OPERATION EPIC FURY
February 28, 2026 | Strategic & International Studies Analysis
Executive Summary
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated military campaign designated ‘Operation Epic Fury’ against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The operation — months in planning — targeted senior Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian, as well as military-industrial infrastructure linked to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responded with retaliatory missile and drone strikes targeting Israel and US forward bases and interests across the Gulf region, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar.
This case study examines the strategic context, principal actors, escalation dynamics, economic and energy ramifications, and the potential trajectories of this conflict. It further analyses the specific implications for Singapore — a small open economy with deep trade, energy, and financial linkages to the affected region — and proposes policy recommendations for government and business stakeholders.
1. Strategic Context and Background
1.1 Decades of Accumulated Tension
The US-Iran confrontation predates the current crisis by nearly five decades. Key historical antecedents include the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, during which 52 Americans were held hostage for 444 days; the 1988 US destruction of Iranian oil platforms during Operation Praying Mantis; the designation of the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Trump administration in 2019; and the US targeted killing of IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.
Israel’s strategic calculus has been shaped by Iran’s stated ambition to eliminate the Israeli state, its support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and — most critically — its advancing nuclear enrichment capability. By early 2026, international inspectors reported that Iran had accumulated sufficient fissile material for multiple nuclear devices, though weaponisation remained a contested assessment.
1.2 Proximate Triggers
Three proximate factors catalysed the operation. First, the collapse of a third round of indirect US-Iran nuclear negotiations in February 2026, which failed to bridge differences on uranium enrichment limits, ballistic missile constraints, and sanctions relief sequencing. Second, a 12-day aerial exchange between Israel and Iran in June 2025, which ended inconclusively but established precedent for direct military engagement. Third, US intelligence assessments, reportedly shared with Congress in closed session, suggesting Iran had begun preliminary weaponisation steps.
1.3 Military Build-Up
In the months preceding the operation, the United States significantly reinforced its regional military posture. Two carrier strike groups were deployed to the Arabian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. The US Air Force forward-deployed stealth aircraft and long-range strike assets to Diego Garcia and undisclosed Gulf bases. This posture was publicly framed as coercive diplomacy, consistent with the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ doctrine, but was — as subsequently revealed — also designed to operationally support the planned strike.
2. Operational Overview
2.1 Objectives and Target Set
The primary objectives of Operation Epic Fury, as stated by President Trump and inferred from target patterns, were: decapitation of the Iranian regime’s political and military leadership; degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure; and the creation of conditions conducive to internal regime change. Trump’s public exhortation for Iranian citizens to ‘take over your government’ during the operation made the regime-change objective explicit, marking a significant departure from prior US declaratory policy.
| Target Category | Reported Targets | Strategic Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Leadership | Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Pezeshkian, IRGC senior commanders | Decapitation to cause command paralysis |
| Nuclear Sites | Enrichment facilities, weaponisation research centres | Prevent nuclear breakout |
| Missile Industry | IRGC ballistic missile production and storage sites | Reduce retaliatory capacity |
| Air Defence | S-300 and Bavar-373 radar and launcher sites | Suppress air defences for follow-on strikes |
| IRGC Infrastructure | Command centres, communications nodes | Degrade coordination capability |
2.2 Iranian Retaliation
Iran’s IRGC announced the launch of a first wave of retaliatory missile and drone strikes within hours, targeting Israeli population centres, US Fifth Fleet assets in Bahrain, and Gulf Arab states perceived as complicit in facilitating the operation. Explosions were reported in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain, and near Iran’s Kharg Island — Iran’s primary crude oil export terminal handling approximately 90 per cent of its oil exports. Qatar reported successfully intercepting all missiles targeting its territory. The IRGC stated that retaliation would continue until ‘the enemy is decisively defeated,’ signalling a sustained campaign rather than a proportionate response.
3. Geopolitical Outlook and Escalation Scenarios
3.1 Escalation Ladder
The conflict presents four distinct escalation trajectories, each with materially different consequences for regional and global stability:
Scenario A: Controlled Degradation (Low Probability — 15%)
Iran’s conventional military capacity is sufficiently degraded within 7–14 days to compel a ceasefire brokered by intermediaries (Qatar, Oman, or China). Iranian leadership survives but is weakened. A negotiated framework on the nuclear file is eventually restored under duress. Regional damage is contained, with Gulf Arab states avoiding direct military entanglement.
Scenario B: Prolonged Attrition (Most Likely — 45%)
Neither side achieves its strategic objectives in the initial phase. Iran sustains asymmetric pressure through proxies (Hezbollah, Houthi, Iraqi Shia militias) and continued missile barrages. The US escalates strikes on Iranian economic infrastructure, including Kharg Island. Oil markets experience sustained disruption. The conflict drags on for weeks to months without a decisive military or diplomatic resolution.
Scenario C: Regime Collapse and Internal Fracture (Moderate Probability — 25%)
The targeting of senior leadership and mass civilian unrest — evidenced by citizens rushing to banks and petrol stations on the first day — accelerates the Islamic Republic’s institutional erosion. Fractures emerge within the IRGC and between pragmatist and hardliner factions. A transitional political arrangement emerges, but state collapse generates refugee flows, militia proliferation, and a protracted stabilisation challenge comparable to Iraq post-2003.
Scenario D: Regional Conflagration (Lower Probability — 15%)
Iran employs its full proxy network simultaneously, triggering a multi-front war involving Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi forces in Yemen, and IRGC-aligned militias in Iraq and Syria. Israeli cities face sustained missile barrages. Gulf Arab states face sustained infrastructure attacks. The Strait of Hormuz is threatened or temporarily closed, triggering a global oil price shock of catastrophic proportions.
3.2 Key Geopolitical Actors and Interests
| Actor | Primary Interest | Expected Posture |
|---|---|---|
| United States | Prevent Iranian nuclear capability; regime change | Lead combatant; escalation control paramount |
| Israel | Permanent elimination of Iranian nuclear and missile threat | Active combatant; will resist premature ceasefire |
| Iran | Regime survival; deterrence restoration | Asymmetric retaliation; proxy activation |
| Saudi Arabia | Contain Iranian regional influence; avoid direct conflict | Strategic ambiguity; quiet facilitation of US logistics |
| UAE / Bahrain | Asset protection; Gulf stability | Defensive posture; seeks rapid de-escalation |
| Qatar | Protect LNG exports; preserve mediation role | Active interception; back-channel diplomacy |
| China | Energy security; strategic competition with US | Diplomatic pressure for ceasefire; economic opportunism |
| Russia | Exploit US distraction; test Western resolve | Political support for Iran; weapons supply risk |
| Turkey | NATO obligations vs. regional interests | Calls for restraint; potential humanitarian corridor |
4. Energy and Economic Ramifications
4.1 Oil and Gas Markets
The Strait of Hormuz — the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which approximately 21 million barrels of oil per day transits — represents the single most critical chokepoint in global energy infrastructure. Even a partial disruption to Hormuz transit would immediately affect approximately one-fifth of global oil supply and approximately one-third of global LNG trade. Iran’s reported strikes near Kharg Island, which handles nine-tenths of Iranian crude exports, and explosions in Abu Dhabi and Dubai signal Iran’s demonstrated willingness to escalate to economic targets.
Brent crude prices are expected to spike sharply in the immediate aftermath, with analysts projecting a range of US$110–US$145 per barrel in a Scenario B environment, and potentially exceeding US$160 per barrel if Hormuz is closed for any sustained period. Gulf Arab producers, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, face threats to their own export infrastructure. The IEA Strategic Petroleum Reserve release mechanism will be under pressure for early activation.
4.2 Financial Market Contagion
Global equity markets will reprice risk premiums sharply upward. Defence sector equities and commodities (gold, oil) will surge, while equities in export-dependent and energy-importing economies will face significant downward pressure. Emerging market currencies will weaken against the US dollar as risk aversion rises. Supply chain disruptions for goods transiting the Red Sea and Gulf will add inflationary pressure to already-strained global supply chains. Insurance premiums for maritime transit through the region will increase dramatically, as observed during the 2019 Gulf tanker incidents.
5. Singapore: Specific Impact Assessment
5.1 Energy Security
Singapore imports approximately 90 per cent of its crude oil from the Middle East, with Gulf producers — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait — accounting for the bulk of supply. LNG imports from Qatar (via the Qatar-Singapore LNG relationship under contracts with Pavilion Energy and others) and from other Gulf suppliers are critical to Singapore’s power generation, with natural gas accounting for approximately 95 per cent of electricity production. Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong has already publicly acknowledged the conflict will ‘affect energy prices and impact countries far away like Singapore.’
A sustained conflict scenario would expose Singapore to a double shock: higher input costs for energy-intensive industries (petrochemicals, aviation, maritime) and potential supply disruption requiring emergency LNG procurement at spot premiums. The National Environment Agency and EMA should be expected to activate energy security protocols, and Jurong Island’s refining and petrochemical complex — one of the world’s top 10 integrated chemical clusters — would face margin compression from both elevated feedstock costs and dampened demand.
5.2 Trade and Shipping
Singapore is the world’s second-largest port by transhipment volume and a critical node in global maritime trade. Approximately 40 per cent of global trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, with a significant proportion of that originating from or destined for the Gulf. Disruption to Gulf shipping routes would cascade into Singapore’s bunkering, ship repair, logistics, and maritime services sectors. MPA-registered vessels operating in the Gulf face elevated risk, and maritime insurance costs will rise significantly, affecting operating costs for Singapore-based shipping companies.
5.3 Aviation
Singapore Airlines and Scoot — which together operate significant networks connecting Singapore to the Middle East, Europe, and South Asia via overflight corridors adjacent to the conflict zone — have already suspended six flights. A prolonged conflict requiring rerouting around Iranian airspace (currently among the most widely used corridors connecting Asia and Europe) would add hours and thousands of US dollars in fuel cost per flight, materially affecting airline profitability and affecting Singapore’s status as a global aviation hub.
5.4 Finance and Investment
Singapore’s status as a regional financial centre means it serves as a gateway for Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds (notably Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Kuwait Investment Authority) investing in Asia, and for Asian capital flowing into Gulf infrastructure and real estate. A protracted conflict will disrupt these flows, suppress Gulf SWF appetite for offshore investment, and potentially trigger asset repatriation to fund domestic reconstruction costs. Singapore’s financial sector, which has deepened ties with Gulf partners through the UAE-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, will experience near-term deal pipeline disruption.
5.5 Singaporeans in the Region
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already urged Singaporeans in the Middle East to stay safe and monitor developments. Singapore maintains a consular and diplomatic presence in Israel, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. An estimated several thousand Singapore citizens and permanent residents reside or work across the Gulf region, employed in sectors including oil and gas, banking, construction, and education. Emergency consular capacity may need to be scaled up if evacuation assistance is required.
| Sector | Impact Level | Key Exposure | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|---|
| Energy / Utilities | Critical | Oil & LNG import costs; supply security | Immediate |
| Aviation | High | Route disruption; fuel costs; SIA & Scoot | Immediate–Short term |
| Maritime & Port | High | Shipping volumes; bunkering; insurance | Immediate–Short term |
| Petrochemicals | High | Feedstock costs; Jurong Island margins | Short–Medium term |
| Finance | Moderate–High | Gulf SWF flows; deal pipeline; FX | Short–Medium term |
| Tourism | Moderate | Inbound Middle East tourism; MICE events | Short term |
| Construction | Low–Moderate | Labour from affected countries; materials | Medium term |
6. Proposed Solutions and Policy Recommendations
6.1 For the Singapore Government
Energy Security
- Activate the National Energy Security Framework’s emergency protocols, including strategic petroleum reserve drawdown triggers and emergency LNG spot procurement pre-authorisations.
- Diversify near-term LNG supply contracts toward Australian (Gorgon, APLNG), US (Sabine Pass), and Southeast Asian suppliers to reduce Gulf dependency exposure.
- Issue guidance to Jurong Island operators on contingency planning for feedstock substitution and production scaling.
Diplomatic Posture
- Maintain Singapore’s traditional role as a neutral convenor by refraining from endorsing either the strikes or Iran’s retaliation, consistent with ASEAN’s non-interference norms and Singapore’s policy of principled equidistance.
- Leverage Singapore’s unique credibility — as a close security partner of the US, a member of UN Security Council-related processes, and a trade partner of both Israel and Gulf Arab states — to advocate for early ceasefire negotiations through multilateral channels, including the UN Secretary-General and ASEAN diplomatic networks.
- Coordinate with Qatar and Oman, which maintain active communication channels with Tehran, to support back-channel de-escalation.
Consular and Civil Preparedness
- Scale up MFA consular operations in the UAE, Israel, and Bahrain; establish a 24-hour crisis hotline for Singaporeans in affected zones.
- Coordinate with SIA, Scoot, and Singapore-based charter operators on evacuation capacity contingency planning.
- Issue clear public communication on energy price outlooks and supply security to pre-empt domestic panic purchasing.
6.2 For Singapore Businesses
Risk Management
- Immediately review supply chain exposures for any goods or energy inputs transiting the Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf, or Red Sea corridors; activate dual-sourcing protocols.
- Secure war risk and political risk insurance riders for assets, vessels, and personnel in the region through Lloyd’s syndicates or Singapore’s AXA/MSIG captive market.
- Hedge forward energy price exposure through CME/ICE Brent and JKM LNG swap instruments for Q2–Q3 2026 delivery.
Business Continuity
- Defer non-critical capex decisions and deal closings contingent on Gulf market stability until Scenario B/C trajectory becomes clearer, expected within 2–4 weeks.
- For businesses with Middle East revenues, model cash flow under a 90-day revenue disruption scenario and assess working capital adequacy.
- Engage government relations teams to monitor MAS, EDB, and MTI guidance, which will likely include targeted support measures for affected sectors.
7. Conclusion
Operation Epic Fury marks a watershed moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics, representing the first direct US military intervention against the Iranian state since the 1988 tanker war. Its consequences will be measured not in days but in months and years, reshaping the regional security architecture, the trajectory of nuclear proliferation norms, and the global energy order.
For Singapore, a small open economy profoundly dependent on global trade stability, energy security, and rule-based international order, the conflict presents an acute test of economic resilience and diplomatic dexterity. The city-state’s strategic assets — its geopolitical neutrality, institutional credibility, financial infrastructure, and proven crisis management capacity — position it uniquely to weather the immediate shock and, over time, to play a constructive role in whatever post-conflict reconstruction and diplomatic settlement eventually emerges.
The overriding priority for Singapore’s leadership in the near term must be threefold: to secure its energy supply and insulate its citizens from the worst of the economic fallout; to protect Singaporeans in the region and maintain consular readiness; and to contribute — through quiet, principled diplomacy — to the earliest possible restoration of regional stability.=