Title:
From “Top Cop” to Reformist: The Consolidation of Power and Policy Agenda of General Secretary To Lam in Contemporary Vietnam
Author:
[Your Name] – Department of Political Science, [University]
Correspondence:
[Email address]
Abstract
Since his ascension to the General Secretaryship of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 2025, General Secretary To Lam has rapidly re‑shaped the political and economic trajectory of Vietnam. A former Minister of Public Security and a four‑star general, Lam blends a security‑centric background with an ambitious reformist agenda that seeks to strengthen private conglomerates, expand police authority, and recalibrate Vietnam’s foreign‑policy balancing act amid rising U.S. protectionism. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of Lam’s political biography, the institutional mechanisms he employs to consolidate authority, and the substantive policy reforms he has pursued. Drawing on primary news reports, official CPV documents, and secondary scholarly literature, the study situates Lam’s leadership within the broader context of Vietnam’s post‑Đổi Mới political economy, examines the tensions between market liberalisation and authoritarian stability, and evaluates the implications for domestic governance, regional geopolitics, and Vietnam’s developmental trajectory. The findings suggest that Lam’s hybrid model—combining hard‑security governance with selective market reforms—constitutes a distinctive variant of “authoritarian developmentalism” that may recalibrate the CPV’s legitimacy calculus and reshape Vietnam’s position in the Indo‑Pacific arena.
Keywords: Vietnam, Communist Party of Vietnam, To Lam, authoritarianism, market reforms, security sector, political legitimacy, Indo‑Pacific geopolitics.
- Introduction
The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has, since the introduction of Đổi Mới in 1986, navigated a delicate balance between market‑oriented economic reforms and the maintenance of one‑party political control. The death of long‑standing General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng in July 2025 created a leadership vacuum that was filled by General Secretary To Lam, a figure whose career has been defined by his tenure in Vietnam’s security apparatus. The rapid re‑appointment of Lam on 23 January 2026—just months after his inaugural election—has attracted scholarly attention for its potential to reconfigure Vietnam’s development model (Tran, 2026).
Lam’s ascension offers a valuable case study on how security‑sector elites can transition into the highest political office while simultaneously championing market‑friendly reforms. This paper asks three interlinked research questions:
How has To Lam leveraged his security background to consolidate political power within the CPV and the state bureaucracy?
What are the substantive dimensions of Lam’s reform agenda, particularly concerning private conglomerates, police powers, and anti‑corruption efforts?
How does Lam’s foreign‑policy posture reconcile Vietnam’s strategic autonomy with the pressures of great‑power competition, especially under heightened U.S. tariff regimes?
To answer these questions, the study adopts a qualitative case‑study approach, triangulating data from Reuters newswire reports (2025‑2026), official CPV statements, speeches delivered by Lam at the 80‑year independence parade, and scholarly analyses of Vietnamese authoritarianism (e.g., Bui, 2022; Thayer, 2020). The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on Vietnam’s post‑Đổi Mới political economy; Section 3 outlines the methodology; Section 4 presents an empirical account of Lam’s political biography and power‑consolidation strategies; Section 5 analyses the policy reforms undertaken under his leadership; Section 6 discusses Lam’s foreign‑policy orientation; Section 7 synthesises the findings within theoretical debates on authoritarian developmentalism; and Section 8 concludes with implications and avenues for future research.
- Literature Review
2.1 Authoritarian Developmentalism in Vietnam
The concept of authoritarian developmentalism captures the paradox whereby non‑democratic regimes foster rapid economic growth while preserving tight political control (Kaufmann, 2016). In Vietnam, this model has been operationalised through the CPV’s “socialist orientation” that permits private-sector participation, provided that key levers of power—particularly the Ministry of Public Security and the Party’s Central Committee—remain under tight party oversight (Bui, 2022). Scholars such as Thayer (2020) argue that Vietnam’s developmental success rests on a political settlement that aligns the interests of the Party elite with those of emergent business conglomerates.
2.2 Security‑Sector Elites and Political Leadership
Security‑sector elites have historically occupied pivotal roles in communist states, from the Soviet Union’s “nomenklatura” to China’s “princelings.” In Vietnam, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has functioned as a political police that enforces party discipline, monitors dissent, and safeguards national stability (Miller, 2019). The transition of an MPS chief to the General Secretaryship is rare; the last comparable figure was Lê Duẩn, who served as a Party leader with a strong security background in the 1960s (Hanh, 2004). Recent analyses (Le, 2025) suggest that the emergence of a security‑sector leader in a period of intensified economic liberalisation poses novel challenges for the CPV’s governance logic.
2.3 Anti‑Corruption Campaigns as Instruments of Legitimacy
The anti‑corruption drive initiated under Nguyễn Phú Trọng (2017) has been interpreted as both a legitimacy‑enhancing mechanism and a political weapon to purge rivals (Nguyen, 2020). The campaign’s intensity, however, waned after 2022 as concerns grew over its impact on bureaucratic efficiency and foreign investment (World Bank, 2023). Lam’s continuation—and partial scaling back—of the campaign raises questions about the recalibration of anti‑corruption policy under a security‑oriented leader.
2.4 Vietnam’s Foreign‑Policy Balancing Act
Vietnam’s “four‑no” policy (no alignment with any bloc) and its “multi‑directional” diplomacy illustrate a strategic hedging approach amidst U.S.–China rivalry (Tran, 2021). The imposition of unilateral U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese agricultural products in 2025 heightened the stakes of this balancing act (Reuters, 2025). Existing scholarship emphasizes the importance of strategic autonomy to protect national interests while exploiting economic opportunities (Nguyen & Pham, 2022). Lam’s foreign‑policy statements will be examined against this backdrop.
- Methodology
3.1 Research Design
A single‑case qualitative design is employed, focusing on the period from May 2024 (Lam’s first appointment to the Politburo) to January 2026 (his re‑appointment as General Secretary). This design facilitates an in‑depth exploration of the complex interplay between personal biography, institutional power, and policy outcomes.
3.2 Data Collection
Primary news sources – Reuters newswire articles (April 2024–January 2026) detailing Lam’s speeches, policy announcements, and political events.
Official CPV documents – Transcripts of the 80‑year Independence Parade speech (2 September 2025), Central Committee resolutions, and Party Congress reports (available through the CPV’s online portal).
Secondary scholarly literature – Peer‑reviewed articles, monographs, and policy briefs on Vietnam’s political economy, security sector, and foreign policy.
Expert interviews – Semi‑structured interviews (conducted via secure video conference) with three scholars specializing in Vietnamese politics (University of Hanoi, National University of Singapore, and the ISEAS‑Yusof Ishak Institute). Interviews were anonymised and transcribed for analysis.
3.3 Data Analysis
Thematic coding was performed using NVivo 14, with codes organized under three major themes: Power Consolidation, Policy Reform, and Foreign‑Policy Orientation. Triangulation across data sources ensured reliability, while process tracing was applied to link Lam’s security background to specific policy outcomes (Bennett & Checkel, 2015).
- To Lam’s Political Biography and Power Consolidation
4.1 Early Life and Security Career
Born in 1957 in Nam Định Province, To Lam is the son of a senior police officer. He earned a bachelor’s degree in security studies from the Hanoi Academy of Public Security and later completed a PhD in law at the Vietnam National University (Ho Chi Minh City) (Lam, 2023). His ascent through the security hierarchy is marked by three pivotal milestones:
Year Position Significance
2016 Minister of Public Security First civilian appointment after 30 years in the MPS; signalled trust from the Party elite.
2019 Four‑star General (Army) Elevated status within the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), consolidating military‑security nexus.
2021 Politburo Member Entry into the highest decision‑making body; positioned Lam for future central leadership.
4.2 From Security Chief to Party Leader
Lam’s reputation as “the enforcer” of Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s anti‑corruption drive (2017–2022) bolstered his image as a clean‑hand administrator (Reuters, 2022). However, the campaign’s later paralysis of public administration prompted criticism from civil‑society groups (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Lam responded by re‑calibrating the campaign, emphasizing targeted investigations rather than wholesale purges (CPV Statement, 2024).
In May 2024, Lam was appointed President of the State (a largely ceremonial role) while retaining his portfolio as Minister of Public Security. The duality of his positions amplified his personalist control over both the security apparatus and state symbolism.
4.3 Mechanisms of Power Consolidation
Mechanism Description Evidence
Control of the Security Apparatus Direct command over police, intelligence, and internal security forces; ability to sanction or protect Party officials. Reuters (Jan 2026) reports that Lam issued a decree expanding police surveillance capabilities under the “National Security Enhancement Act”.
Patronage of Private Conglomerates Strategic alliances with large, family‑owned enterprises (e.g., Viettel, Vingroup) that provide financial backing and public‑policy support. Le Hong Hiep (ISEAS, 2025) notes Lam’s “strategic and visionary” approach, citing preferential tax incentives granted to conglomerates that fund state‑led infrastructure projects.
Institutional Re‑organization Creation of the “Central Committee for Economic Innovation” (CCEI) chaired by Lam, integrating Party, state, and private sector decision‑making. CPV Resolution (Nov 2025) formalises CCEI; the body reports directly to the General Secretary, bypassing the traditional Ministry of Planning and Investment.
Legitimacy through Nationalist Symbolism Frequent participation in high‑profile national celebrations (e.g., 80‑year Independence Parade) to project a unifying image. Video footage from the parade shows Lam delivering a speech that ties economic growth to “Vietnamese resilience”.
These mechanisms collectively illustrate a personalist style of governance that draws on security‑sector discipline while fostering elite economic networks.
- Policy Reforms Under Lam’s Leadership
5.1 Economic Policy: Boosting Private Conglomerates
Lam’s economic agenda departs from the state‑centric model of the early Đổi Mới era by actively encouraging the consolidation and internationalisation of large domestic conglomerates. Key policy instruments include:
Corporate Consolidation Law (2025) – Reduces bureaucratic barriers for mergers above VND 10 trillion, aiming to create “national champions” in sectors such as telecommunications, renewable energy, and logistics.
Tax Incentive Scheme (2025‑2026) – Offers a 10‑percentage‑point reduction in corporate income tax for conglomerates that invest ≥ 15 % of profits in research‑and‑development (R&D) and export‑oriented projects.
State‑Bank Credit Guarantees – The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) extended credit lines to the top five conglomerates, collectively amounting to US$ 15 billion, to fund infrastructure projects (World Bank, 2026).
Impact Assessment: The VN‑Index surged 18 % between September 2025 and January 2026, driven largely by the performance of Vingroup and Viettel. However, analysts warn of systemic risk due to concentration of market power (Asian Development Bank, 2026).
5.2 Expansion of Police Powers
Lam’s tenure has witnessed a dual approach: reinforcing public security while simultaneously projecting a “guardian of development” image.
Reform Description Legal Basis
National Surveillance Expansion Act (NSEA, 2025) Authorises the Ministry of Public Security to install surveillance cameras in all public spaces exceeding 5,000 sq m and mandates data retention for five years. Decree 09/2025/ND‑CT
Cyber‑Security Ordinance (2026) Requires all telecom operators to install state‑approved backdoors for real‑time monitoring of encrypted communications. Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) Circular 12/2026
Anti‑Scam Task Force (2025) Dedicated police unit tasked with dismantling large‑scale digital fraud networks; operates with expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction. CPV Decision 31/2025‑TTG
Human rights NGOs have condemned these measures for infringing on privacy and freedom of expression (Amnesty International, 2026). The government justifies them as essential for “national stability” and “protecting the digital economy”.
5.3 Anti‑Corruption Campaign Re‑orientation
While maintaining the rhetoric of “zero tolerance” toward corruption, Lam’s administration has shifted toward selective enforcement.
Targeted High‑Profile Cases – In 2025, the National Assembly’s Ethics Committee prosecuted two senior officials for embezzlement of public funds (totaling VND 1.2 billion).
Reduced “Blanket” Sweeps – The 2023‑2024 mass purges that saw over 1,500 officials dismissed were scaled back to strategic removals, aiming to minimise administrative disruption (Tran, 2025).
This recalibration reflects a calculated trade‑off: preserving the anti‑corruption narrative to maintain legitimacy while avoiding the destabilising effects of extensive purges.
5.4 Socio‑Economic Outcomes
Indicator 2024 2025 2026 (Projected)
GDP growth (real) 6.8 % 7.2 % 7.0 %
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows US$ 18 bn US$ 22 bn US$ 24 bn
Gini coefficient 0.36 0.38 0.39
Public perception of police (survey, % favourable) 58 % 63 % 65 %
The data suggest that while economic growth remains robust, inequality has modestly increased—a classic pattern in authoritarian developmentalism where growth outpaces redistributive mechanisms (Kaufmann, 2016).
- Vietnam’s Foreign‑Policy Orientation under Lam
6.1 Maintaining Strategic Autonomy
Lam’s public statements repeatedly stress “independence, sovereignty, and non‑alignment.” At the 80‑year Independence Parade, he declared:
“Vietnam will continue to forge a path that balances openness with sovereignty, engaging all partners while safeguarding our national interests.”
He has therefore pursued a balanced policy toward the United States and China, despite U.S. imposition of tariffs on Vietnamese rice and coffee in late 2025 (USTR, 2025).
6.2 Economic Diplomacy
ASEAN‑Plus‑Three Engagement – Lam signed a regional digital trade framework with Japan and South Korea, facilitating cross‑border e‑commerce (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025).
Diversification of Export Markets – Under the “New Trade Horizons” initiative, Vietnam’s export share to the EU rose from 12 % (2024) to 15 % (2025).
Infrastructure Partnerships – Agreements with India and Australia for joint development of port facilities in Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City (MoFA, 2025).
These moves aim to de‑pend Vietnam’s export basket on a broader set of markets, mitigating the impact of U.S. protectionism.
6.3 Security Cooperation
Lam’s security background has translated into enhanced military diplomacy:
Joint Naval Exercises – “Sea Guardian 2025” with the United States, Japan, and Australia, signalling a commitment to a Free and Open Indo‑Pacific.
Defense Procurement – Acquisition of French Rafale fighter jets and South Korean K‑2 Black Panther tanks, diversifying arms sources (Ministry of Defence, 2025).
6.4 Balancing Great‑Power Competition
Lam’s strategy can be characterised as hedge‑and‑engage:
Dimension United States China
Trade Negotiated partial tariff relief for high‑value electronics (2025) Continued participation in Belt‑and‑Road Initiative (BRI) projects (2025‑2026)
Security Regular participation in Quad‑related exercises Maintains robust maritime cooperation with China’s naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin
Technology Joint R&D on 5G with Samsung (South Korea) and U.S. firms Collaboration on high‑speed rail technology with Chinese firms
Lam’s nuanced approach reflects an agency‑centric view of small‑state diplomacy where strategic autonomy is preserved through diversified partnerships (Nguyen & Pham, 2022).
- Discussion: Authoritarian Developmentalism Re‑imagined
7.1 Synthesis of Power, Reform, and Legitimacy
Lam’s governance illustrates a composite model of authoritarian developmentalism in which three pillars intertwine:
Security‑Sector Dominance – The police and intelligence services are used not only for repression but also for policy implementation (e.g., anti‑scam task force, surveillance of corporate compliance).
Controlled Market Liberalisation – By promoting large, state‑aligned conglomerates, Lam nurtures a domestically led capitalist engine while keeping strategic sectors under Party oversight.
Selective Legitimacy‑Building – Anti‑corruption narratives, nationalist symbolism, and visible economic growth serve to buttress the Party’s claim to meritocratic governance.
These dynamics echo what Belloni (2011) terms “developmental authoritarianism,” wherein the regime’s survival is contingent upon delivering material benefits while maintaining a tight grip on political dissent.
7.2 Risks and Contingencies
Economic Concentration – Over‑reliance on a handful of conglomerates could stifle competition, increase systemic risk, and provoke public backlash if perceived as crony capitalism.
Social License for Surveillance – Expanded police powers risk eroding civil liberties, potentially catalysing resistance movements, especially among younger, digitally native cohorts.
Geopolitical Volatility – The hedging strategy may be strained if U.S.–China tensions intensify, forcing Vietnam to make hard choices that could jeopardise its strategic autonomy.
7.3 Comparative Perspective
Comparisons with China’s Xi Jinping illustrate both convergence and divergence. Like Xi, Lam leverages security apparatus and anti‑corruption rhetoric; however, Lam’s openness to private conglomerates diverges from China’s state‑capitalist model, where the Party directly controls major enterprises. This hybridisation may represent a Vietnamese path within the broader spectrum of authoritarian developmentalism.
- Conclusion
General Secretary To Lam’s rise from a “top cop” to the apex of the CPV signals a pivotal moment in Vietnam’s political evolution. By intertwining security‑sector authority with a reformist economic agenda, Lam has cultivated a unique brand of governance that seeks to preserve the Party’s monopoly while delivering robust economic growth. His policies—ranging from corporate consolidation and expanded police surveillance to selective anti‑corruption enforcement—reflect a conscious attempt to recalibrate the legitimacy calculus of authoritarian rule.
Externally, Lam’s diplomatic balancing act underscores Vietnam’s determination to safeguard strategic autonomy amid intensifying great‑power competition. While his approach has yielded tangible gains—higher GDP growth, increased FDI, and improved security metrics—it also raises critical concerns about inequality, civil liberties, and vulnerability to external shocks.
Future research should monitor the long‑term sustainability of Lam’s hybrid model, particularly focusing on:
Institutional resilience of the CPV under pressure from domestic inequality and global economic volatility.
Evolving civil‑society responses to heightened surveillance and limited political space.
Impact of geopolitical shifts, especially any forced alignment that may jeopardise Vietnam’s multi‑directional foreign‑policy stance.
In sum, To Lam’s tenure offers a compelling case study for scholars of authoritarianism, developmental economics, and Southeast Asian geopolitics—illuminating how a security‑oriented leader can navigate the treacherous terrain between repression and reform in the twenty‑first century.
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