Title: Italy’s Shift in Foreign Policy: Advocating for EU Sanctions on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Following Alleged ‘Heinous Acts’
Abstract
This paper analyzes Italy’s recent diplomatic initiative to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization under the European Union (EU) sanctions regime. Historically, Italy had aligned with cautious EU member states resisting such a move, prioritizing diplomatic engagement and nuclear negotiations with Iran. However, in January 2026, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani announced a pivotal shift in Rome’s stance, citing the Iranian government’s alleged violent suppression of mass protests that reportedly resulted in thousands of civilian deaths. This paper examines the geopolitical, legal, and human rights dimensions of Italy’s proposal, contextualizing it within broader EU foreign policy dynamics, transatlantic coordination, and the implications for EU-Iran relations. The study draws on official statements, media reports, scholarly analysis, and prior EU sanctioning practices to assess the likelihood and consequences of IRGC’s inclusion on the EU terrorist list.
Keywords: European Union, Iran, Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), terrorism designation, sanctions, human rights, Italy, foreign policy, EU foreign affairs
- Introduction
On January 26, 2026, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani declared that Italy would formally propose the listing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization within the European Union’s legal framework. This announcement, made ahead of a scheduled meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, marked a significant departure from Italy’s historically moderate position on Iran. For years, Rome had joined countries like France and Germany in resisting efforts—championed primarily by the United States and some Central European EU members—to formally brand the IRGC as a terrorist group, citing concerns over the destabilizing consequences for nuclear diplomacy and regional engagement.
Tajani justified the shift by referencing what he described as the “heinous acts” committed by Iranian security forces during a recent wave of nationwide protests, reportedly resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians. While the veracity and scale of the casualty figures remain subject to verification amid restricted media access in Iran, the Italian government framed the move as a necessary response to egregious human rights violations and a reaffirmation of EU values.
This paper explores the strategic, political, and normative implications of Italy’s new position. It investigates the historical resistance to IRGC designation within the EU, the evolving human rights context in Iran, and the potential repercussions of such sanctions for EU foreign policy cohesion and international security.
- Background: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
The IRGC (Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi) was established in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution to defend the ideological foundations of the nascent theocratic regime. Over four decades, it has evolved into a powerful military, economic, and political institution with extensive influence across Iran’s public and private sectors.
2.1. Military and Strategic Role
The IRGC operates parallel to Iran’s regular armed forces and controls elite units such as the Quds Force, responsible for extraterritorial operations and support for proxy groups across the Middle East—including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. It also oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program and plays a central role in advancing the country’s strategic deterrence capabilities.
2.2. Economic Influence
Estimates suggest the IRGC controls up to one-third of Iran’s economy through a network of subsidiaries, construction companies, energy firms, and trade conglomerates, often operating with limited oversight or accountability. This economic entrenchment enables the IRGC to circumvent international sanctions and fund its operations independently.
2.3. Current Status in International Sanctions Regimes
While the United States designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2019—the first time a state entity received such a designation—most EU member states have refrained from similar action. The EU, however, has imposed restrictive measures on specific IRGC officers and units under its human rights sanctions regime since 2022, particularly in response to Iran’s crackdown on the Mahsa Amini protests. The IRGC remains unlisted under the EU’s consolidated list of terrorist organizations, a status that carries far more stringent legal and financial consequences.
- Italy’s Evolving Stance on Iran and the IRGC
Italy has traditionally pursued a policy of diplomatic pragmatism toward Iran, emphasizing multilateralism, nuclear non-proliferation, and humanitarian engagement. As a major European energy importer, Italy maintained robust commercial ties with Iran prior to the intensification of U.S. sanctions in 2018. Moreover, Rome has often aligned with France and Germany in efforts to salvage the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), despite its de facto collapse following the U.S. withdrawal under President Trump.
3.1. Past Opposition to IRGC Designation
Until early 2026, Italy consistently opposed any move to include the IRGC on the EU terrorist list. Officials argued that such a designation would:
Undermine diplomatic channels with Iran, particularly regarding nuclear negotiations.
Jeopardize the safety of EU nationals detained in Iran, who are often held as bargaining chips.
Exacerbate regional tensions, potentially triggering retaliatory actions against European interests.
Italy, along with France and Spain, also raised procedural and legal concerns about designating an entire branch of a foreign state’s military as terrorist, arguing that such a move could set a precedent with unpredictable consequences.
3.2. The Turning Point: January 2026 Protests and Crackdown
In mid-January 2026, Iran experienced a resurgence of mass protests triggered by economic hardship, inflation exceeding 50%, and the arrest of prominent civil society figures. According to human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and HRANA (Human Rights Activists in Iran), Iranian security forces, including IRGC-affiliated Basij militias, responded with disproportionate force—firing live ammunition on demonstrators, conducting mass arrests, and allegedly committing torture and extrajudicial killings.
Unverified reports suggest that over 3,000 civilians may have been killed, although Tehran has not released official figures. Satellite imagery and social media analysis indicated the use of military-grade weaponry in urban areas, sparking international condemnation.
It was against this backdrop that Foreign Minister Tajani announced Italy’s policy reversal. In a statement posted on X (formerly Twitter) on January 26, 2026, he declared:
“The losses suffered by the civilian population during the protests require a clear response. I will propose, coordinating with other partners, the inclusion of the Revolutionary Guards on the list of terrorist organisations, as well as individual sanctions against those responsible for these heinous acts.”
This marked the first time an Italian government had explicitly endorsed the IRGC’s terrorist designation at the EU level.
- The EU’s Terrorist Listing Mechanism and Legal Implications
The EU maintains a consolidated list of persons, groups, and entities involved in terrorist activities under Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 and Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. Inclusion on this list triggers a comprehensive set of restrictive measures, including:
Asset freezes: All funds and economic resources belonging to the listed entity are frozen.
Travel bans: Individuals associated with the group are prohibited from entering or transiting through EU territory.
Prohibition of financial support: EU persons and entities are barred from making funds or economic resources available to the listed group.
Criminal liability: Member states must ensure that participation in, or support for, listed organizations constitutes a criminal offense under national law.
Designation requires unanimous agreement among all 27 EU member states, making consensus a critical hurdle.
4.1. Precedents and Challenges
Only a limited number of state-linked entities have been listed as terrorist organizations by the EU. Notably, Hezbollah’s military wing was designated in 2013, but the political wing was excluded to preserve dialogue channels. The prospect of listing an entire wing of a sovereign military force—especially one as deeply embedded in Iran’s governance structure as the IRGC—represents an unprecedented escalation.
Legal scholars debate whether the IRGC meets the EU’s definition of a terrorist organization, which requires evidence of engagement in acts of terrorism intended to intimidate populations or compel governments. Critics argue that while the IRGC supports armed groups involved in such acts, its primary function remains that of a national defense and security force.
- EU Divisions and Diplomatic Dynamics
Italy’s push has reignited a long-standing debate within the EU about the strategic utility of broad terrorist designations. As of late January 2026, the bloc remains deeply divided.
5.1. Supporters of Designation
Baltic and Eastern European States: Countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland have long advocated for IRGC designation, citing Tehran’s support for destabilizing activities in the region and threats to EU security.
Nordic States: Sweden and Denmark have increasingly voiced alignment with U.S. assessments of the IRGC’s malign influence, particularly after IRGC-linked plots on European soil were uncovered in 2023–2025.
Italy (newly aligned): Rome’s shift adds significant diplomatic weight to the initiative, given its status as one of the EU’s “big three” powers alongside Germany and France.
5.2. Opponents and Concerns
France: Paris has consistently opposed the move, warning that it would irreparably damage any remaining prospects for reviving nuclear talks and could endanger dual nationals imprisoned in Iran.
Germany: Berlin emphasizes the importance of maintaining diplomatic avenues, particularly as the EU continues to engage Iran through the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), despite its limited utility.
Southern EU Members: Cyprus and Greece express concern over potential Iranian retaliation in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Tehran has strengthened ties with Turkey and Lebanon.
EU diplomats reported in early January that Italian, French, and Spanish representatives had raised “qualms” about the proposal during preparatory meetings, underscoring the difficulty of achieving consensus.
- Strategic and Geopolitical Implications
6.1. Impact on EU-Iran Relations
Listing the IRGC as a terrorist organization would likely precipitate a full-scale diplomatic rupture between the EU and Iran. Tehran could respond by:
Expelling EU diplomats.
Halting cooperation on nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Increasing support for anti-Western militias in the Middle East.
Targeting European interests through cyberattacks or proxy actions.
Such a scenario could further isolate Iran but risks accelerating its nuclear advances in the absence of dialogue.
6.2. Transatlantic Alignment
The U.S. has long urged its European allies to follow its lead in designating the IRGC. Washington argues that the EU’s reluctance has created a regulatory gap exploited by the IRGC for fundraising, procurement, and intelligence operations on European soil. Italy’s move may signal a broader convergence of EU and U.S. policy, especially under a Biden administration that emphasizes human rights and alliance coordination.
However, European officials remain wary of becoming overly reliant on U.S. foreign policy agendas, particularly in the Middle East.
6.3. Human Rights vs. Realpolitik
The debate embodies a classic tension in international relations: the conflict between normative imperatives (condemning human rights abuses) and realpolitik considerations (preserving diplomatic leverage). Proponents of listing argue that the EU must uphold its human rights principles unequivocally. Opponents caution that sanctions may harden Iranian intransigence without improving the human rights situation on the ground.
- Conclusion
Italy’s call for the EU to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization represents a watershed moment in European foreign policy toward Iran. Driven by the alleged atrocities committed during the January 2026 protests, Rome’s shift reflects growing frustration with Iran’s domestic repression and regional aggression. However, the path to consensus remains fraught with legal, political, and strategic challenges.
While the IRGC’s activities—particularly its support for armed groups and suppression of dissent—undoubtedly raise serious concerns, the EU’s decision will ultimately hinge on whether member states prioritize moral accountability over pragmatic diplomacy. The outcome of the upcoming Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Brussels will reveal much about the EU’s capacity to act decisively in defense of human rights, even at the risk of broader geopolitical instability.
As the debate unfolds, Italy’s leadership on this issue may herald a new phase of EU assertiveness in confronting state-sponsored repression. Yet, without unified support, especially from key players like France and Germany, the proposal risks remaining symbolic rather than transformative.
References
Amnesty International. (2026). Iran: Brutal Crackdown on January 2026 Protests. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org
Council of the European Union. (2023). Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism.
European Commission. (2022). Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism.
Foreign Ministry of Italy. (2026). Statement by Minister Antonio Tajani on Iran. January 26, 2026.
HRANA – Human Rights Activists in Iran. (2026). Casualty Report: January Uprising. January 25, 2026.
Reuters. (2026). Italy pushes for EU clampdown on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard over ‘heinous acts’. January 26, 2026.
U.S. Department of State. (2019). Designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. April 8, 2019.
Zurcher, C. (2023). The IRGC: Elite Power in the Islamic Republic. Cambridge University Press.
EU Diplomatic Sources. (2026). Private Briefings on EU Foreign Ministers Meeting. Brussels, January 15, 2026.