Geopolitical Architecture, Implementation Challenges, and Singapore’s Strategic Position
Date February 22, 2026
Event Inaugural Board of Peace Summit, Washington D.C. (19 February 2026)
Reconstruction Target $70 billion (UN/EU/World Bank estimate)
Pledges to Date $7 billion (9 member nations) + $10 billion (United States)
Singapore Status Invited; non-member; named as participant in Japan-hosted fundraiser
- Background and Context
1.1 Origins of the Board of Peace
The Board of Peace (BoP) was formally established on the sidelines of the 56th World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026, following a proposal by U.S. President Donald Trump in September 2025. Its creation was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (November 2025), which authorised deployment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to Gaza and welcomed the BoP as an oversight body for post-conflict reconstruction.
The BoP represents a structural departure from post-World War II multilateral architecture. Unlike the United Nations, which operates on member-state consensus, the BoP concentrates governance authority in its chairman, Donald Trump, who holds the title for life per the board’s charter. Permanent membership is priced at $1 billion per country, payable within the first year; otherwise, nations serve renewable three-year terms.
The board’s Executive Board includes Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Jared Kushner, and World Bank President Ajay Banga, among others. On the operational side, Israeli billionaire Yakir Gabay and Apollo Global Management CEO Marc Rowan oversee reconstruction contracting and capital mobilisation.
1.2 The Gaza Reconstruction Imperative
The Gaza conflict, which began following the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023, ended under a ceasefire framework in October 2025. Over two years of fighting left more than 72,000 Palestinians dead and the territory in a state of near-total physical destruction. A joint UN, EU, and World Bank assessment estimated reconstruction costs at approximately $70 billion, encompassing the removal of 70 million tons of rubble, hundreds of kilometres of Hamas tunnel infrastructure, and the rebuilding of housing, hospitals, schools, and civil institutions for approximately 2.3 million people.
The phased reconstruction plan, as presented at the February 19 summit, centres initially on Rafah in southern Gaza. Phase 1 targets 100,000 homes for 500,000 residents and $5 billion in transportation, water, and energy infrastructure. The long-term vision calls for 400,000 homes and more than $30 billion in infrastructure, with Gaza projected to be self-governed and regionally integrated by Year 10.
- The February 19 Summit: Key Outcomes
2.1 Financial Pledges
At the inaugural summit, nine BoP member nations pledged a combined $7 billion toward Gaza reconstruction: Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Kuwait. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait each committed $1 billion. A full country-by-country breakdown was not immediately published. Azerbaijan’s participation in the $7 billion figure was subsequently disputed by a senior Azerbaijani presidential aide, introducing early questions about the reliability of the announced totals.
President Trump separately announced a U.S. commitment of $10 billion to the Board of Peace itself, without specifying the funding source or allocation mechanism. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs agreed to raise an additional $2 billion, and FIFA committed $75 million for sports-related infrastructure in Gaza. Japan agreed to host a regional fundraising event, with Trump naming South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, China, and Russia as expected participants.
Against the $70 billion reconstruction estimate, the $17 billion currently on the table represents roughly 24% of what analysts consider necessary. Chatham House scholar Julie Norman characterised the pledges as representing only a “small fraction” of required funding.
2.2 Security Architecture
The ISF, commanded by U.S. Major General Jasper Jeffers, is designed to reach 20,000 troops and 12,000 police. As of the summit, Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Morocco had pledged soldiers, while Egypt and Jordan committed to police training. Indonesia, notably, offered up to 8,000 troops and will hold the deputy commander position. The force will begin operations in Rafah and expand sector-by-sector across Gaza.
A U.S. military team is already on the ground preparing infrastructure for ISF headquarters. Contracting records reviewed by the Guardian indicate plans for a 5,000-person military base to serve as the operational site.
2.3 Governance Structure
The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), led by Palestinian technocrat Dr. Ali Sha’ath, is tasked with restoring public services and governance capacity. The NCAG is currently based in Egypt and has not yet entered Gaza. The BoP’s High Representative for Gaza, former UN official Nikolay Mladenov, serves as the liaison between the board and the NCAG. Critically, no Palestinian factions, including Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, hold representation on either the BoP Executive Board or the Gaza Executive Board. Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem characterised the BoP as constituting “international guardianship.”
- Structural Analysis and Critical Evaluation
3.1 Governance Legitimacy Deficit
The most substantial structural vulnerability of the Board of Peace lies in its governance architecture. The charter concentrates decision-making authority, membership control, funding oversight, and veto power in a single individual. No independent oversight mechanism exists; the World Bank functions as a “limited trustee” rather than an independent auditor. The occupied party, Palestine, holds no seat, while the occupying power, Israel, joined the board in early February 2026. This asymmetry has attracted criticism from the Vatican (Cardinal Pizzaballa characterised the BoP as a “colonialist operation”), Spain, most of Western Europe, and several civil society analysts.
European hesitation reflects both institutional and constitutional concerns. Italy, for instance, signalled that elements of the BoP charter are “incompatible” with its constitution. The EU, UK, Germany, France, Norway, and Switzerland sent observers to the summit without committing to membership, a hedge reflecting the tension between maintaining U.S. alignment and preserving multilateral norms.
3.2 The Funding Gap Problem
The $17 billion currently mobilised represents approximately 24% of the estimated $70 billion required. This ratio is compounded by several factors: the Azerbaijan dispute over its inclusion in the donor list raises questions about whether even the announced $7 billion figure is firm; the U.S. $10 billion pledge lacks congressional authorisation and specified allocation; and the World Bank’s role is limited to fund management rather than independent procurement oversight. Historical precedent from post-conflict reconstruction efforts, including Iraq and Libya, suggests that pledged funds frequently fail to materialise in full, are delayed, or are captured by contracting inefficiencies.
The concentration of reconstruction contracting authority in the hands of private equity executives and real estate developers, without transparent tendering processes or parliamentary oversight, introduces further fiduciary risk. The overlap between board members’ commercial interests and the reconstruction mandate they administer has drawn academic and journalistic scrutiny.
3.3 The UN Displacement Question
Trump’s statement that the BoP would “look over the United Nations and make sure it runs properly” represents a significant escalation in the administration’s posture toward multilateral institutions. Former NATO Ambassador Ivo Daalder described the BoP as a potential rival architecture, noting that the United States, as the UN’s largest contributor, establishing an alternative body signals a “fundamental reversal of the last 80-some years of global politics.” The BoP’s first meeting displaced a scheduled UN Security Council session on the Gaza ceasefire. These dynamics have geopolitical implications well beyond the Gaza file, particularly for small states whose security and commercial interests have historically been anchored in the rules-based international order.
3.4 Hamas Disarmament as a Structural Blocker
The BoP’s reconstruction mandate is contingent on Hamas disarmament, a position supported by Israel as a precondition for reconstruction to commence. Hamas has offered to “bury” its weapons under a long-term truce but has refused full disarmament absent mutual security guarantees from Israel. Israel has declined any such agreement. This deadlock constitutes a structural blocker: reconstruction funding exists in principle, but on-the-ground implementation cannot begin while the disarmament precondition remains unresolved. Ongoing Israeli military strikes on Gaza, which have killed 611 Palestinians since the ceasefire’s entry into force, further complicate the political sustainability of the peace framework.
- Singapore’s Strategic Position
Singapore occupies a nuanced and strategically exposed position in the BoP landscape. It was among the countries invited to join the board but has not signed the charter. It was absent from the February 19 summit as a formal participant. Yet Trump explicitly named Singapore as an expected participant in Japan’s upcoming BoP fundraising event, placing Singapore in a semi-engaged posture: not a member, not an observer, but not disengaged either.
4.1 The Invitation and Singapore’s Non-Commitment
TIME magazine’s reporting confirmed Singapore among over a dozen countries that received invitations but had not announced membership decisions. The Diplomat’s coverage of the ASEAN dimension noted Singapore’s absence from the Washington summit as a notable omission given its status as “one of the closest American partners in the region.” This absence aligns with Singapore’s consistent foreign policy practice of avoiding entanglement in initiatives that might compromise its neutrality, particularly those with implications for its relationship with the Arab world and its Muslim-majority Malay community.
Elina Noor, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace based in Singapore, offered a pointed assessment: the BoP, despite being framed as a special opportunity for members, is in reality a body that has granted itself authority to rebuild Gaza without accountability for the destruction caused. This perspective captures the reputational and normative risk Singapore faces if it joins a body whose governance model diverges substantially from the multilateral norms Singapore has invested in for decades.
4.2 Economic and Commercial Interests
Singapore’s potential economic exposure to Gaza reconstruction is real, if indirect. Singapore-headquartered construction, engineering, and logistics firms could, in principle, participate in Gaza reconstruction contracts, particularly in port infrastructure, urban planning, and technology-enabled governance systems. Singapore’s sovereign wealth funds, GIC and Temasek, have existing exposure to Middle Eastern investment ecosystems through Gulf state partnerships; a more stable Gaza could, over time, create adjacent investment opportunities.
Singapore is also a significant trade and financial hub for the Gulf states that constitute the BoP’s primary donor bloc. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait together pledged $4 billion or more of the $7 billion announced. Singapore’s deep financial and commercial ties with these states mean that the flow of reconstruction capital will pass through corridors in which Singapore financial institutions are active. The role of the World Bank as fund trustee also creates opportunities for Singapore-linked multilateral finance professionals to participate in project development.
The Japan fundraiser, in which Singapore is named as a participant, represents a lower-commitment engagement point. Singapore’s participation would signal continued willingness to contribute to peace-building efforts without the formal entanglement of BoP membership, preserving optionality while demonstrating alignment with U.S. and Gulf state interests.
4.3 Geopolitical Risk Calculus
Singapore’s foreign policy operates under a set of well-understood constraints: it cannot afford to be seen as a U.S. proxy, cannot alienate major trading partners in the Arab world, and must maintain credibility as a neutral convening ground for international business and diplomacy. The BoP presents a layered risk matrix in this regard.
Membership risk: If Singapore joins the BoP, it risks being associated with a governance architecture criticised for lacking Palestinian representation and concentrated personal authority. This could damage relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Arab world, particularly given the board’s ambiguity on Palestinian statehood.
Non-engagement risk: If Singapore refuses to engage at all, it risks being perceived as unwilling to support a U.S.-led initiative at a moment when the Trump administration has made clear it does not tolerate equivocation. Trump’s comment that “you can’t play cute with me” was directed at hesitant nations broadly.
Current posture: The observer or fundraiser-participant path Singapore appears to be navigating represents the dominant strategy: maintain proximity to the initiative without formal commitment, monitor its institutional evolution, and preserve the ability to escalate or disengage based on outcomes.
This approach mirrors Singapore’s handling of other geopolitically charged multilateral initiatives and is consistent with its historical practice of maximising engagement while minimising formal alignment costs.
4.4 The ASEAN Fracture Line
The BoP has exposed a significant divergence within ASEAN. Indonesia joined and committed 8,000 troops, positioning itself as a middle-power peacekeeper and gaining direct access to the Trump White House in the process. Vietnam and Cambodia attended at leadership level, motivated largely by trade leverage considerations. Malaysia categorically refused, citing its principled opposition to the peace plan’s inadequate guarantees for Palestinians. The Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, stayed away. Singapore’s non-participation at the summit, without a formal refusal, places it in a category closer to Thailand: cautiously hedging.
The fracture has implications for ASEAN’s collective positioning. If the BoP expands its mandate beyond Gaza to other global conflicts, as Trump has signalled is his intent, ASEAN states that have joined will face coordination challenges with those that have not, potentially complicating the bloc’s consensus-based approach to external relations.
4.5 Singapore and the Rules-Based Order
Perhaps the most profound long-term implication for Singapore is the BoP’s relationship to the multilateral rules-based order more broadly. Singapore’s prosperity, security, and diplomatic standing are deeply invested in a world governed by rules, institutions, and norms rather than power alone. The BoP, as structured, represents a test case for whether large-power unilateralism can be institutionalised and normalised.
Singapore has historically been among the most articulate defenders of the rules-based international order precisely because, as a small state, it has the most to lose from a world organised around bilateral power relationships. The BoP’s success or failure will, over the coming years, have significant implications for this normative contest. Singapore’s response to it, whether through quiet participation in fundraising, eventual membership, continued abstention, or vocal institutional critique, will be watched carefully by both the Trump administration and the Global South.
- Key Uncertainties and Scenarios
Several critical uncertainties will determine whether the BoP achieves its Gaza reconstruction mandate and what broader institutional role it ultimately plays.
Hamas disarmament The most immediate blocker. Without resolution of the disarmament deadlock, reconstruction cannot begin regardless of available funding. Netanyahu has explicitly conditioned reconstruction on prior disarmament.
Funding disbursement Whether pledged funds are actually transferred, and on what timeline. Historical reconstruction pledges from multilateral conferences have a poor track record of full, timely disbursement.
Palestinian legitimacy Whether the NCAG gains sufficient credibility with the Palestinian population to function effectively. Its absence from Gaza and exclusion of Hamas and the PA from its formation are significant handicaps.
Ongoing Israeli strikes The fragile ceasefire remains contested, with continuing Israeli military action. A ceasefire collapse would likely suspend the entire reconstruction framework.
European engagement Whether major European economies and the EU eventually join, normalising the BoP within the broader international system, or continue to hold out in defence of UN primacy.
Singapore’s next move Whether Singapore participates meaningfully in the Japan fundraiser, eventually joins as a non-permanent member, or maintains distance as the BoP’s institutional character becomes clearer.
- Conclusions
The Board of Peace represents the most significant attempt to reorganise international conflict-resolution architecture since the founding of the United Nations. Its inaugural summit mobilised substantial diplomatic attention and $17 billion in pledged funding, but the gap between pledges and the $70 billion required, the structural concentration of authority in its charter, and the unresolved Hamas disarmament question leave its implementation prospects genuinely uncertain.
For Singapore, the BoP presents a calibrated challenge. The city-state is named by the Trump administration as a participant in coming fundraising efforts, placing it in a visible semi-engagement posture it cannot easily reverse. Its deep commercial ties with Gulf state donors, its status as a regional financial hub, and its close relationship with the United States create genuine economic incentives to participate. Its commitment to Palestinian rights, Muslim-majority community considerations, multilateral norms, and small-state vulnerability to unilateralism create countervailing pressures against formal membership.
The dominant strategy, for now, appears to be calibrated proximity without commitment: engage in humanitarian fundraising, maintain observer-level awareness of the board’s institutional evolution, and preserve the political space to adjust course as the BoP’s governance record, legitimacy, and operational effectiveness become clearer. This approach is consistent with Singapore’s post-independence foreign policy tradition, and it is likely to be sustained until one of two things happens: either the BoP achieves sufficient international legitimacy to make non-membership costly, or its structural failures become apparent enough to validate continued distance.
The case ultimately illustrates a broader dilemma confronting small states in an era of great-power competition and institutional flux: how to remain relevant, commercially engaged, and diplomatically credible when the rules-based architecture that has underwritten small-state security is itself under contestation.