The Split Decision That Divides a Nation—And Tests Singapore’s Regional Role
As Myanmar concludes its controversial three-phase election today, Singapore finds itself navigating a complex web of economic interests, humanitarian concerns, and regional diplomacy that will have lasting implications for Southeast Asia.
PEKON, Myanmar / SINGAPORE — On a misty hilltop in Pekon, Shan state, fighters from the Kayan National Army stand guard over a displaced persons camp while, just 90 kilometers away in junta-controlled territory, voters cast ballots in Myanmar’s first election since the military coup five years ago. This stark division encapsulates not only Myanmar’s fractured reality but also the dilemma facing Singapore and the broader ASEAN region.
For Singapore, Myanmar’s crisis presents a uniquely challenging convergence of strategic, economic, and humanitarian imperatives that cannot be easily disentangled.
A Relationship Built on Economic Ties
Singapore’s connection to Myanmar runs deep through commerce and investment. As Myanmar’s largest foreign investor with US$161.14 billion invested in 2020-21 and cumulative investments of approximately S$30.5 billion, Singapore has more at stake economically than any other nation. Bilateral trade in goods reached S$4 billion in 2018, with Singapore consistently ranking among Myanmar’s top trading partners.
The relationship was formalized through a Bilateral Investment Treaty signed in September 2019, designed to promote and protect investments between the two nations. Singapore’s investments span critical sectors including energy, oil and gas, manufacturing, infrastructure, and human resource development. Even the iconic Strand Hotel in Yangon reportedly has ties to Singaporean ownership through the Singapore-listed Memories Group.
However, this deep economic relationship has become increasingly problematic since the 2021 coup. Singapore-based firms have been implicated in facilitating US$254 million worth of arms transfers to the junta between 2021 and 2023, according to UN reports. Although subsequent investigations by Singapore authorities led to an 83 percent drop in such transfers, the episode highlighted the complexity of maintaining commercial ties while opposing military violence.
Recent data reveals Singapore remains Myanmar’s top investor even amid the ongoing crisis, with businesses investing US$456 million in projects during 2024 alone. Singapore-based companies like Interra Resources and Emerging Towns & Cities continue operations that critics argue directly or indirectly fund the military regime.
The Human Connection: Myanmar Workers in Singapore
Beyond business, Singapore hosts an estimated 200,000 to 256,000 Myanmar nationals, making the human dimension of this relationship equally significant. Myanmar workers in Singapore occupy diverse roles across construction, domestic work, healthcare, marine industries, and professional sectors. As of late 2022, approximately 256,300 migrant domestic workers (MDWs) were registered under Singapore’s Work Permit category, with Myanmar workers comprising a substantial portion.
Myanmar domestic workers have become integral to Singapore’s social reproduction economy, earning on average less than domestic workers from other nations. Research shows that Myanmar MDWs work in approximately one of every five Singaporean households. Peninsula Plaza, located near Singapore’s former City Hall, has emerged as a vibrant hub for the Myanmar community, with traditional shops, restaurants, and a Burmese-language library.
Yet the 2021 coup dramatically worsened conditions for Myanmar migrants. Economic collapse and heightened insecurity in Myanmar have increased outmigration while intensifying pressure on workers to send larger remittances home, making them more vulnerable to exploitation. The junta has compounded these challenges by implementing forced remittance requirements (25 percent of salaries through official channels at unfavorable rates) and imposing income taxes on Myanmar nationals abroad—effectively double taxation.
In February 2025, Singapore’s Ministry of Manpower took the unusual step of advising employment agencies to consider recruiting from countries other than Myanmar, citing armed conflicts, martial law, and travel restrictions. The ministry noted Myanmar’s state of emergency and conscription policies that require men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to serve two years in the military. This guidance reflects Singapore’s attempt to protect both employers and workers while acknowledging the deteriorating situation.
For Myanmar migrants in Singapore, the junta’s election creates a painful dilemma. The Union Election Commission announced that citizens residing abroad could cast advance votes at embassies, but this requires submitting personal information to the military-controlled commission—information that could be used against them or their families. Research indicates the vast majority of Myanmar migrants have no plans to participate, viewing the election as neither free nor fair.
Singapore’s Diplomatic Tightrope
At the ASEAN level, Singapore has positioned itself among the bloc’s more critical voices regarding Myanmar’s military government, alongside Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This contrasts with the more accommodating approaches of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong articulated Singapore’s position at the Regional Outlook Forum 2026, emphasizing that ASEAN had not decided to send election observers due to grave doubts about whether preconditions for legitimate elections would be met. He referenced ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, which requires cessation of violence, inclusive dialogue, and humanitarian aid access—conditions the junta has largely ignored.
Lee drew historical parallels to Myanmar’s previous military rule from 1990 to 2011, suggesting the current military leadership might eventually recognize, as their predecessors did, that ruling by repression offers no sustainable future. However, he stopped short of calling for outright non-recognition of the election results, instead emphasizing Myanmar’s need to solve its problems internally.
“We have doubts, but I think it is best that Myanmar solve that part of the problem itself,” Lee stated, reflecting Singapore’s careful calibration between principle and pragmatism.
Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan has repeatedly acknowledged the complexity of Myanmar’s situation and the dangers of external interference. While Singapore takes a “principled position” against the junta’s use of force against civilians and has worked to prevent arms transfers, it remains careful not to block legitimate trade and financial links that “support the livelihoods of the Myanmar people.”
This nuanced approach reflects Singapore’s broader foreign policy philosophy: maintaining principled stances on human rights while respecting sovereignty and avoiding actions that could be construed as interference in domestic affairs. It’s a position that has drawn criticism from human rights organizations who argue for stronger measures, yet aligns with Singapore’s consistent approach to international relations.
Banking and Financial Flows Under Scrutiny
Singapore’s financial sector has become a critical chokepoint in Myanmar’s crisis. Singaporean banks have historically held approximately 67 percent of the junta’s foreign reserves, making them essential to the regime’s financial operations. Civil society organizations have urged targeted sanctions to block the junta’s access to Singapore’s financial system.
In August 2023, United Overseas Bank (UOB), one of Singapore’s major banks, began cutting banking relationships with Myanmar accounts, announcing restrictions on card transactions for Myanmar individuals and closing Burmese nostro accounts in its Hong Kong branches. This move was interpreted both as a response to international pressure and as a reflection of the growing costs and risks of doing business with Myanmar’s military regime.
The banking sector’s gradual withdrawal illustrates how private sector risk calculations can sometimes accomplish what diplomatic pressure alone cannot. As Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis deepens and territorial control fragments, the business case for maintaining extensive Myanmar operations becomes increasingly difficult to justify—even without formal sanctions.
The Broader ASEAN Dilemma
Myanmar’s crisis has exposed fundamental weaknesses in ASEAN’s architecture. The organization’s consensus-based decision-making and principle of non-interference have prevented coordinated action despite nearly five years of escalating violence. The Five-Point Consensus adopted in April 2021 has yielded minimal results, with the junta blocking ASEAN special envoys from meeting opposition leaders and continuing military operations.
ASEAN’s fragmented response stems from divergent threat perceptions and national interests among member states. While Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines prioritize democratic principles and regional credibility, Thailand and Vietnam emphasize border security and economic stability. Cambodia and Laos maintain the closest ties to Myanmar’s military government.
The upcoming ASEAN chairmanship rotation adds another layer of complexity. The Philippines will chair in 2026, followed by Singapore in 2027. There had been concerns about Myanmar potentially chairing ASEAN in 2026, which would have granted the junta significant regional legitimacy. However, with Myanmar’s political situation remaining unresolved, such a scenario appears increasingly unlikely.
For Singapore, the prospect of chairing ASEAN in 2027 while Myanmar’s crisis continues presents both challenge and opportunity. It will require Singapore to balance its critical stance toward the junta with its traditional role as an honest broker, all while maintaining ASEAN unity and relevance.
Humanitarian Implications and Regional Stability
The humanitarian toll of Myanmar’s crisis has direct implications for Singapore and the region. More than 3.5 million people have been internally displaced, with thousands killed and tens of thousands detained. Myanmar ranks 153rd out of 163 countries on the Global Peace Index 2025—the least peaceful in the Asia-Pacific region.
Singapore has participated in humanitarian responses, including sending civil defense forces to assist in urban search-and-rescue operations following the devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake that struck Myanmar in March 2025, killing over 3,700 people. Foreign Minister Balakrishnan called for a ceasefire to facilitate aid delivery during that crisis.
Yet the overlap of natural disasters with armed conflict creates extraordinary complications for humanitarian access. The junta insists on controlling where and how aid is delivered, raising concerns that assistance could be manipulated for political purposes. ASEAN’s Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) has tried to navigate these challenges, but with limited success.
The refugee and migration pressures from Myanmar’s instability also affect regional security calculations. While Singapore doesn’t host large refugee populations, neighboring Thailand and Bangladesh bear the burden of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, creating pressure on ASEAN solidarity and testing the limits of regional burden-sharing.
Economic Realities and Ethical Imperatives
For Singaporean businesses, Myanmar presents a classic dilemma between economic opportunity and ethical responsibility. The country’s natural resources, strategic location, and potential market of 54 million people make it attractive for investment. Yet operating in Myanmar increasingly means navigating a business environment where the lines between legitimate commerce and regime support have become blurred.
Companies face difficult questions: Does paying taxes to the military government constitute support for its repression? Can businesses truly avoid indirect connections to military-linked entities that dominate Myanmar’s economy? How can firms protect their workers and investments while respecting human rights?
Some Singaporean businesses have become more wary since 2021, with companies reassessing risk exposure and some gradually withdrawing. However, complete disengagement carries its own costs—both for Singaporean investors and for Myanmar’s civilian population, who rely on foreign investment for employment and livelihoods.
The investments in energy, oil, and gas sectors are particularly sensitive. While these projects were initiated during Myanmar’s democratic transition, they now risk becoming sources of revenue for a military government that has systematically violated human rights. Yet abandoning these projects could create economic chaos that harms ordinary Myanmar citizens most severely.
The Road Ahead: Difficult Choices
As Myanmar’s election concludes today, the path forward remains deeply uncertain. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party is projected to win overwhelmingly in areas under junta control, but this landslide will do nothing to resolve Myanmar’s fundamental political crisis. With one-fifth of townships unable to hold votes due to rebel control, and major opposition parties dissolved or boycotting, the election’s legitimacy is essentially non-existent.
For Singapore, several key decisions loom:
On diplomatic engagement: Will Singapore recognize a government formed from this election? Senior Minister Lee suggested Singapore conducts business with governments regardless of electoral legitimacy, but noted Myanmar’s special status as an ASEAN member state creates different considerations. Singapore will likely wait to see how other ASEAN members respond before determining its own position.
On economic relations: How should Singapore balance maintaining trade and investment that supports Myanmar’s people against the risk of indirectly funding military operations? The gradual risk-based withdrawal by major banks like UOB may provide a template—letting market forces and reputational concerns drive private sector decisions rather than imposing blanket sanctions.
On humanitarian support: Singapore can continue supporting humanitarian assistance through ASEAN channels while advocating for improved access to all affected populations. This includes maintaining pressure for the Five-Point Consensus to be implemented, even if progress remains frustratingly slow.
On migrant workers: Singapore must protect Myanmar workers already in the country while responding to changed circumstances in Myanmar. The February 2025 guidance to diversify recruitment sources acknowledges reality without abandoning existing workers or cutting off all pathways for legal migration.
On ASEAN leadership: As Singapore prepares for its 2027 ASEAN chairmanship, it can work to strengthen collective approaches to Myanmar. This might include supporting proposals for a permanent ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar rather than annually rotating positions, and developing more robust mechanisms for humanitarian access that don’t require junta consent for every delivery.
Voices from the Margins
Back in the displacement camp in Pekon, residents like 40-year-old Simonet and 20-year-old William express little hope that the election will bring change. They’ve lived through the military’s aerial bombardments, watched their communities fracture, and seen promises of democracy repeatedly betrayed.
“While the election is happening, they are still bombing the public by plane,” Simonet observed in the early morning chill. “If you ask me if the election will bring peace, I don’t think so.”
William was equally dismissive: “It’s impossible for it to be free and fair. I believe they’re holding it just to sustain their power. No one else wants to compete and the people have no desire to vote.”
These voices from Myanmar’s margins remind us that behind the geopolitical calculations and economic statistics are millions of people whose lives hang in the balance. For them, Singapore’s choices about investment, migration policy, and diplomatic engagement have real and immediate consequences.
Conclusion: No Easy Answers
Singapore’s relationship with Myanmar exemplifies the challenges facing middle powers in an era of renewed authoritarianism. How can nations uphold values and principles while maintaining pragmatic engagement? When does economic interaction become complicity? What obligations do regional neighbors have when a member state commits systematic human rights violations?
There are no simple answers to these questions. Singapore’s approach—combining principled criticism with continued engagement, supporting ASEAN consensus while acknowledging its limitations, maintaining economic ties while trying to prevent arms flows—reflects an attempt to navigate an impossibly complex situation.
Critics will argue Singapore should do more: impose unilateral sanctions, completely cut economic ties, actively support the democratic opposition. Supporters will counter that such measures would accomplish little beyond damaging Singapore’s own interests and reducing what limited influence it retains.
What seems clear is that Myanmar’s crisis will continue to test Singapore’s foreign policy dexterity for years to come. The junta’s election today resolves nothing; it merely creates a new facade for continued military rule. The civil war grinds on. The humanitarian crisis deepens. And Singapore, along with the rest of ASEAN, must decide what role it will play in shaping Myanmar’s future—knowing that both action and inaction carry profound consequences.
As junta chief Min Aung Hlaing told reporters after voting in Mandalay, urging citizens “to work for the good of the nation and to be open-minded,” the irony was bitter. In Pekon and countless other areas beyond military control, the battle lines have been drawn. The real Myanmar—divided, suffering, and yearning for genuine peace—will not be found in polling stations or election results, but in the choices made by its people and the international community willing to stand with them.
For Singapore, the test ahead is whether it can maintain its principles while preserving its pragmatism, support Myanmar’s people while managing regional relationships, and help ASEAN find effective responses to a crisis that has exposed the organization’s deepest vulnerabilities. The decisions made in the coming months will shape not just Singapore-Myanmar relations, but the credibility and relevance of ASEAN itself.