The Hong Kong Case: Paradigm of Escalating Restrictions
The Miles Kwan case exemplifies several concerning patterns in Hong Kong’s post-2020 governance structure that merit careful scholarly examination.
1. Expansion of “Sedition” Beyond Historical Precedent
Hong Kong’s national security legislation includes both the 2020 National Security Law (NSL) imposed by Beijing and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO) passed locally, which replaced colonial-era sedition provisions with harsher penalties of up to seven years imprisonment Wikipedia. What distinguishes contemporary application is the targeting of civic accountability demands following public disasters.
Since March 2024, sixteen people have been arrested for sedition under Article 23, with arrests encompassing social media posts, commemorations of Tiananmen, and minor protest acts Al Jazeera. The arrest of Kwan for distributing flyers demanding government accountability after a fire that killed 168 people represents a fundamental shift: sedition charges are now deployed against calls for transparency in public safety disasters, not merely political opposition.
2. Institutional Complicity and the Erosion of University Autonomy
The Chinese University of Hong Kong’s disciplinary action against Kwan raises critical questions about institutional independence. The university expelled him not directly for the sedition arrest, but for calling the disciplinary committee a “kangaroo panel” and for previous activism. This pattern reflects what scholars describe as anticipatory compliance—institutions acting punitively without explicit government directive to demonstrate political alignment.
The case mirrors broader patterns where five individuals received 19-month prison sentences for publishing children’s books depicting 2019 protests, and activist Tam Tak-chi received 40 months for “uttering seditious words” International Fire & Safety Journal. Universities have become enforcement mechanisms rather than spaces of critical inquiry.
3. Chilling Effects on Civil Society
Between June 2020 and December 2023, 286 individuals were arrested under NSL and sedition laws, targeting everyone from legislative opposition members to authors of children’s books and ordinary social media commenters CNBC. Courts convicted activist Chow Kim-ho to one year imprisonment in April 2025 for social media comments under sedition charges, and in 2023 convicted Mika Yuen for Facebook posts made while she was in Japan Human Rights Watch.
The transnational application is particularly troubling. The NSL applies to people outside Hong Kong, enabling charges against individuals for conduct occurring abroad, and authorities have detained family members of exiled activists Wikipedia. This extraterritorial reach fundamentally undermines the concept of civil liberties as geographically bounded rights.
Singapore Context: Parallels and Divergences
Singapore’s regulatory framework presents both similarities and important distinctions from Hong Kong’s trajectory.
1. Legal Architecture of Control
Singapore repealed its Sedition Act in November 2022, but simultaneously amended the Criminal Procedure Code to make deliberate wounding of religious or racial feelings and promotion of disharmony arrestable offences GOV.UK. This represents not liberalization but recalibration—shifting from colonial-era legislation to contemporary regulatory mechanisms.
The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) and Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) constitute Singapore’s primary information control architecture. POFMA grants any government minister power to order correction notices without court approval, requiring compliance before appeals can be filed The Singapore LGBT encyclopaedia Wiki. FICA allows designation of individuals as “politically significant persons” requiring regular reporting on foreign affiliations, with appeals only to political appointees and judicial review limited to procedural matters The Singapore LGBT encyclopaedia Wiki.
2. Academic Freedom and Self-Censorship
Self-censorship on Singapore-related topics is common among academics, who face legal and career consequences for critical speech ResearchGate. However, the mechanisms differ from Hong Kong’s direct criminalization.
Research by Academia.sg found that external political signals from the state are internalized by university administrators, who then impose restrictions without receiving explicit instructions, with evidence that ethical review procedures have been extended to vet politically sensitive research Wikipedia. FICA’s definition of “public interest” includes preventing diminution of public confidence in government performance, potentially covering any effective criticism regardless of merit Nus.
A revealing incident involved NUS President Tan Eng Chye’s September 2020 message to all faculty stating that academic freedom exists “as long as this is carried out in a professional, responsible and accountable manner, without contravening the laws of Singapore,” following a POFMA order against an NUS professor’s article on government corruption scandals MARUAH Singapore. The conditional framing of academic freedom—freedom “as long as”—illustrates how legal constraints create atmospheric pressure for self-censorship.
3. Enforcement Patterns and Scope
Since October 2019, 163 POFMA orders have been issued, with over a quarter related to COVID-19 pandemic information Singapore Statutes Online. Recent targets include the Transformative Justice Collective opposing death penalty, which had its website designated a “Declared Online Location” in December 2024, barring financial benefits and ultimately forcing suspension of operations in January 2025 Singapore Statutes Online.
Both POFMA and FICA enable government demonetization of websites, with 13 sites designated as “declared online locations” by end of coverage period, prohibited from accepting donations or advertising revenue The Singapore LGBT encyclopaedia Wiki. This financial strangulation represents indirect censorship—technically allowing speech while eliminating economic sustainability.
Comparative Analysis: Degrees of Restriction
Hong Kong employs direct criminalization with severe penalties (life imprisonment maximum under NSL), coupled with institutional transformation eliminating opposition political structures. The approach is maximalist: comprehensive dismantling of civil society infrastructure through arrests, prosecutions, organizational closures, and judicial system reorganization.
Singapore relies on administrative mechanisms, financial pressures, and institutionalized self-censorship. The approach is calibrated: maintaining appearance of openness while creating regulatory and economic constraints that achieve similar restrictive outcomes without mass imprisonment. Singapore is classified as “partly free” by Freedom House, contrasting with Hong Kong’s steeper democratic decline ResearchGate.
The critical distinction lies in intensity rather than fundamental nature. Both systems prioritize political stability and government authority over robust civil liberties, but Hong Kong’s post-2020 framework represents authoritarian consolidation while Singapore maintains a more technocratic authoritarian equilibrium.
Analytical Framework: The “Public Interest” Paradox
Both jurisdictions invoke “public interest” to justify restrictions, yet this framing contains an inherent contradiction. In the Wang Fuk Court fire case, Kwan’s petition called for investigation into government accountability for a disaster that killed 168 people—precisely the kind of civic engagement that serves genuine public interest in safety, transparency, and corruption prevention.
When governments criminalize demands for accountability following public disasters, they reveal that “public interest” in practice means “state interest” or “government reputation protection.” This semantic slippage is characteristic of what political scientists term “authoritarian legalism”—using law as instrument of political control while maintaining formal legal structures.
Implications for Democratic Governance
These cases illuminate several concerning trajectories:
Normalization of exceptional powers: What begins as emergency or security legislation becomes routine governance tools. Sedition provisions originally targeting violent overthrow now criminalize memorial events and accountability petitions.
Institutional capture: Universities, courts, and civil society organizations become compliance mechanisms rather than independent voices. The transformation occurs through combination of legal pressure, economic incentives, and career consequences.
Transnational reach: Both jurisdictions assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, undermining traditional concepts of territorial sovereignty and creating chilling effects on diaspora communities.
Economic weaponization: Beyond criminal penalties, financial strangulation through demonetization, donation prohibitions, and advertising restrictions creates unsustainable conditions for critical voices.
The Miles Kwan case thus represents not an isolated incident but a paradigmatic example of how post-2020 Hong Kong has fundamentally restructured the relationship between state and civil society, with Singapore offering a comparator model of how similar restrictions operate through different mechanisms. Both contexts demonstrate that the question is not whether governments will restrict civic space in the name of stability, but through what means and to what degree.