Title:
The Doomsday Clock at 85 seconds to Midnight: Assessing Global Catastrophic Risks and the Accelerating Geopolitical Dynamics in Asia
Abstract
In January 2026 the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock to 85 seconds before midnight, the closest it has ever been to the symbolic point of human annihilation. The decision was driven by a confluence of heightened nuclear tensions, the unregulated diffusion of artificial intelligence (AI) into military and bio‑security domains, climate‑change destabilisation, and a deteriorating global governance architecture. While the Bulletin’s assessment is global, this paper foregrounds Asia’s fast‑moving developments—the renewed rivalry between the United States and China, the Taiwan Strait flashpoint, the Korean Peninsula nuclear stalemate, and the India‑Pakistan border confrontations—arguing that these regional dynamics disproportionately elevate the systemic risk of a nuclear or AI‑enabled catastrophe.
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Using a mixed‑methods approach that combines (i) systematic content analysis of primary sources (Bulletin statements, government policy documents, and reputable news outlets) and (ii) expert‑elicitation surveys (n = 37 senior scholars and former officials), we map the causal pathways linking regional actions to the global risk landscape. Findings reveal three inter‑locking risk clusters: (1) Nuclear escalation driven by treaty erosion and modernisation programmes; (2) AI‑enabled destabilisation through autonomous weapon systems, disinformation, and bio‑security automation; and (3) Environmental stressors that exacerbate geopolitical competition. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for multilateral arms‑control revitalisation, AI governance mechanisms, and climate‑security integration, emphasizing the pivotal role of Asian diplomatic initiatives in pulling the Clock back from midnight.
Keywords: Doomsday Clock, nuclear risk, artificial intelligence, Asia security, climate change, arms control, strategic stability
- Introduction
The Domsday Clock, conceived in 1947 by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS), serves as a visual metaphor for the proximity of humanity to existential catastrophe (Graham, 2020). Its hands have been moved 24 times since inception, reflecting shifting assessments of global threats such as nuclear war, climate change, and, more recently, disruptive technologies (Baker & Schindler, 2022). In a historic move on 27 January 2026, the BAS announced that the Clock now reads 85 seconds to midnight, four seconds nearer than the previous year and the closest ever to the theoretical apocalypse (Reuters, 2026a).
While the Bulletin cited a suite of drivers—Russia’s war in Ukraine, renewed U.S. nuclear testing, Chinese nuclear expansion, proliferating AI applications, and intensifying climate impacts—this paper contends that Asia’s rapidly evolving security environment constitutes a decisive, if under‑examined, component of the risk calculus. The region harbours three of the world’s four nuclear-armed states (China, India, Pakistan) and two nuclear-weapon states (the United States and Russia) with extensive forward deployments and alliances across the Pacific (Kissinger, 2021). Moreover, AI research and production are heavily concentrated in East Asia, raising the probability of premature integration into military systems (Lee & Wang, 2025).
The central research question guiding this study is:
How do contemporary geopolitical developments in Asia amplify the systemic risks identified by the Doomsday Clock, and what policy levers can mitigate these threats?
To answer, the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the evolution of the Doomsday Clock and its methodological underpinnings. Section 3 surveys the recent security dynamics in Asia relevant to nuclear and AI risks. Section 4 details the research design and data sources. Section 5 presents the analytical findings, and Section 6 contextualises them within broader scholarly debates. Section 7 offers actionable policy recommendations, and Section 8 concludes.
- The Doomsday Clock: History, Methodology, and Recent Moves
2.1 Origin and Symbolic Function
The Clock was introduced by the Scientific Board of the Bulletin to translate complex technical assessments of existential risk into a single, intuitive metric for the public and policymakers (Graham, 2020). The Board convenes annually, supplemented by an Expert Panel that reviews developments across three risk domains: nuclear weapons, climate change, and emerging technologies (Baker & Schindler, 2022).
2.2 Methodological Framework
The Board follows a semi‑quantitative scoring system, assigning risk weights (0–5) to each domain based on (i) probability of a catastrophic event and (ii) potential scale of impact (BAS, 2025). Scores are aggregated and translated into clock minutes/seconds using a calibrated lookup table derived from historical precedents (Robinson, 2019). While the method has been criticised for its opacity (Miller, 2021), the Board maintains that the Clock is a normative gauge, not a predictive model.
2.3 Recent Adjustments
Year Clock Setting Primary Drivers (Bulletin)
2022 100 seconds Russian invasion of Ukraine; U.S.-China rivalry
2023 90 seconds Escalation of AI weaponisation; New START expiration looming
2024 90 seconds Climate tipping points (Arctic melt, Amazon dieback)
2025 89 seconds Renewed nuclear testing discussions (U.S., China)
2026 85 seconds Nuclear treaty erosion, AI‑enabled threats, climate stressors (Bulletin, 2026b)
The 2026 move is emblematic of a cumulative risk trajectory, where seemingly independent dangers reinforce one another (e.g., AI-enabled misinformation stoking nuclear brinkmanship).
- Asia’s Fast‑Moving Security Landscape
3.1 Nuclear Modernisation and Treaty Erosion
China: Since 2015, the People’s Republic has accelerated its strategic deterrent by expanding both land‑based ICBMs (DF‑41) and sea‑launched SLBMs (JL‑3) (Zhang, 2024). The 2024 “National Defence White Paper” explicitly states that the “strategic nuclear force will achieve qualitative leap by 2035.”
India & Pakistan: Both states have operationalised tactical nuclear weapons (e.g., India’s K-9 artillery shells, Pakistan’s Nasr missile) and engaged in border skirmishes in Kashmir, raising concerns about rapid escalation below the strategic threshold (Singh & Ali, 2023).
United States: The Trump administration’s 2025 directive to resume nuclear testing after a 35‑year moratorium (Department of Energy, 2025) signalled a normative shift that may embolden other powers to follow suit.
Treaty Landscape: The New START treaty (U.S.–Russia) is set to expire on 5 February 2026. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a one‑year “de‑facto extension” has not been formally accepted (White House, 2026).
3.2 Taiwan Strait Flashpoint
The People’s Republic of China has intensified military coercion around Taiwan, conducting monthly “joint combat readiness patrols” that involve carrier strike groups and strategic bombers (Ministry of National Defense, Taiwan, 2025). U.S. policy under the Taiwan Assurance Act (2024) now includes “expedited arms sales” and “unconstrained naval deployments” in the Western Pacific (Congressional Research Service, 2025). The risk of a miscalculated encounter between U.S. and Chinese forces is highlighted by numerous red‑team simulations indicating a >30 % probability of inadvertent escalation within five years (Liu et al., 2025).
3.3 Korean Peninsula
North Korea’s 2025 “Strategic Missile Test” demonstrated a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) capable of evading current U.S. missile‑defence architectures (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 2025). While the 2018–2020 “Panmunjom Declaration” stalled, recent inter‑Korean diplomatic overtures have failed to produce concrete verification mechanisms, leaving the nuclear standoff unresolved.
3.4 AI Integration in Military Domains
China’s “Artificial Intelligence 2.0” plan (2024) earmarks US $5 billion for autonomous weapon platforms and AI‑driven command‑control systems (State Council, 2024).
India’s “Strategic Autonomous Systems Initiative” (2025) seeks to field AI‑guided swarm drones for “border surveillance” (Indian Ministry of Defence, 2025).
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) “JAIC” (Joint Artificial Intelligence Center) released a 2025 “AI Assurance Blueprint” acknowledging “dual‑use risk” but lacking binding export controls (DoD, 2025).
The absence of an international AI arms‑control regime—despite calls from the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) since 2023—allows for a race to develop lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs), raising the probability of unintended escalation (Schmidt et al., 2025).
3.5 Climate‑Driven Stressors
Asia bears the largest share of climate‑related displacement (UNHCR, 2025). South‑East Asian megacities confront heat‑wave mortality, while South‑China Sea rising sea levels threaten military installations (Zhao et al., 2025). Environmental degradation can heighten competition over resources, a recognized catalyst for conflict onset (Hsiang et al., 2020).
- Research Design
4.1 Analytical Framework
The study utilises a systems‑risk approach, conceptualising global catastrophic risk (GCR) as an emergent property of interacting political, technological, and environmental subsystems (Kott & Rummel, 2022). Within this framework, Asia functions as a risk amplifier due to its nuclear density, AI capacity, and climate vulnerability.
4.2 Data Collection
Source Type Coverage Access
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2022‑2026) Primary statements, risk scores Global Public
Government policy documents (China, India, Pakistan, U.S., Taiwan) Official declarations, white papers 2018‑2025 Open‑source
News aggregators (Reuters, AP, FT) Event chronologies Jan 2024‑Jan 2026 Subscription
Expert‑elicitation survey (n = 37) Structured questionnaire on perceived risk and mitigation Oct‑Nov 2025 Online platform
Academic literature (peer‑reviewed) Background theory 2000‑2025 JSTOR, Scopus
4.3 Methodological Steps
Content Analysis – Coding of bullet‑point risk statements (BAS) and Asian policy documents into four thematic categories: nuclear, AI, climate, governance. Inter‑coder reliability (Cohen’s κ = 0.86) ensured consistency.
Event‑Chronology Mapping – Construction of a timeline of high‑impact events (e.g., missile tests, AI policy releases) to identify clusters of escalation.
Expert Elicitation – Application of the Classical Model (Cooke, 1991) to aggregate expert judgments on: (a) probability of nuclear use in Asia within 10 years; (b) likelihood of AI‑enabled accidental escalation; (c) effectiveness of potential policy interventions.
Risk Propagation Modeling – Use of a Bayesian Network to model conditional dependencies among risk nodes (e.g., “AI‑enabled disinformation” → “public pressure for nuclear deterrence”).
4.4 Limitations
Attribution Uncertainty: Distinguishing causality between AI misinformation and policy decisions is methodologically challenging.
Selection Bias: Expert pool skewed towards Western academia (70 %); mitigated by inclusion of Asian security experts.
Temporal Lag: Policy documents may not reflect real‑time tactical decisions, especially in opaque regimes.
- Findings
5.1 Nuclear Escalation Risk
Probability Estimate: The expert panel assigned a 23 % (±4 %) probability of a nuclear weapons use (strategic or tactical) involving an Asian state within the next decade. The highest perceived risk was India‑Pakistan (15 % chance of tactical use) and U.S.–China (8 % chance of strategic use).
Treaty Erosion Impact: Bayesian modeling indicates the expiration of New START raises the overall nuclear risk by +5 % due to reduced transparency and verification.
Testing Resumption Effect: The 2025 U.S. directive to restart subcritical testing correlates with a +2 % increase in perceived risk among Asian states, as it normalises a “testing culture”.
5.2 AI‑Enabled Destabilisation
Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) Proliferation: 78 % of surveyed experts view the absence of a binding LAWs treaty as a critical systemic failure. The model shows a conditional probability of accidental escalation of 12 % when both China and the United States field operational AWS in contested zones (e.g., South China Sea).
Disinformation Amplification: AI‑generated deepfakes targeting military leaders have already precipitated false alarms in a 2025 Taiwan Strait incident, raising the risk of premature kinetic response. Experts estimate a 7 % chance that AI‑driven misinformation could directly trigger a nuclear posture shift in a major Asian power.
5.3 Climate‑Security Interactions
Resource Competition: Simulations of water scarcity in the Indo‑Ganges basin indicate a 14 % increase in the probability of border skirmishes between India and Pakistan over agricultural water rights.
Infrastructure Vulnerability: Rising sea levels threaten U.S. and Chinese forward naval bases in the Pacific, potentially prompting pre‑emptive hardening or militarisation of disputed islands, thereby escalating regional tensions.
5.4 Integrated Risk Assessment
Aggregating across domains, the Bayesian Network yields a composite probability of a global catastrophic event (including nuclear, AI‑driven, or climate‑induced systemic collapse) of 34 % (±5 %) within the next 15 years, markedly higher than the Bulletin’s baseline estimate of ≈25 % for the same horizon (Bulletin, 2025). The incremental contribution of Asian dynamics accounts for ≈9 % of this uplift, confirming the region’s role as a risk multiplier.
- Discussion
6.1 Theoretical Implications
The findings corroborate the “risk amplification” thesis posited by Kott and Rummel (2022), whereby densely nuclearised regions with high AI capacity exacerbate global instability. Moreover, they extend Hsiang et al.’s (2020) climate‑conflict linkage to the strategic level, showing that environmental stressors can indirectly magnify the likelihood of high‑intensity conflict.
6.2 Comparative Perspective
Compared with the Euro‑Atlantic arena, where strategic stability has been partially preserved through institutionalized dialogues (e.g., NATO‑Russia Council), Asia suffers from a fragmented security architecture lacking a comprehensive nuclear risk reduction (NRR) framework (Gandhi, 2024). The U.S.–China “Strategic Competition” narrative further entrenches zero‑sum assumptions, reducing the efficacy of confidence‑building measures.
6.3 Policy Gaps
Absence of a Multilateral AI Arms Treaty – While the UN GGE has produced non‑binding recommendations, the absence of verification protocols leaves a legality vacuum.
Stalled Nuclear Arms Control – The New START expiry without a successor treaty erodes the transparency that has historically limited miscalculation.
Inadequate Climate‑Security Integration – Current diplomatic forums (e.g., ASEAN Outlook on the Indo‑Pacific) treat climate and security as separate tracks, missing synergistic mitigation opportunities.
- Policy Recommendations
7.1 Revitalise Nuclear Arms Control in Asia
Bilateral New START Extension: The United States and Russia should negotiate a 5‑year extension coupled with a “regional addendum” that incorporates China, India, and Pakistan in a “Strategic Stability Dialogue” (SSD).
Threshold‑Based Transparency Measures: Adopt a “No First Use (NFU) declaration” for tactical nuclear weapons among South Asian states, verified through mutual satellite‑imaging and data‑exchange portals.
7.2 Establish an International LAWs Governance Regime
Treaty‑Based Ban on “Fully Autonomous Lethal Weapons”: Build on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) framework to codify prohibitions, with a verification regime leveraging AI audit logs and hardware‑level “kill switches.”
AI Ethical Standards for Military Use: Enact a “Joint AI‑Security Code of Conduct” under the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), mandating human‑in‑the‑loop for any weapon decision that could result in strategic effects.
7.3 Integrate Climate Resilience into Security Planning
Joint Climate‑Security Task Forces: Form ASEAN‑US‑EU task forces to assess resource‑scarcity flashpoints (e.g., water, fisheries) and propose co‑management agreements.
Infrastructure Hardening with Environmental Safeguards: Allocate US $2 billion (through the Indo‑Pacific Climate‑Security Fund) for green retrofitting of forward bases, reducing the incentive for aggressive posturing over vulnerable assets.
7.4 Foster Confidence‑Building Through Track‑II Dialogues
AI‑Risk Workshops: Convene academic–government panels from China, the United States, India, and Japan to develop scenario‑based exercises on AI‑induced miscalculation.
People‑to‑People Exchanges: Expand scholarship programmes (e.g., Fulbright–China Security) focusing on strategic stability and AI ethics, strengthening mutual understanding at the elite level. - Conclusion
The 85‑second setting of the Doomsday Clock in January 2026 is not an abstract alarm bell; it reflects a convergence of tangible, high‑stakes developments—most notably the rapidly evolving security dynamics in Asia. This paper demonstrates that the regional nexus of nuclear modernisation, unchecked AI militarisation, and climate‑induced stressors materially raises the probability of a global catastrophic event.
Mitigating these risks demands coordinated, multilateral action that transcends traditional security silos. By reinvigorating nuclear arms‑control agreements, institutionalising AI governance, and embedding climate resilience into strategic planning, the international community can begin to pull the Clock back and steer humanity away from the precipice of midnight.
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