Singapore’s expertise; build collective resilience
Track II Initiatives: Establish regular dialogues bringing together scholars, former officials, and experts from different sides to explore solutions

Long-term (3-5+ years):

Economic Transformation: Shift toward higher-value, more resilient economic model less vulnerable to great power competition; invest in next-generation industries
Regional Integration: Deepen ASEAN economic and security integration to create genuine counterweight to great power pressure; build truly unified regional market
Institutional Innovation: Propose and help establish new international mechanisms better suited to multipolar world; protect small state interests in reformed architecture
Next Generation Leadership: Develop cadre of Singaporean leaders with deep expertise in great power relations; invest in education and exchange programs; build relationship networks
Strategic Partnerships: Cultivate comprehensive partnerships with middle powers (Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, EU members) who share interest in stable, rules-based order

8. Conclusion

The deepening China-Russia strategic partnership, as highlighted by President Zelenskiy’s warnings, represents one of the most significant geopolitical developments of the 21st century. While framed by Zelenskiy as Russia ceding sovereignty to China out of desperation, the cooperation reflects deeper structural forces: Western sanctions, shared authoritarian governance, complementary capabilities, and mutual interest in challenging U.S. primacy.

For the international community, this partnership poses profound challenges to the rules-based order, complicates security calculations across two theaters, and accelerates global polarization. Effective responses require diplomatic engagement, targeted economic measures, enhanced deterrence, and preservation of pathways for de-escalation. The goal should be managing competition while avoiding catastrophic conflict.

For Singapore, the stakes are existential. As a small, trade-dependent state built on openness and rule of law, Singapore has thrived in an environment of great power stability and free flows of goods, capital, and ideas. A world divided into competing blocs threatens this foundation. Yet crisis also creates opportunity. Singapore’s neutrality, competence, and convening power become more valuable as the world polarizes.

Singapore’s response must be grounded in clear principles: preserving strategic autonomy, championing international law, fostering ASEAN unity, engaging in selective cooperation, and investing in resilience. Neither retreat into isolation nor full alignment with any power serves Singapore’s interests. Instead, Singapore must navigate between great powers while strengthening the regional and institutional frameworks that protect small states.

The path forward requires wisdom, courage, and unity. Singapore cannot prevent great power competition, but it can shape how that competition unfolds in Southeast Asia. By maintaining principles, building capabilities, and working with like-minded partners, Singapore can preserve its autonomy and prosperity even in an era of heightened geopolitical tension. The deepening China-Russia partnership makes this task more difficult but also more urgent. Singapore’s response will help determine not only its own future but the future of the broader rules-based order that has enabled its success.